Event Notification Report for August 27, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/26/1999 - 08/27/1999
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36079
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVE WALSH
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVE WALSH
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 08/27/1999
Notification Time: 06:48 [ET]
Event Date: 08/27/1999
Event Time: 06:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/1999
Notification Time: 06:48 [ET]
Event Date: 08/27/1999
Event Time: 06:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN MODES (R1)
KATHLEEN MODES (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM DEGRADATION (ONLY ONE OF FOUR PUMPS OPERABLE)
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"On 08/26/99, Susquehanna Unit 1 and Unit 2 were operating at 100% power with the 'B' loop of emergency service water [(ESW)] out of service for scheduled maintenance. During testing on the ESW system, with all ESW pumps in service, it was identified that the 'C' and 'D' ESW pumps' discharge check valves were closed. The ESW flow surveillance was performed, and the 'C' and 'D' ESW pumps failed to achieve the required flow and were declared inoperable. Concurrently, the 'B' loop of ESW was returned to service. During the time the 'B' ESW loop was inoperable, the 'A' ESW pump was the only one operable ESW pump. This constitutes a serious degradation of the plant in that it is a condition which is outside of design basis and, therefore, reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii) requiring a 1-hour ENS notification."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATE 1453EDT ON 9/3/99 FROM GRANT FERNSLER TO S. SANDIN * * *
"This Notification is a retraction of a previous ENS Notification made 8/27/99 (Event # 36079)."
"Subsequent evaluation by Engineering has concluded that the plant had at least two Emergency Service
Water pumps capable of performing their specified safety function at all times. As such, the plant was not
in a condition outside of its design basis and the report previously made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)
is hereby retracted."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO(Rogge).
* * *UPDATE 0316EDT ON 09/23/99 FROM MIKE PEAL TAKEN BY MACKINNON* * *
The licensee is Retracting the Retraction they called in on 09/03/99 at 1453EDT.
"On 09/22/99 at 2230, an Engineering evaluation concluded that the operability determination associated with the above stated event was not adequate, specifically relating to the potential for pump interaction to create low flow conditions. "
"The Engineering evaluation was being performed in response to an anomaly identified on 09/20/99 during the run of 'D' Diesel Generator. During the preparation of the operability statement for the 09/20/99 anomaly, engineering personnel realized that incorrect assumptions were used in the previous operability statement. The 'C' and 'D' ESW pumps were declared inoperable at 2230 on 09/22/99. Evaluation continues to determine if other combinations of equipment out of service times result in additional reportable conditions." R1DO (Bob Summers) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of the Retraction to the Retraction of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE AT 1325 ON 10/21/99 BY MIKE PEAL TO JOLLIFFE * * *
Based on additional evaluations by Licensee Engineering, Operations and Licensing spanning the time frame of 06/03/99 to 09/28/99, the licensee concluded that the plant had at least one Emergency Service Water Pump per loop capable of performing its specified safety function at all times. As such, the plant was not in a condition outside of its design basis, was not in an unanalyzed condition, and there was no loss of safety function. The report previously made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii) on 09/23/99 is hereby retracted.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
The NRC Operations Officer notified the R1DO Bill Cook.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"On 08/26/99, Susquehanna Unit 1 and Unit 2 were operating at 100% power with the 'B' loop of emergency service water [(ESW)] out of service for scheduled maintenance. During testing on the ESW system, with all ESW pumps in service, it was identified that the 'C' and 'D' ESW pumps' discharge check valves were closed. The ESW flow surveillance was performed, and the 'C' and 'D' ESW pumps failed to achieve the required flow and were declared inoperable. Concurrently, the 'B' loop of ESW was returned to service. During the time the 'B' ESW loop was inoperable, the 'A' ESW pump was the only one operable ESW pump. This constitutes a serious degradation of the plant in that it is a condition which is outside of design basis and, therefore, reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii) requiring a 1-hour ENS notification."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATE 1453EDT ON 9/3/99 FROM GRANT FERNSLER TO S. SANDIN * * *
"This Notification is a retraction of a previous ENS Notification made 8/27/99 (Event # 36079)."
"Subsequent evaluation by Engineering has concluded that the plant had at least two Emergency Service
Water pumps capable of performing their specified safety function at all times. As such, the plant was not
in a condition outside of its design basis and the report previously made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)
is hereby retracted."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO(Rogge).
