Event Notification Report for October 01, 2019

AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DURING REACTOR STARTUP

"On 10/1/2019, at 0307 CDT, Unit 2 was conducting a normal reactor startup and received a valid Reactor Protection System (RPS) scram. The reactor was critical in MODE 2 at the Point of Adding Heat. Operators began withdrawing Source Range Monitor (SRM) Instrumentation per procedure. When the operator depressed the SRM Drive Out pushbutton to withdraw the last two SRMs (C and D), an unexpected full Reactor Scram was received. Annunciator indication in the Main Control Room indicated a Neutron Monitoring Scram. The Intermediate Range Monitors (IRM) D, E, F, H and G all indicated Upscale High High. There were no Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) or Containment Isolation System actuations. All other systems functioned as designed.

"The cause of the Reactor Scram is still under investigation.

"This event requires a 4-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.'

"This event also requires an 8-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B), (1) Reactor protection system (RPS) including: reactor scram or reactor trip, except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.'

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA

The following was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Agency) via email:

"On October 2, 2019, a licensee reported to the Agency that they could not locate one of their Industrial Nuclear Co. IR-100 radiography cameras (S/N: 4414) containing an Iridium-192 source (S/N: 850D) with approximately 6 Curies of activity. The licensee stated that he believed the source was located at one of his satellite locations in Orange, Texas. The loss was discovered after performing an inventory check. The licensee has initiated an investigation and is currently searching for the device.

"Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident #: 9718

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example: level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

Note: This device is assigned an IAEA Category 3 value based on the actual radioactivity of the source, not on the device type. (Reference IAEA RG-G-1.9)

PART 21 REPORT - ITE/GOULD J20M COIL BLOCK RELAY

"On October 1, 2019, the Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Site Vice President was notified of a defect on an ITE/Gould J20M Coil Block Relays which met the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 21.21.

"ANO is making this non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(I) concerning a defect on an ITE/Gould J20M Coil Block Relay which resulted in one of four safety related containment cooling fans failure to start at ANO Unit 2. On June 1, 2019, a failure occurred when the containment cooler fan hand switch was taken to 'start' during the recent Unit 2 forced outage. Troubleshooting identified the control power relay coil was found to have an open winding condition.

"The Unit 2 reactor was in shutdown (Mode 5) and no impacts to nuclear or radiological safety occurred because of this event. The failure of the containment cooling fan to start would have prevented the Containment Cooling System from performing its function of providing essential cooling/environmental controls for safety related equipment inside containment.

"On August 15, 2019, ANO approved a causal evaluation which determined the failure of the relay occurred due to a manufacturing defect associated with uneven varnish application on the coil windings. This defect lead to premature turn-to-turn shorting of the coils. This failure was determined to be limited to ITE/Gould relays that were part of a 1991 batch purchased by ANO. The 1991 relay batch had a manufacturing date code of 9132.

"As part of the ANO evaluation, an industry operating experience review identified INPO ICES OE 242045. This OE identified another utility had purchased three relays from ANO in 2007 and subsequently experienced coil failures on two of the three relays. The utility did not issue a 10 CFR Part 21 notification.

"During the ANO evaluation, NRC IN 92-27 Supplement 1 was reviewed. The IN noted the same component failure mode. However, the failure mechanism was different. The IN discussed failures associated with thermal degradation of the relay armature carriers in ganged mounting configurations. The failure mechanism at ANO is due to uneven varnish application to the coil windings.

"Entergy ANO performed a Part 21 Evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(a)(1) which was completed on September 25, 2019. This evaluation determined this defect could create a substantial safety hazard as defined in 10 CFR 21.3.

"The licensee has two relays left that could be affected. One relay is installed and currently in use by the other containment cooling fan and the other relay is on parts hold in an ANO onsite warehouse. A Condition Report has been initiated to document the potential for failure of the installed control power relay. This ITE/Gould J20 is obsolete and other options are being evaluated to replace the ITE/Gould J20M Coil Block Relay. ANO has notified the utility to whom it sold the relays in 2007. ANO has also notified the vendor."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING / RECOVERED PORTABLE DENSITY GAUGE

The following was received from the Maryland Radiological Health Program via phone and email:

"On October 2, 2019, at 0825 EDT, the Maryland Department of the Environment Radiological Health Program (MDE-RHP) was contacted via telephone by the Vice President and Office Manager of Engineering Consulting Services Mid-Atlantic, LLC (ECS), Maryland license number MD-03-092-01, that a portable density gauge was missing. The gauge was identified as a Troxler model 3430, S/N 34485, with nominal activities of 10 mCi Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am-241/Be. The last leak test was performed on July 23, 2019.

"On October 1, 2019, at approximately 1200 EDT, ECS management started to track down the location of the portable density gauge as an internal audit revealed that this gauge was not signed out by the user. Later that afternoon, the gauge user was found at home by ECS management. The user then revealed that his vehicle was in a minor accident in Hanover, MD and the Anne Arundel County police impounded his vehicle with the gauge locked in the trunk. Multiple attempts were made to recover the portable gauge after hours on October 1, 2019 from the impoundment lot but without success. The gauge remained secured in the trunk of the vehicle while within the fenced and secured impoundment lot overnight. The Radiation Safety Officer from ECS recovered the portable density gauge at 0855 hours EDT on October 2, 2019. The gauge was found intact and returned to ECS storage.

"MDE/RHP will conduct a reactive investigation."

Notified R1DO (Dentel), ILTAB and NMSS (email)

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf