Event Notification Report for September 04, 2020
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/03/2020 - 09/04/2020
EVENT NUMBERS
54885548835488154926
Power Reactor
Event Number: 54885
Facility: Cook
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Perry Graham
HQ OPS Officer: Bethany Cecere
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Perry Graham
HQ OPS Officer: Bethany Cecere
Notification Date: 09/05/2020
Notification Time: 02:27 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2020
Event Time: 22:42 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/05/2020
Notification Time: 02:27 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2020
Event Time: 22:42 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/05/2020
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - Eccs Injection 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - Eccs Injection 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
CHRIS MILLER (NRR EO)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
CHRIS MILLER (NRR EO)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 92 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP AND AUTOMATIC SAFETY INJECTION
"On September 4, 2020, DC Cook Unit 2 experienced a lowering Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure caused by a failed open Reactor Coolant Pressurizer Spray valve. At approximately 2242 [EDT], a manual Reactor Trip was performed due to the lowering RCS pressure. Following the manual reactor trip, an automatic Safety Injection was actuated due to the lowering RCS pressure. RCS pressure has recovered to normal and is stable.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation, and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), ECCS Discharge to RCS, as a four (4) hour report. Notification is also being made as an 8 hour report under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), Reactor Protection System (RPS), Containment Isolation, Emergency Core Cooling (ECCS), Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW), and Emergency AC Electrical Power actuations. The DC Cook Resident NRC Inspector has been notified.
"Unit 2 is being supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted. Aux Feedwater Pumps started as required and are operating properly. All ECCS components operated as required including Containment Isolation. Decay heat is being removed via the Condenser Steam Dumps and ECCS has been secured. Three of four Reactor Coolant Pumps were secured and RCS pressure has recovered to normal pressure and is stable. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the Reactor Trip and Safety Injection. DC Cook Unit 2 remains stable in Mode 3. No radioactive release is in progress as a result of this event."
Unit 1 was not affected and remains in Mode 1, 100 % power.
"On September 4, 2020, DC Cook Unit 2 experienced a lowering Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure caused by a failed open Reactor Coolant Pressurizer Spray valve. At approximately 2242 [EDT], a manual Reactor Trip was performed due to the lowering RCS pressure. Following the manual reactor trip, an automatic Safety Injection was actuated due to the lowering RCS pressure. RCS pressure has recovered to normal and is stable.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation, and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), ECCS Discharge to RCS, as a four (4) hour report. Notification is also being made as an 8 hour report under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), Reactor Protection System (RPS), Containment Isolation, Emergency Core Cooling (ECCS), Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW), and Emergency AC Electrical Power actuations. The DC Cook Resident NRC Inspector has been notified.
"Unit 2 is being supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted. Aux Feedwater Pumps started as required and are operating properly. All ECCS components operated as required including Containment Isolation. Decay heat is being removed via the Condenser Steam Dumps and ECCS has been secured. Three of four Reactor Coolant Pumps were secured and RCS pressure has recovered to normal pressure and is stable. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the Reactor Trip and Safety Injection. DC Cook Unit 2 remains stable in Mode 3. No radioactive release is in progress as a result of this event."
Unit 1 was not affected and remains in Mode 1, 100 % power.
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 54883
Rep Org: Soil and Materials Engineering, Inc
Licensee: Soil and Materials Engineering, Inc.
Region: 3
City: Canton State: MI
County:
License #: 21-17158-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Trevor Shaheen
HQ OPS Officer: Jeffrey Whited
Licensee: Soil and Materials Engineering, Inc.
Region: 3
City: Canton State: MI
County:
License #: 21-17158-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Trevor Shaheen
HQ OPS Officer: Jeffrey Whited
Notification Date: 09/04/2020
Notification Time: 16:28 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2020
Event Time: 14:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/04/2020
Notification Time: 16:28 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2020
Event Time: 14:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/04/2020
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - Safety Equipment Failure
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - Safety Equipment Failure
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
DAMAGED GAUGE DUE TO VEHICLE INCIDENT
The following was received via email from the licensee:
"[The Engineering Technician] was performing density tests on an aggregate base with a nuclear density gauge (nuc) [gauge: Troxler 3411 s/n 14468; 8.0 mCi Cs-137; 40.0 mCi Am-241] and the loader operator was also working in the area. The [loader] operator was trying to back-up and grazed [the Engineering Technician] on his left shoulder slightly with the rear bumper end, just after [the Engineering Technician] had brought the source rod into the safe position to record the test results. [The Engineering Technician] rolled out of the way and as the loader came to a stop it had hit the nuc gauge and broke the guide rod. Unsure if the source was intact, [the Engineering Technician] kept the loader in-place and kept people more than 15 feet away until [the Operations Manager and the Senior Project Consultant] could arrive on-site to assess the situation. [The Engineering Technician] informed [the Operations Manager and the Senior Project Consultant] on the phone and once they arrived on-site that he was uninjured, since he was able to easily roll out of the way of the loader. [The licensee] then determined that both sources were still intact and the source tip was in the shielded position within the gauge. [The licensee] took a Geiger Counter reading at the site (0.06 mRem/hr 3 feet from the gauge) and again after loading the gauge into the transport box (less than 0.03 mRem/hr 3 feet from the box). Prior to loading the gauge into the box, [the licensee] performed a leak test on the gauge and shipped the leak test to Instrotek as soon as [the licensee] returned to the office with the damaged gauge."