* * *UPDATE 0316EDT ON 09/23/99 FROM MIKE PEAL TAKEN BY MACKINNON* * *
The licensee is Retracting the Retraction they called in on 09/03/99 at 1453EDT.
"On 09/22/99 at 2230, an Engineering evaluation concluded that the operability determination associated with the above stated event was not adequate, specifically relating to the potential for pump interaction to create low flow conditions. "
"The Engineering evaluation was being performed in response to an anomaly identified on 09/20/99 during the run of 'D' Diesel Generator. During the preparation of the operability statement for the 09/20/99 anomaly, engineering personnel realized that incorrect assumptions were used in the previous operability statement. The 'C' and 'D' ESW pumps were declared inoperable at 2230 on 09/22/99. Evaluation continues to determine if other combinations of equipment out of service times result in additional reportable conditions." R1DO (Bob Summers) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of the Retraction to the Retraction of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE AT 1325 ON 10/21/99 BY MIKE PEAL TO JOLLIFFE * * *
Based on additional evaluations by Licensee Engineering, Operations and Licensing spanning the time frame of 06/03/99 to 09/28/99, the licensee concluded that the plant had at least one Emergency Service Water Pump per loop capable of performing its specified safety function at all times. As such, the plant was not in a condition outside of its design basis, was not in an unanalyzed condition, and there was no loss of safety function. The report previously made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii) on 09/23/99 is hereby retracted.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
The NRC Operations Officer notified the R1DO Bill Cook.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36080
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: MATT POHL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: MATT POHL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 08/27/1999
Notification Time: 14:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/27/1999
Event Time: 12:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/27/1999
Notification Time: 14:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/27/1999
Event Time: 12:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/27/1999
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a)(1)(i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a)(1)(i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
PHIL HARRELL (R4)
JIM LYONS (NRR)
FRANK CONGEL (IRO)
ERIC WEINSTEIN (RCT)
JOE DAVIS (EPA)
PHIL HARRELL (R4)
JIM LYONS (NRR)
FRANK CONGEL (IRO)
ERIC WEINSTEIN (RCT)
JOE DAVIS (EPA)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LICENSEE DECLARED AN UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO AN ON-GOING CHEMICAL RELEASE FROM AN OFFSITE CHEMICAL FACILITY.
"FT. CALHOUN HAS DECLARED A [NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT (NOUE)] PER [EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL)] 11.1 DUE TO AN ON-GOING CHEMICAL RELEASE AT THE CARGILL FACILITY WHICH IS AN OFFSITE PLANT. THE CHEMICAL RELEASE IS A MIXTURE OF SODIUM HYPORCHLORATE AND UREA AMMONIUM NITRATE WHICH WERE INADVERTENTLY COMBINED. SITE PERSONNEL AT FT. CALHOUN ARE NOT AT JEOPARDY AT THIS TIME. HOWEVER, THE POTENTIAL FOR PERSONNEL HAZARD EXISTS IF THE WIND WERE TO CHANGE DIRECTION. CURRENTLY, THERE IS NO IMPACT ON STATION OPERATION."
THE CARGILL CHEMICAL FACILITY NOTIFIED FT. CALHOUN OF THE CHEMICAL RELEASE AT 1210CDT, AND THE LICENSEE DECLARED THE NOUE AT 1235CDT.
THE CARGILL CHEMICAL FACILITY IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 1/2 MILE NORTH OF THE SITE. CURRENT WIND DIRECTION AND SPEED IS SOUTH TO NORTH AT 3 MPH. SEVERAL GASES WERE GENERATED BY AN EXOTHERMIC REACTION INCLUDING CHLORINE. THE QUANTITY OF THE CHEMICAL RELEASE IS UNKNOWN. THE LICENSEE HAS IMPLEMENTED PERIMETER MONITORING WHICH HAS NOT DETECTED ANY ABNORMAL INDICATIONS. LOCAL HAZMAT TEAMS HAVE RESPONDED INCLUDING THE LOCAL FIRE DEPARTMENT. THE LICENSEE IS NOT AWARE OF ANY EVACUATION OR PERIMETERS HAVING BEEN ESTABLISHED.
STATE, LOCAL, AND COUNTY ORGANIZATIONS WERE NOTIFIED. THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS ALSO INFORMED.
AT 1403CDT ON 8/27/99 DURING AN NRC CONFERENCE CALL, THE LICENSEE TERMINATED THE NOUE AFTER RECEIVING NOTIFICATION THAT THE LEAK HAD BEEN TERMINATED.
* * * UPDATE AT 1615EDT ON 8/27/99 BY S.SANDIN * * *
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WAS PROVIDED BY THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (DAVIS) DURING A FOLLOW-UP BRIEFING. APPROXIMATELY 16,000 LBS OF UREA AMMONIUM NITRATE WAS PUMPED FROM A MISIDENTIFIED RAIL CAR INTO A TANK CONTAINING HYDROCHLORIC ACID. THE RESULTING REACTION PRODUCED "AQUA REGIA" WHICH IS A MIXURE OF CORROSIVE AND TOXIC GASES [SEE NORTH AMERICAN EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDE #157]. ACCORDING TO A PLANT ENGINEER AT CARGILL, THE ERROR OCCURRED AT APPROXIMATELY 1000CDT. A PLUME WAS GENERATED BUT HAD MOSTLY DISSIPATED BEFORE CROSSING THE FACILITY BOUNDARY. THE REACTION CONTINUED FOR ABOUT 1 TO 1-1/2 HOURS. FIFTEEN (15) CARGILL EMPLOYEES WERE TAKEN TO LOCAL MEDICAL FACILITIES FOR OBSERVATION ALTHOUGH ONLY THREE (3) WERE ACTUALLY EXPOSED TO THE MATERIAL. ALL FIFTEEN WERE SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED. BRIEFING PARTICIPANTS INCLUDED THE R4DO (HARRELL), NRR EO (LYONS), IRO (GIITTER), RCT (WEINSTEIN), FT. CALHOUN (POHL), AND EPA REGION VII BRIEFER (DAVIS).
"FT. CALHOUN HAS DECLARED A [NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT (NOUE)] PER [EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL)] 11.1 DUE TO AN ON-GOING CHEMICAL RELEASE AT THE CARGILL FACILITY WHICH IS AN OFFSITE PLANT. THE CHEMICAL RELEASE IS A MIXTURE OF SODIUM HYPORCHLORATE AND UREA AMMONIUM NITRATE WHICH WERE INADVERTENTLY COMBINED. SITE PERSONNEL AT FT. CALHOUN ARE NOT AT JEOPARDY AT THIS TIME. HOWEVER, THE POTENTIAL FOR PERSONNEL HAZARD EXISTS IF THE WIND WERE TO CHANGE DIRECTION. CURRENTLY, THERE IS NO IMPACT ON STATION OPERATION."
THE CARGILL CHEMICAL FACILITY NOTIFIED FT. CALHOUN OF THE CHEMICAL RELEASE AT 1210CDT, AND THE LICENSEE DECLARED THE NOUE AT 1235CDT.
THE CARGILL CHEMICAL FACILITY IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 1/2 MILE NORTH OF THE SITE. CURRENT WIND DIRECTION AND SPEED IS SOUTH TO NORTH AT 3 MPH. SEVERAL GASES WERE GENERATED BY AN EXOTHERMIC REACTION INCLUDING CHLORINE. THE QUANTITY OF THE CHEMICAL RELEASE IS UNKNOWN. THE LICENSEE HAS IMPLEMENTED PERIMETER MONITORING WHICH HAS NOT DETECTED ANY ABNORMAL INDICATIONS. LOCAL HAZMAT TEAMS HAVE RESPONDED INCLUDING THE LOCAL FIRE DEPARTMENT. THE LICENSEE IS NOT AWARE OF ANY EVACUATION OR PERIMETERS HAVING BEEN ESTABLISHED.
STATE, LOCAL, AND COUNTY ORGANIZATIONS WERE NOTIFIED. THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS ALSO INFORMED.
AT 1403CDT ON 8/27/99 DURING AN NRC CONFERENCE CALL, THE LICENSEE TERMINATED THE NOUE AFTER RECEIVING NOTIFICATION THAT THE LEAK HAD BEEN TERMINATED.
