Event Notification Report for August 06, 2020

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER

The following is a summary of information received via email:

On 8/6/2020, the licensee notified the Kentucky Radiation Health Branch of an event which had occurred on the same day. The shutter control mechanism malfunctioned on a nuclear gauge and the shutter could not be completely closed. The gauge has been taken out of service and no overexposures were reported as a result of this incident. A service provider has been contacted to help repair or replace the damaged gauge.

The gauge is a Data Measurement Corporation Model AM-3E containing a 3 Ci Am-241 sealed source.

Kentucky Event Report ID No.: KY200003

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA GUIDE TUBE DENTED

The following was received from the Tennessee Division of Radiological Health via email:

"On August 6, 2020, World Testing radiographers were radiographing at Matrix Drilling in Lewisburg, Tennessee. They were radiographing pipes and one of the pipes (weighing approximately 1000 pounds) rolled onto the guide tube, denting it. They could not crank the source back in. They called the RSO [(Radiation Safety Officer)]. The guide tube was curled and making it more difficult to get the source back into the camera. They pulled on the crank to straighten out the guide tube and with enough pressure they were able to get the source past the dent and back into the exposure device. They placed lead on the collimator for additional shielding while working with it. The camera was a Sentinel, Model 880D, Serial number D-1120. The [Ir-192] source serial number was 96522G, with an activity of 44Ci. The source was exposed for approximately 4 hours. All personnel involved were wearing dosimetry. There were no overexposures."

Tennessee Event Report ID No.: TN-20-114

60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF AN INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION

"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of an emergency service water system component that does not normally run and which provides an ultimate heat sink.

"On August 6, 2020, at approximately 0128 CDT, the A3 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) pump received an auto-start signal while performing Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) on the 3C Core Spray pump. Normally, the involved EECW pump would be started prior to testing to prevent an auto-start; however, in this case the pump was not running prior to the test. When the 3C Core Spray pump breaker was closed while in the test position, an unanticipated actuation of the A3 EECW pump occurred. Work was stopped and the workers reported to the Control Room to evaluate the condition. Based on a review of this event, individuals involved were coached on understanding system response prior to performing work.

"The A3 EECW pump responded in accordance with the plant design. No other plant equipment was affected during this event. There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into TVA's corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. Reference corrective action document CR 1628479. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."

60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF AN INVALID ACTUATION OF A GENERAL CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL AFFECTING MORE THAN ONE SYSTEM

"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.

"On August 6, 2020, at approximately 1749 CDT, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Unit 2 experienced a loss of Reactor Protection System (RPS) Bus 2A. Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolated in response to this event. The PCIS isolations caused the initiation of Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) trains A, B, and C, and Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystem A. Unit 2 declared RCS leakage detection instrumentation inoperable and entered TS LCO 3.4.5 condition A, B, and D with required action D.1 to enter LCO 3.0.3 immediately. Unit 2 entered TS LCO 3.0.3 with required actions to be in Mode 2 within 10 hours, Mode 3 within 13 hours, and Mode 4 within 37 hours. Upon investigation, it was discovered that an age-related overheating condition resulted in the failure of the 2A RPS Motor Generator (MG) set, causing the feeder beaker from the 2A 480v Remote Motor-Operated Valve distribution board to trip. On August 6, 2020, at approximately 1808 CDT, Operations personnel commenced restoration of Unit 2 to normal after transferring 2A RPS to its alternate power supply. The 2A RPS MG Set drive motor was replaced on August 24, 2020.

"Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 2 actuations are Reactor Vessel (RV) Low Water Level or Drywell High Pressure. Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 3 actuations are RV Low Water Level or Reactor Water Cleanup Area High Temperature. Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 6 actuations are RV Low Water Level, High Drywell Pressure, or Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation. Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 8 actuations are Reactor Vessel (RV) Low Water Level or Drywell High Pressure. At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid.

"All affected safety systems responded as expected. There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. This event was entered into the Corrective Action Program as Condition Report 1628707. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."