Event Notification Report for August 23, 2000

MISSING M43A1 CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTOR

The licensee reported that one M43A1 chemical agent detector, containing 250 µCi of Am-241, had been lost during a training exercise at Camp Shelby, Mississippi. The Alabama National Guard was conducting a class, removed the cell containing the chemical agent detector which apparently was not replaced. This was discovered when the assembly was sent in for the detector to be leak checked. An investigation has looked for the missing detector and is still looking for it.

BOTH RIVER WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS WERE DECLARED INOPERABLE.

At 0230 the River Water Supply (RWS) instrument air system failed resulting in an invalid low RWS pit level alarm. Operators restored system air pressure at 0243. The loss of instrument air pressure also resulted in the loss of automatic traveling screen control and the screen high differential level alarm function. Because both of the automatic traveling screen wash systems were inoperable, both RWS systems were declared inoperable for the 13 minute duration. Failure of both systems resulted in a loss of safety function (supplies water to the Residual Heat Removal Service Water Pumps and the Emergency Service Water System). The licensee entered the applicable Technical Specifications for the loss of the RWS system. A new air dryer was installed recently and when the operator cycled the power supply to the air dryer it hung up. This caused the Instrument Air blockage.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

* * * UPDATE 1102 FROM BRIAN VOSS TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *

The licensee made the following corrections to the event report: (1) the operator cycled the power supply to the compressor after it stopped, not before, as noted above; and (2) there was no instrument air blockage, as stated above. Notified R3DO (Hiland).

* * * RETRACTION 1600 9/19/2000 FROM KARRICK TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *

"The DAEC is retracting event reports 37248 (8/24/00) and 37292 (9/5/00) that involved a loss of the River Water Supply (RWS) System's instrument air. These two 10CFR50.72(b)(2(ii) reports (an event or condition alone that could have prevented safety function fulfillment) were based on the initial determination that both loops of RWS System were inoperable, due, in part, to a Precaution and Limitation (P&L) contained in the system's Operating Instruction (OI-410). The loss of air had impacted a portion of the RWS screen wash support system. The P&L provides guidance on the screen wash subsystem's impact on RWS System operability. Follow-up engineering assessment has concluded that a loss of instrument air, by design, does not prevent the RWS system from fulfilling its intended safety function. The RWS system would have been capable of fulfilling its intended safety function during both events.

"Technical Specification (TS) Bases 3.7.2 defines RWS subsystem operability as having, 'an OPERABLE UHS, one OPERABLE pump, and an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the intake structure and transferring the water to the RHRSW/ESW Stilling Basin in the pump house.' For both of the events, the only question regarding operability was that of the OPERABLE flowpath. The follow-up engineering assessment concluded that the flowpath remained operable. Actual river water flow, as indicated in the control room, was not impacted by the loss of instrument air throughout the (short) duration of these events. Also, there is no question regarding past or historical operability because the cause of the loss of air was related to air system modifications, which were in process at the time or the events.

"Therefore, there was no event or condition alone that could have prevented safety function fulfillment. Once discovered, the appropriate TS action statements were entered. No TS 3.0.3. entry was made (or required to be made). There were no Operations or Conditions Prohibited by TS. No other reporting criteria apply to these events. These events are considered not-reportable under 10CFR50.72 or 10CFR50.73."

Notified R3DO (Burgess).

- MD Department of Environment to be notified of high coliform levels in visitor's center domestic water system -

The licensee plans to notify the Maryland Department of Environment that high coliform levels were discovered in the Calvert Cliffs visitor's center domestic water system. The licensee isolated the system and provided portable water to the visitor's center. The licensee plans to re chlorinate the water system and resample the system prior to restoring it to service.

The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

- PUBLIC NOTIFICATION SIRENS INOP FOR 20 MINUTES DUE TO TRIPPED POWER SUPPLY BREAKER -

At 1604 on 08/23/00, the licensee was notified that the Saint Lucie public notification sirens were inoperable from 1445 to 1505 due to a tripped power supply circuit breaker. The sirens are now fully operable. All other emergency notification system, emergency assessment, and state notification equipment remained operable during this event. The licensee is investigating the cause of the tripped breaker.

The licensee notified local officials and the NRC Resident Inspector.

- ECC SYSTEM MOV MAY NOT CLOSE DURING A LOCA AND A LOOP AS REQUIRED -

While reviewing motor operated valve (MOV) data from December, 1999, plant staff personnel identified an error in the analyzed data for the closing torque for an MOV in the Emergency Closed Cooling (ECC) System that is required to close during a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP).

The valve, #OP42-F0295B, isolates the ECC System from the Nuclear Closed Cooling (NCC) Water System. A second isolation valve, #OP42-F0290, was subsequently found to have insufficient data to ensure that it alone would have provided the required isolation. Failure of both valves to potentially not close completely could cause the ECC System to transfer the system's cooling water inventory via the NCC Water System to the Intermediate Building resulting in the loss of cooling capability of the ECC System. This would result in the loss of cooling capability for the systems required to support the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) 'B' and 'C' Subsystems. The #F0290 valve has been successfully tested to ensure that it has adequate torque to close under accident conditions; however, there is insufficient leakage test data available on this valve at this time. Therefore, assuming that valve #F0290 leaks and valve #F0295B does not fully close, a total loss of inventory would potentially occur for Division 2.

Therefore, this condition is being conservatively reported to the NRC as a loss of safety function during a past outage which removed RHR 'A' from service, until further evaluation is completed.

Valve #OP42-F0295B has been electrically closed under static flow conditions to ensure continued operability of the ECC System.

Licensee planned actions include further evaluation of past test data or performance of a specific leak test on valve #OP42-F0290 and further evaluation of data on valve #OP42-F0295B.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTED AT 1622 EDT ON 9/21/00 BY MICHAEL McFARLAND TO FANGIE JONES * * *

"A 10 CFR 50.72, four (4) hour non-emergency notification was initially made on 8-23-2000, due to Emergency Closed Cooling Loop B inoperability subsequent to valve OP42-F0295B inoperability, due to inadequate closing torque under dynamic flow conditions concurrent with an outage on the alternate, Division 1, equipment. it was indeterminate at that time if sufficient torque existed for the valve to close under accident conditions.

"Subsequent to the event notification, the valve has been tested under dynamic flow and reevaluated. This information has resulted in a determination that the OP42-F0295B valve has been, and continues to be, operable under both normal and accident conditions.

"Since the valve was determined to have been continuously operable, no Technical Specification Required Actions were exceeded and both loops of ECC remained operable. This event was determined not reportable and ENF 37251 is retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R3DO (Bruce Burgess) was notified.

BOTH DIVISIONS OF CORE SPRAY AND HPCI RENDERED INOPERABLE.

During a walkdown of equipment required to be environmentally qualified, plant staff identified electrical circuits which do not conform to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49. These circuits control the minimum flow motor operated valves for both divisions of Core Spray and HPCI (High Pressure Coolant Injection). This condition rendered both divisions of Core Spray and HPCI inoperable. Technical Specification Limiting Condition of Operation for Core Spray and HPCI were entered. This condition therefore constitutes a condition that alone could have prevented Core Spray and HPCI from removing decay heat.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.