* * * UPDATE AT 1615EDT ON 8/27/99 BY S.SANDIN * * *
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WAS PROVIDED BY THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (DAVIS) DURING A FOLLOW-UP BRIEFING. APPROXIMATELY 16,000 LBS OF UREA AMMONIUM NITRATE WAS PUMPED FROM A MISIDENTIFIED RAIL CAR INTO A TANK CONTAINING HYDROCHLORIC ACID. THE RESULTING REACTION PRODUCED "AQUA REGIA" WHICH IS A MIXURE OF CORROSIVE AND TOXIC GASES [SEE NORTH AMERICAN EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDE #157]. ACCORDING TO A PLANT ENGINEER AT CARGILL, THE ERROR OCCURRED AT APPROXIMATELY 1000CDT. A PLUME WAS GENERATED BUT HAD MOSTLY DISSIPATED BEFORE CROSSING THE FACILITY BOUNDARY. THE REACTION CONTINUED FOR ABOUT 1 TO 1-1/2 HOURS. FIFTEEN (15) CARGILL EMPLOYEES WERE TAKEN TO LOCAL MEDICAL FACILITIES FOR OBSERVATION ALTHOUGH ONLY THREE (3) WERE ACTUALLY EXPOSED TO THE MATERIAL. ALL FIFTEEN WERE SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED. BRIEFING PARTICIPANTS INCLUDED THE R4DO (HARRELL), NRR EO (LYONS), IRO (GIITTER), RCT (WEINSTEIN), FT. CALHOUN (POHL), AND EPA REGION VII BRIEFER (DAVIS).
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36082
Rep Org: INOVISION
Licensee: AMPHENOL
Region: 3
City: CLEVELAND State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JANICE BROWNLEE/FAX
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: AMPHENOL
Region: 3
City: CLEVELAND State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JANICE BROWNLEE/FAX
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 08/27/1999
Notification Time: 16:58 [ET]
Event Date: 08/27/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/1999
Notification Time: 16:58 [ET]
Event Date: 08/27/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
MELVYN LEACH (R3)
KATHLEEN MODES (R1)
SCOTT SPARKS (R2)
CHARLES CAIN (R4)
VERN HODGE (FAX) (NRR)
MELVYN LEACH (R3)
KATHLEEN MODES (R1)
SCOTT SPARKS (R2)
CHARLES CAIN (R4)
VERN HODGE (FAX) (NRR)
PART 21 NOTIFICATION INVOLVING UNACCEPTABLE RETENTION CAPABILITY FOR BNC CONNECTORS
"In accordance with the requirements for basic components regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as specified in 10 CFR 21.21, I am providing this notification. In June 1999, the reliability engineer with the 'systems group' department of our company sent me a memo that suggested we might have accepted an unacceptable part for the 30-4 connector, which is a regulated component. He had connected an AMP BNC connector to a cable to determine its equivalency to the other qualified part from Amphenol p/n 31-2. He found that when the wires were combed out as directed on the instructions that came with the AMP connector, it did not appear to perform correctly with respect to cable retention, and [he] asked if someone in QA could verify his preliminary testing.
"Subsequently, our Quality Manager examined the connector and obtained instructions from the manufacturer that said the wires should be left braided, not combed out, and that if you left it braided, a stronger grip was achieved. The reliability engineer tried the braided connection and did find that the retention was improved. However, in investigating the matter further with the manufacturer, it was found that the manufacturer did have conflicting instructions but said the drawing specifying a braided connection should be considered the official one since it was a controlled document. It was also found that the part from AMP was not the originally qualified part number - 221552-1. AMP had obsoleted that part in 1992 and substituted the 221265-0 in its place. The new part, however, did not carry a military specification for shock (MIL-Std. 202) and was not military type UG-88 like the previous one - conditions which provided assurance that it met certain criteria needed for Seismic Class 1 rating. This information was presented at the company's Quality Review Meeting on August 12, 1999. A technical evaluation was conducted and reported in an abstract for the 30-4 BNC Connector by the reliability engineer on August 26, 1999.
"The connectors for part 30-4 that were in stock were inspected, and it was found that all of them were this incorrect AMP part number. The connectors were subsequently put on hold by the Quality Manager, and correct connectors have been ordered from Amphenol.
