Event Notification Report for March 12, 2020
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/11/2020 - 03/12/2020
Part 21
Event Number: 54664
Rep Org: SCHULZ ELECTRIC
Licensee: SCHULZ ELECTRIC
Region: 1
City: NEW HAVEN State: CT
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES ELDRIDGE
HQ OPS Officer: BRIAN P. SMITH
Licensee: SCHULZ ELECTRIC
Region: 1
City: NEW HAVEN State: CT
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES ELDRIDGE
HQ OPS Officer: BRIAN P. SMITH
Notification Date: 04/14/2020
Notification Time: 07:55 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2020
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/14/2020
Notification Time: 07:55 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2020
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/14/2020
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - Defects And Noncompliance
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - Defects And Noncompliance
Person (Organization):
DONNA JANDA (R1DO)
MARK MILLER (R2DO)
JEFFREY JOSEY (R4DO)
- PART 21/50.55 REACTORS (EMAIL)
DONNA JANDA (R1DO)
MARK MILLER (R2DO)
JEFFREY JOSEY (R4DO)
- PART 21/50.55 REACTORS (EMAIL)
PART 21 NOTIFICATION - MOTOR BEARING OIL RESERVOIR RECOATING
The following is a summary of information obtained from Schulz Electric via email report:
During the time period of January 2014 through November 2015, Schulz Electric performed recoating on several vertical motor endbell bearing oil reservoirs. In November 2015, one of Schulz Electric's nuclear customers identified an issue with the adherence of the coatings. In January 2016, the same customer reported another motor which had indicated coating adherence issues. The lack of adequate adherence root cause was determined to be a contamination that was introduced to the oil reservoir surface through the use of a chemical chelating agent to remove rust from the endbells after cleaning.
On March 12, 2020 the same customer contacted Schulz Electric again to identify that two more motors had been pulled from service for standard overhaul and the bearing oil reservoirs for both motors had degraded coatings as well. As such, Schulz Electric performed an extent of condition investigation and determined that there were additional customers for which Schulz Electric provided the bearing oil reservoir recoating.
The loss of adhesion and flaking exposes the bearing oil reservoir to oil and allows oil migration into the base metal. Over time the safety related motors could degrade from the foreign material (flaking) concerns.
The licensees affected are Hope Creek, North Anna, Hatch, Farley, Vogtle, Grand Gulf, and Columbia.
Point of Contact: Charles Eldredge, Quality Assurance Manager at Schulz Electric, 30 Gando Drive, New Haven, CT 06513, Office Number (203) 859-7413
The following is a summary of information obtained from Schulz Electric via email report:
During the time period of January 2014 through November 2015, Schulz Electric performed recoating on several vertical motor endbell bearing oil reservoirs. In November 2015, one of Schulz Electric's nuclear customers identified an issue with the adherence of the coatings. In January 2016, the same customer reported another motor which had indicated coating adherence issues. The lack of adequate adherence root cause was determined to be a contamination that was introduced to the oil reservoir surface through the use of a chemical chelating agent to remove rust from the endbells after cleaning.
On March 12, 2020 the same customer contacted Schulz Electric again to identify that two more motors had been pulled from service for standard overhaul and the bearing oil reservoirs for both motors had degraded coatings as well. As such, Schulz Electric performed an extent of condition investigation and determined that there were additional customers for which Schulz Electric provided the bearing oil reservoir recoating.
The loss of adhesion and flaking exposes the bearing oil reservoir to oil and allows oil migration into the base metal. Over time the safety related motors could degrade from the foreign material (flaking) concerns.
The licensees affected are Hope Creek, North Anna, Hatch, Farley, Vogtle, Grand Gulf, and Columbia.
Point of Contact: Charles Eldredge, Quality Assurance Manager at Schulz Electric, 30 Gando Drive, New Haven, CT 06513, Office Number (203) 859-7413
Part 21
Event Number: 54584
Rep Org: FLOWSERVE
Licensee: FLOWSERVE
Region: 1
City: RALEIGH State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MATT HOBBS
HQ OPS Officer: SILAS KENNEDY
Licensee: FLOWSERVE
Region: 1
City: RALEIGH State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MATT HOBBS
HQ OPS Officer: SILAS KENNEDY
Notification Date: 03/12/2020
Notification Time: 17:08 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2020
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/11/2020
Notification Time: 17:08 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2020
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/11/2020
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - Interim Eval Of Deviation
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - Interim Eval Of Deviation
Person (Organization):
PATRICK FINNEY (R1DO)
- PART 21/50.55 REACTORS (EMAIL)
PATRICK FINNEY (R1DO)
- PART 21/50.55 REACTORS (EMAIL)
INTERIM PART 21 NOTIFICATION - DEFECTIVE SOLENOID VALVES
The following is a summary of information that was obtained from Flowserve via facsimile:
On January 13, 2020, and January 14, 2020, two Flowserve Model 38878-8, 3-way, 2-postion solenoids valves supplied to Seabrook Station for use on the feed water isolation valve actuator failed bench testing. The failed solenoid valves were returned to Flowserve for evaluation. The evaluation of these solenoid valves will be completed by June 11, 2020.
Point of Contact: Matt Hobbs, PE Engineering Manager Office: 919-334-7127 MHobbs@flowserve.com
* * * UPDATE ON 6/11/20 AT 1235 EST FROM MEGAN STRONG TO THOMAS KENDZIA * * *
The following is a summary of the information provided by the vendor via fax and email:
Testing at Flowserve determined that valves did not reposition when actuated and were failed. Disassembly determined that one valve had unidentified foreign material that was preventing valve from actuating, and the other valve had been partially disassembled and then reassembled, resulting in damage that caused the valve to not actuate.
Flowsever determined that these conditions would have caused failure of the assembly and test performed at Flowserve before the valves were shipped and therefore occurred after Flowserve shipped the valves. Flowserve concluded that these two solenoid valve failures are not defects or deviations that occurred at Flowserve that would be associated with substantial safety hazards.
Notified R1DO (Jackson) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors Group (by email).
The following is a summary of information that was obtained from Flowserve via facsimile:
On January 13, 2020, and January 14, 2020, two Flowserve Model 38878-8, 3-way, 2-postion solenoids valves supplied to Seabrook Station for use on the feed water isolation valve actuator failed bench testing. The failed solenoid valves were returned to Flowserve for evaluation. The evaluation of these solenoid valves will be completed by June 11, 2020.
Point of Contact: Matt Hobbs, PE Engineering Manager Office: 919-334-7127 MHobbs@flowserve.com
* * * UPDATE ON 6/11/20 AT 1235 EST FROM MEGAN STRONG TO THOMAS KENDZIA * * *
The following is a summary of the information provided by the vendor via fax and email:
Testing at Flowserve determined that valves did not reposition when actuated and were failed. Disassembly determined that one valve had unidentified foreign material that was preventing valve from actuating, and the other valve had been partially disassembled and then reassembled, resulting in damage that caused the valve to not actuate.
Flowsever determined that these conditions would have caused failure of the assembly and test performed at Flowserve before the valves were shipped and therefore occurred after Flowserve shipped the valves. Flowserve concluded that these two solenoid valve failures are not defects or deviations that occurred at Flowserve that would be associated with substantial safety hazards.
Notified R1DO (Jackson) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors Group (by email).