Event Notification Report for July 31, 2019

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO INOPERABLE BORON INJECTION FLOW PATHS AND CHARGING PUMPS

"On July 31, 2019, at 1206 CDT, Waterford 3 commenced initiation of a plant shutdown as required by Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3. Prior to this, on July 31, 2019, at 1108 CDT, the boron injection flow paths were declared inoperable in accordance with LCO 3.1.2.2, 'Flow Paths - Operating,' and the charging pumps were declared inoperable in accordance with LCO 3.1.2.4, 'Charging Pumps-Operating.' This was due to visual examination identifying that propagation had progressed on a previously identified flaw on piping upstream of the header supplying the charging pumps. TS LCO 3.0.3 was entered due to the action statements of LCOs 3.1.2.2 and 3.1.2.4 not being met. LCO 3.0.3 requires that action shall be initiated within one hour to place the unit in a mode in which the specification does not apply by placing it in hot standby within the next 6 hours and cold shutdown within the next 30 hours. At 1206 CDT, Waterford 3 commenced direct boration to the reactor coolant system.

"This condition meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) due to the initiation of plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) and (D) due to an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (A) shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition and (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident."

60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION DUE TO AN INVALID ACTUATION OF A CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL

"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.

"On July 31, 2019, at approximately 1650 hours Central Daylight Time (CDT), Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Unit 1 experienced a Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 6 isolation during performance of surveillance procedure 1-SR-3.3.6.2.3(A), Reactor/Refueling Zone Ventilation Radiation Monitor 1-RM-90-140/142 Calibration and Functional Test. The Group 6 isolation caused the initiation of Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) Trains A, B, and C, and Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystem B. Unit 1 H2O2 Analyzer and Drywell Radiation Monitor CAM, 1-RM-90-256, were declared Inoperable and Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.4.5 Condition B was entered. All affected safety systems responded as expected.

"Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 6 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3), High Drywell Pressure, or Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation (Reactor Zone or Refuel Zone). At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid.

"This condition was the result of two cleared fuses in the alarm logic. The apparent cause is a ground fault on the A6 Open Drain Input/Output Module.

"There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

"This event was entered into the Corrective Acton Program as Condition Report 1537358.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CAMERA SOURCE UNABLE TO RETRACT

The following was reported by the Virginia Office of Radiological Health, via email:

"On August 26, 2019, the Virginia Office of Radiological Health (ORH) received an incident report from the licensee, MISTRAS GROUP, Inc. The source, 66 curies of Ir-192, could not be retracted to its shielded position during radiographic work. The radiographic work involved inspecting a water tank located in an open space. The incident occurred on July 31, 2019, at about 1028 EDT at a temporary jobsite located in White Post, Virginia. The incident occurred because a magnetic stand that was utilized to support the source tube fell during an exposure, creating a kink in the source tube and preventing full retraction back to the shielded position. The radiography crew immediately established a new boundary, notified the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) and customer, and relocated all workers outside the boundary area. A radiation survey was performed immediately at the new boundary and the measurement did not exceed 2 mR in any one hour. The site was supervised by the radiography crew until the RSO arrived at the scene and repositioned the source back to its shielding position safely. The pocket dosimeters indicated that the RSO, the radiographer, and assistant radiographer received 28 mrem, 20 mrem, and 10 mrem, respectively. In addition, the whole body dosimeters were sent to Landauer for analysis and no significant radiation exposures were reported to the RSO, Radiographer, and Assistant Radiographer.

"On August 28, 2019, the ORH inspector conducted a reactive inspection and it was found that the root causes of the incident were identified properly by the licensee and corrective actions, including training on procedures, on radiographic techniques, and on set up for that particular type of radiography work were discussed with the radiographer. The ORH determined that this incident is closed."

The report from Virginia also stated:

"This incident was reported to the NRC through NMED on August 29, 2019 as if it was a 30-day notification requirement. However, the 2020 Virginia IMPEP review team discovered that it should have been classified as a 24-hour notification requirement. Accordingly, this report is being sent to correct the error."

Event Report ID No: VA-19004