Event Notification Report for March 17, 2000

PART 21 REPORT - LOSS OF GASKET SEAL INTEGRITY ON FOXBORO TRANSMITTER DISPLAY COVERS

The Foxboro Company has identified a potential defect with certain Foxboro transmitter display covers manufactured between August 1997 and June 1999. These display covers may not be in compliance with the requirements of leech 1P65 nor NEMA Type-4 Environmental Protection, CENELEC (flameproof), CSA and FM (explosion proof) electrical classification requirements are also affected.

A Foxboro investigation was initiated upon the return of a commercial grade display cover which was reported to have lost seal integrity. This investigation found that an unauthorized manufacturing process change occurred between August 4, 1997 (date code 9732) and March 12, 1999 (date code 9911) which allowed an interrupted seal on some portion of the covers manufactured, compromising the environmental and electrical protection requirements.

Foxboro is taking immediate action to notify all customers who purchased this product from The Foxboro Company during the time period affected and to provide replacement covers.

Indian Point Unit 3 and Cook Units 1 and 2 may be affected by this problem.

Foxboro plans to submit a written report to the NRC on this 10 CFR Part 21 Report.

(Call the NRC operations center for contact information.)

LOSS OF TWO DIVISION 2 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (SWP) PUMPS WHILE ONE DIVISION 1 PUMP WAS OUT OF SERVICE

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"At time 1020 hours on 03-17-00, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 entered Special Operating Procedure (SOP) N2-SOP-11 for loss of service water. Specifically, the Division 2 SWP pumps 2SWP*P1B [and] 2SWP*P1D tripped due to a low flow condition. Operations personnel were restoring the Service Water System (SWP) in accordance with procedure N2-PM-@12, attachment 2, to align Division 1, following the Division 1 AC electrical bus outage. A lead was re-landed in the Division 1 SWP logic. A failed component in this Division 1 SWP logic caused the safety-related to non-safety-related isolation valves to isolate. 2SWP*P1C remained in service when the Division 2 pumps tripped. Subsequently, [the] SWP system was restored to a [one] pump per division line-up. Investigation of the failed Division 1 logic component continues at this time."

The licensee stated that 2SWP*P1D was restored to service within approximately 20 minutes and that no fuel moves (as part of a fuel shuffle) were ongoing at the time of the event.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

DISCOVERY THAT AN M43A1 CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTOR CELL MODULE CONTAINING 250 µCi OF AMERICIUM-241 HAD BEEN MISSING FROM FT. BRAGG (NORTH CAROLINA) SINCE APRIL 1996

Late yesterday afternoon (03/16/00), representatives from Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, requested the U.S. Army in Rock Island, Illinois, to help trace files for documentation regarding a cell module that was discovered to be missing from an M43A1 chemical agent detector. (The cell module contained 250 µCi of americium-241.) The most recent documentation found related to the missing cell module indicated that it was last seen at Ft. Bragg in April of 1996. More recent paperwork has not yet been found. The licensee determined this event to reportable at approximately 1200 CST today (03/17/00).

The licensee hypothesized that the M43A1 chemical agent detector may have been turned into a maintenance unit at some point. If the device tested with bad air flow, the maintenance unit could have replaced several items including the cell module. At this time, it is believed that the cell module in question may have been removed (without any paperwork) and that the device may have been returned without a replacement cell module installed.

The licensee stated that there does not appear to be any likelihood that the general public will get involved with this issue. The licensee plans to submit a 30-day written report to the NRC Region 3 office. (Call the NRC operations officer for licensee contact information.)

* * * UPDATE AT 1420 ON 03/30/00 BY MOHS RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *

The module was found on March 23, 2000. The Operations Center notified the R3DO (Gardner) and R2DO (Caudle) and NMSS (Sherbini).

***** UPDATE AT 1631 ON 04/27/00 FROM JEFF HAVENNER TO LEIGH TROCINE *****

Based on a paper trail, the missing item was located at a Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) facility in Anniston, Alabama. The M43A1 chemical agent detector cell module was non-functional and had been removed during maintenance. It was then turned in through channels and sent to this depot facility.

The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Shear), R2DO (Fredrickson), and NMSS EO (Cool).

AS-FOUND TEST VALUES FOR 8 OF 20 MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES WERE OUT OF TOLERANCE HIGH.

The preliminary results on the analysis of testing of the main steam safety valves indicates that the plant was operating outside the design bases. A hypothetical turbine trip and loss of load accident would have exceeded the design limit for secondary side pressure. The limit for pressure is 1318.5 psig, and preliminary analysis shows a pressure of 1354 psig. The main steam safety valves have since been set to within 1% of the tolerance of the required setpoints for all 20 valves. This action of resetting the valves returned the plant to within the design basis.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1630 ON 4/12/00, BY ROCHA RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *

Following the preliminary analysis, the Nuclear Fuel Management Department performed a detailed evaluation of LOCA Analyses and Non-LOCA and Containment Analyses using the test data from the MSSV testing. The limiting event is the LOL/TT (Loss of Load/ Turbine Trip) event, which is part of the Non-LOCA Analyses. For the LOL/TT event, the detailed evaluation utilized certain cycle specific parameters, uncertainty values and instrument response times in place of the conservative analysis of record assumptions. The results of each of the evaluations indicated the acceptance criteria for each of these events were not exceeded, with a calculated peak secondary side pressure of 1308.2 psia. The pressure limit is 1318.5 psia. Therefore, the plant was not outside of the design basis as a result of the high relief setpoints for the MSSVs.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The operations center notified the R3DO(Hiland).

DISCOVERY OF NON-CONSERVATIVE RODDED RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS IN THE CORE PROTECTION CALCULATORS AND CORE OPERATING LIMIT SUPERVISORY SYSTEM FOR GROUPS 5 AND P

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"On 03/17/00 at approximately 1730 MST, Palo Verde Engineering determined that Non-conservative Rodded Radial Peaking Factors were installed in the Unit 1 Core Protection Calculators (CPC) and Core Operating Limit Supervisory System for Group 5 and Group P. During the course of normal operations, Group 5 could be inserted into the core in order to compensate for Axial Shape Index. With the current values of Rodded Radial Peaking Factors, Group 5 may be outside of its design basis. Control room operators have been briefed on contingency actions to prevent the unit from operating outside the design basis. At this time, only Unit 1 is impacted, and the investigation is continuing."

The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 0009 ON 3/18/00, BY BANKS RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *

"On 3/17/00 at 2122, conservative Rodded Radial Peaking Factors were installed in unit 1, Core Protection Calculators (CPCs) channels A, B, & C and Core Operating Limit Supervisory System for Group 5 and Group P. CPC channel D remains out of service for an unrelated issue, however, before the channel is placed back into service, the new conservative Rodded Radial Peaking Factor will be installed."

The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector of this update. The Operations Center notified the R4DO (Graves).

* * * RETRACTION ON 04/07/00 AT 1627 EDT BY DAN MARKS TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *

On 04/06/00, Palo Verde Engineering personnel completed an analysis of the impact of the non-conservative Rodded Radial Peaking Factors and concluded that sufficient margin existed such that the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System and Core Protection Calculators would have maintained their safety system function and would have tripped/alarmed as required to maintain the plant within its design basis. The evaluation demonstrated that sufficient margin would exit throughout the current operating cycle such that the specified acceptable fuel design limits would not have been violated.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee. R4DO (Jeff Shackelford) notified.