Event Notification Report for December 18, 2019
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/17/2019 - 12/18/2019
Power Reactor
Event Number: 54452
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ETHAN HAUSER
HQ OPS Officer: OSSY FONT
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ETHAN HAUSER
HQ OPS Officer: OSSY FONT
Notification Date: 12/18/2019
Notification Time: 15:27 [ET]
Event Date: 12/18/2019
Event Time: 09:08 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/18/2019
Notification Time: 15:27 [ET]
Event Date: 12/18/2019
Event Time: 09:08 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/18/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT PRESSURE DEGRADED
"On December 18, 2019, at 0908 EST, with the East and Center Reactor Building HVAC (RBHVAC) trains in service, secondary containment pressure degraded to the point where the Technical Specification (TS) requirement for secondary containment pressure was not met and secondary containment was declared inoperable. Secondary containment pressure did not meet the TS required limit for approximately four minutes. The maximum secondary containment pressure observed during that time was approximately 0.064 inches of vacuum water gauge.
"Secondary containment pressure was returned to within the TS operability limit of greater than or equal to 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) by starting Division 1 of the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS). Secondary containment was declared Operable at 0912 EST. A modulating damper associated with the Center train of RBHVAC was identified as not properly controlling; an investigation is in progress. RBHVAC was manually secured to support problem identification and resolution. Secondary containment pressure is currently stable with Division 1 SGTS in service. There were no radiological releases associated with this event.
"Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"On December 18, 2019, at 0908 EST, with the East and Center Reactor Building HVAC (RBHVAC) trains in service, secondary containment pressure degraded to the point where the Technical Specification (TS) requirement for secondary containment pressure was not met and secondary containment was declared inoperable. Secondary containment pressure did not meet the TS required limit for approximately four minutes. The maximum secondary containment pressure observed during that time was approximately 0.064 inches of vacuum water gauge.
"Secondary containment pressure was returned to within the TS operability limit of greater than or equal to 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) by starting Division 1 of the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS). Secondary containment was declared Operable at 0912 EST. A modulating damper associated with the Center train of RBHVAC was identified as not properly controlling; an investigation is in progress. RBHVAC was manually secured to support problem identification and resolution. Secondary containment pressure is currently stable with Division 1 SGTS in service. There were no radiological releases associated with this event.
"Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Agreement State
Event Number: 54484
Rep Org: NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: IRIS NDT
Region: 4
City: MANDAN State: ND
County:
License #: 33-56806-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID STRADINGER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: IRIS NDT
Region: 4
City: MANDAN State: ND
County:
License #: 33-56806-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID STRADINGER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/17/2020
Notification Time: 17:00 [ET]
Event Date: 12/18/2019
Event Time: 22:15 [MST]
Last Update Date: 01/17/2020
Notification Time: 17:00 [ET]
Event Date: 12/18/2019
Event Time: 22:15 [MST]
Last Update Date: 01/17/2020
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
CALE YOUNG (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
CALE YOUNG (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
NORTH DAKOTA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE DISCONNECT
The following information is summarized from an email received from the state of North Dakota:
At approximately 2215 MST on 12/18/2019, while setting up for a radiography shot, the radiography team experienced a source disconnect. When the team realized a disconnect occurred, they established a 2 mR/hr. boundary and contacted the radiation safety officer (RSO). The RSO arrived on site and was able to retrieve the source back into the shielded position. No overexposures were reported. The licensee removed the camera from service and returned it to their facility in Bismarck, ND.
The licensee determined that poor camera maintenance and personnel error contributed to the guide tube being only partially connected to the camera which led to the disconnect. The radiography crew was briefed on the cause of the event and the proper steps to maintain and inspect a camera prior to use.
The camera was a SPEC 150, serial number 2592 , with a 66 Ci Ir-192 source, serial number AK 2405.
The following information is summarized from an email received from the state of North Dakota:
At approximately 2215 MST on 12/18/2019, while setting up for a radiography shot, the radiography team experienced a source disconnect. When the team realized a disconnect occurred, they established a 2 mR/hr. boundary and contacted the radiation safety officer (RSO). The RSO arrived on site and was able to retrieve the source back into the shielded position. No overexposures were reported. The licensee removed the camera from service and returned it to their facility in Bismarck, ND.
The licensee determined that poor camera maintenance and personnel error contributed to the guide tube being only partially connected to the camera which led to the disconnect. The radiography crew was briefed on the cause of the event and the proper steps to maintain and inspect a camera prior to use.
The camera was a SPEC 150, serial number 2592 , with a 66 Ci Ir-192 source, serial number AK 2405.