"One hundred pieces of the incorrect part (AMP 1-221265) were received at Victoreen (now a part of Inovision) in January 1997. A search has been conducted to identify those parts, assemblies, and kits which list part 30-4 as part of their bill of material. From those, a review will be done to identify those that have been produced since the receipt of the incorrect part and, therefore, have the potential for being incorrect. The customers who have received the identified products will be sent a notification within 30 days. If acceptable replacement parts can be obtained with that time frame, they will be sent with the notification.
"A notification was sent to the Plant Manager/Senior Executive and to the Chief Operating Officer of Inovision on August 26, 1999. The Plant Manager has authorized me to submit this report by facsimile to the NRC Operations Center. A written report containing the information specified at 10 CFR 21.21(d)(4) will be submitted to the NRC within 30 days."
(Call the NRC operations officer for contact telephone numbers.)
* * * UPDATE AT 1609 EDT ON 9/23/99 BY DAVE SMITH TO FANGIE JONES * * *
Inovision corrective actions are completed, the unacceptable parts were removed from stock and scrapped. An investigation on part usage since January, 1997 (the date that the unacceptable part was received into stock) indicated that four (4) unacceptable parts may have been sent to Rochester Gas and Electric. The utility has been notified by phone and certified mail.
R1DO (Robert Summers), R3DO (Roger Lanksbury), and NRR (Vern Hodges) have been notified.
"In accordance with the requirements for basic components regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as specified in 10 CFR 21.21, I am providing this notification. In June 1999, the reliability engineer with the 'systems group' department of our company sent me a memo that suggested we might have accepted an unacceptable part for the 30-4 connector, which is a regulated component. He had connected an AMP BNC connector to a cable to determine its equivalency to the other qualified part from Amphenol p/n 31-2. He found that when the wires were combed out as directed on the instructions that came with the AMP connector, it did not appear to perform correctly with respect to cable retention, and [he] asked if someone in QA could verify his preliminary testing.
"Subsequently, our Quality Manager examined the connector and obtained instructions from the manufacturer that said the wires should be left braided, not combed out, and that if you left it braided, a stronger grip was achieved. The reliability engineer tried the braided connection and did find that the retention was improved. However, in investigating the matter further with the manufacturer, it was found that the manufacturer did have conflicting instructions but said the drawing specifying a braided connection should be considered the official one since it was a controlled document. It was also found that the part from AMP was not the originally qualified part number - 221552-1. AMP had obsoleted that part in 1992 and substituted the 221265-0 in its place. The new part, however, did not carry a military specification for shock (MIL-Std. 202) and was not military type UG-88 like the previous one - conditions which provided assurance that it met certain criteria needed for Seismic Class 1 rating. This information was presented at the company's Quality Review Meeting on August 12, 1999. A technical evaluation was conducted and reported in an abstract for the 30-4 BNC Connector by the reliability engineer on August 26, 1999.
"The connectors for part 30-4 that were in stock were inspected, and it was found that all of them were this incorrect AMP part number. The connectors were subsequently put on hold by the Quality Manager, and correct connectors have been ordered from Amphenol.
"One hundred pieces of the incorrect part (AMP 1-221265) were received at Victoreen (now a part of Inovision) in January 1997. A search has been conducted to identify those parts, assemblies, and kits which list part 30-4 as part of their bill of material. From those, a review will be done to identify those that have been produced since the receipt of the incorrect part and, therefore, have the potential for being incorrect. The customers who have received the identified products will be sent a notification within 30 days. If acceptable replacement parts can be obtained with that time frame, they will be sent with the notification.
"A notification was sent to the Plant Manager/Senior Executive and to the Chief Operating Officer of Inovision on August 26, 1999. The Plant Manager has authorized me to submit this report by facsimile to the NRC Operations Center. A written report containing the information specified at 10 CFR 21.21(d)(4) will be submitted to the NRC within 30 days."
(Call the NRC operations officer for contact telephone numbers.)
* * * UPDATE AT 1609 EDT ON 9/23/99 BY DAVE SMITH TO FANGIE JONES * * *
Inovision corrective actions are completed, the unacceptable parts were removed from stock and scrapped. An investigation on part usage since January, 1997 (the date that the unacceptable part was received into stock) indicated that four (4) unacceptable parts may have been sent to Rochester Gas and Electric. The utility has been notified by phone and certified mail.
R1DO (Robert Summers), R3DO (Roger Lanksbury), and NRR (Vern Hodges) have been notified.