The licensee noted that the gauge is currently locked-out/tagged-out and once they receive the leak test results they will most likely transfer the gauge to Instrotek for disposal.
The following was received via email from the licensee:
"[The Engineering Technician] was performing density tests on an aggregate base with a nuclear density gauge (nuc) [gauge: Troxler 3411 s/n 14468; 8.0 mCi Cs-137; 40.0 mCi Am-241] and the loader operator was also working in the area. The [loader] operator was trying to back-up and grazed [the Engineering Technician] on his left shoulder slightly with the rear bumper end, just after [the Engineering Technician] had brought the source rod into the safe position to record the test results. [The Engineering Technician] rolled out of the way and as the loader came to a stop it had hit the nuc gauge and broke the guide rod. Unsure if the source was intact, [the Engineering Technician] kept the loader in-place and kept people more than 15 feet away until [the Operations Manager and the Senior Project Consultant] could arrive on-site to assess the situation. [The Engineering Technician] informed [the Operations Manager and the Senior Project Consultant] on the phone and once they arrived on-site that he was uninjured, since he was able to easily roll out of the way of the loader. [The licensee] then determined that both sources were still intact and the source tip was in the shielded position within the gauge. [The licensee] took a Geiger Counter reading at the site (0.06 mRem/hr 3 feet from the gauge) and again after loading the gauge into the transport box (less than 0.03 mRem/hr 3 feet from the box). Prior to loading the gauge into the box, [the licensee] performed a leak test on the gauge and shipped the leak test to Instrotek as soon as [the licensee] returned to the office with the damaged gauge."
The licensee noted that the gauge is currently locked-out/tagged-out and once they receive the leak test results they will most likely transfer the gauge to Instrotek for disposal.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 54881
Rep Org: Eli Lilly Company Manufacturers
Licensee: Eli Lilly Company Manufacturers
Region: 3
City: Indianapolis State: IN
County:
License #: 13-01133-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: James Maker
HQ OPS Officer: Jeffrey Whited
Licensee: Eli Lilly Company Manufacturers
Region: 3
City: Indianapolis State: IN
County:
License #: 13-01133-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: James Maker
HQ OPS Officer: Jeffrey Whited
Notification Date: 09/04/2020
Notification Time: 13:38 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2020
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/09/2020
Notification Time: 13:38 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2020
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/09/2020
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - Lost/Stolen Lnm>10x
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - Lost/Stolen Lnm>10x
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB (EMAIL)
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date : 9/10/2020
EN Revision Text: LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGN
The following is the summary of a call with the licensee:
During an annual inventory review, the licensee noticed that an exit sign had been removed from the wall. It was supposed to have been repurposed and moved to a different location but the licensee has lost confidence that the exit sign is in its control.
The licensee is continuing to look for the exit sign.
Exit sign details: purchased from SRBT, s/n C083911, manufacture date 2/2011, original activity: 21.6 Ci, current activity 12.6 Ci.
* * * RETRACTION ON 9/9/2020 AT 1455 EDT FROM TRENTON MAYS TO THOMAS HERRITY * * *
The following is the summary of a call with the licensee:
The licensee is retracting this event. After further searching for the exit sign, the licensee was able to recover the sign and determined that it had continuously been in its possession.
The licensee notified R3 (Warren) that the sign had been found.
Notified R3DO (Hills) and NMSS Events Notification and ILTAB via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Agreement State
Event Number: 54926
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: NCH Imaging Medical Boulevard
Region: 1
City: Naples State: FL
County:
License #: 4201-6
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Matthew Senison
HQ OPS Officer: Brian P. Smith
Licensee: NCH Imaging Medical Boulevard
Region: 1
City: Naples State: FL
County:
License #: 4201-6
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Matthew Senison
HQ OPS Officer: Brian P. Smith
Notification Date: 10/01/2020
Notification Time: 12:03 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2020
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/01/2020
Notification Time: 12:03 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2020
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/01/2020
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
FRANK ARNER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
FRANK ARNER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING SEALED SOURCE
The Florida Bureau of Radiation Control reported the following via email:
"The RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] notified the BRC [Bureau of Radiation Control] by mail that a leak test performed on this source [217.6 microCurie Cs-137 e-vial] resulted in greater than 0.005 microCi of the acceptable removable contamination. After determination, the source was sealed within the shielded e-vial container using silicone. The outer shielded container had no removable contamination. The sealed container was then wrapped in plastic. The outer plastic also had no removable contamination. The area was evaluated for signs of removable contamination with no results above background. The licensee intends to dispose of this source through a licensed radioactive waste disposal company."
Florida Event Number: FL20-113
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The Florida Bureau of Radiation Control reported the following via email:
"The RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] notified the BRC [Bureau of Radiation Control] by mail that a leak test performed on this source [217.6 microCurie Cs-137 e-vial] resulted in greater than 0.005 microCi of the acceptable removable contamination. After determination, the source was sealed within the shielded e-vial container using silicone. The outer shielded container had no removable contamination. The sealed container was then wrapped in plastic. The outer plastic also had no removable contamination. The area was evaluated for signs of removable contamination with no results above background. The licensee intends to dispose of this source through a licensed radioactive waste disposal company."
Florida Event Number: FL20-113
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf