Event Notification Report for May 09, 2019
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/08/2019 - 05/09/2019
EVENT NUMBERS
5405454055541345414454147
Power Reactor
Event Number: 54054
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RICK GALLAGHER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RICK GALLAGHER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 05/09/2019
Notification Time: 07:01 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2019
Event Time: 03:48 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/09/2019
Notification Time: 07:01 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2019
Event Time: 03:48 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/09/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
KARLA STOEDTER (R3DO)
KARLA STOEDTER (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO TURBINE TRIP
"On May 9, 2019 at 0348 CDT, an automatic scram was received on Unit 2 following a turbine trip.
"All rods inserted to their full-in positions.
"All Group 2 and Group 3 automatic isolations actuated as expected. Systems operated as expected.
"Reactor vessel inventory and pressure are being maintained in normal control bands.
"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Decay heat is being removed using the steam bypass valves to the condenser and the safety relief valves did not lift as a result of the trip.
"On May 9, 2019 at 0348 CDT, an automatic scram was received on Unit 2 following a turbine trip.
"All rods inserted to their full-in positions.
"All Group 2 and Group 3 automatic isolations actuated as expected. Systems operated as expected.
"Reactor vessel inventory and pressure are being maintained in normal control bands.
"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Decay heat is being removed using the steam bypass valves to the condenser and the safety relief valves did not lift as a result of the trip.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 54055
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVEN KOCH
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVEN KOCH
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH
Notification Date: 05/09/2019
Notification Time: 13:51 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2019
Event Time: 09:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/09/2019
Notification Time: 13:51 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2019
Event Time: 09:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/09/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
FFD GROUP (EMAIL)
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
FFD GROUP (EMAIL)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EMPLOYEE SUPERVISOR TESTED POSITIVE ON A RANDOM FITNESS-FOR-DUTY TEST
A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the site has been terminated.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the site has been terminated.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 54134
Rep Org: U.S. NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY
Licensee: U.S. NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY
Region: 1
City: WASHINGTON State: DC
County:
License #: 45-23645-01NA
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JERETTE SPANN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Licensee: U.S. NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY
Region: 1
City: WASHINGTON State: DC
County:
License #: 45-23645-01NA
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JERETTE SPANN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 06/27/2019
Notification Time: 09:30 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2019
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2019
Notification Time: 09:30 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2019
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
DONNA JANDA (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
DONNA JANDA (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
LEAKING NI-63 SOURCES
The following is a summary of the phone conversation with the licensee:
Two Ni-63 sources (Agilent Technologies S/Ns PRO30 and U11381) used in an electron capture detector were found to be leaking. Both sources contained 15 mCi Ni-63. Leakages were 0.048 and 0.039 microCuries. Both sources will be transferred to Agilent Technologies for disposal. Leak tests are performed every 6-months. The last leak tests were performed on 01/08/2019.
The licensee contacted NRC Region I regarding this event.
The following is a summary of the phone conversation with the licensee:
Two Ni-63 sources (Agilent Technologies S/Ns PRO30 and U11381) used in an electron capture detector were found to be leaking. Both sources contained 15 mCi Ni-63. Leakages were 0.048 and 0.039 microCuries. Both sources will be transferred to Agilent Technologies for disposal. Leak tests are performed every 6-months. The last leak tests were performed on 01/08/2019.
The licensee contacted NRC Region I regarding this event.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 54144
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN YODERSMITH
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN YODERSMITH
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH
Notification Date: 07/03/2019
Notification Time: 12:42 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2019
Event Time: 20:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/03/2019
Notification Time: 12:42 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2019
Event Time: 20:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/03/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ROBERT WILLIAMS (R2DO)
ROBERT WILLIAMS (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
60 DAY OPTIONAL NOTIFICATION DUE TO ACTUATION OF AN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR
"This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER submittal, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).
"At approximately 2000 EDT on May 9, 2019, an invalid actuation of emergency diesel generator (EDG) 1 occurred. At the time, EDG 1 was removed from service for planned maintenance. The invalid actuation occurred when the starting air clearance was being lifted while simultaneously performing a Post Maintenance Test (PMT) where an external DC power source was applied to a relay that provided continuity directly to the starting air solenoids. As a result, the air start solenoids were energized causing EDG 1 to start.
"EDG 1 started and functioned successfully. The actuation was complete; EDG 1 successfully started and ran unloaded. The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. Therefore, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation.
"This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER submittal, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).
"At approximately 2000 EDT on May 9, 2019, an invalid actuation of emergency diesel generator (EDG) 1 occurred. At the time, EDG 1 was removed from service for planned maintenance. The invalid actuation occurred when the starting air clearance was being lifted while simultaneously performing a Post Maintenance Test (PMT) where an external DC power source was applied to a relay that provided continuity directly to the starting air solenoids. As a result, the air start solenoids were energized causing EDG 1 to start.
"EDG 1 started and functioned successfully. The actuation was complete; EDG 1 successfully started and ran unloaded. The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. Therefore, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation.
"This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 54147
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: DONNA BOYD
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: DONNA BOYD
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 07/03/2019
Notification Time: 18:32 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2019
Event Time: 12:05 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/03/2019
Notification Time: 18:32 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2019
Event Time: 12:05 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/03/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
60-DAY TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF INVALID ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SIGNAL
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to provide information pertaining to an invalid Engineered Safety Feature actuation signal.
"On May 9, 2019, at Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Unit 1, while performing an Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) Channel B monthly test, a test pushbutton was mispositioned, resulting in an inadvertent initiation of the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System.
"In accordance with the Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) Trip Test portion of the surveillance, the first technician placed EFIC Train B in the tripped condition. The second technician then went to the front of the control room to verify Remote Switch Matrix (RSM) indications. The first technician recalls thinking he was given the order to reset Train B EFW Bus 1 Trip. Therefore, the first technician performed the step using three-part communication, but there is uncertainty about what was said.
"Due to the amount of time the second technician spent in front of the control room, the first technician assumed Operations reset the RSM to complete the Train B reset.
"The second technician returned to the ESAS cabinet and directed the first technician to perform the reset of Train B EFW Bus 1 Trip. The first technician, expecting his next action to be the trip of Train B EFW Bus 2, placed Bus 2 in the tripped condition. This put both buses of Train B EFW in trip and caused the actuation of P-7A EFW Pump.
"This inadvertent actuation was caused by human error and was not a valid signal resulting from parameter inputs. The 1992 Statements of Consideration define an invalid signal to include human error. Therefore, this actuation is considered invalid.
"This event was entered into ANO's corrective action program for resolution. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The plant responded as expected.
"In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(i) a telephone notification is being made in lieu of submitting a written Licensee Event Report.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to provide information pertaining to an invalid Engineered Safety Feature actuation signal.
"On May 9, 2019, at Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Unit 1, while performing an Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) Channel B monthly test, a test pushbutton was mispositioned, resulting in an inadvertent initiation of the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System.
"In accordance with the Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) Trip Test portion of the surveillance, the first technician placed EFIC Train B in the tripped condition. The second technician then went to the front of the control room to verify Remote Switch Matrix (RSM) indications. The first technician recalls thinking he was given the order to reset Train B EFW Bus 1 Trip. Therefore, the first technician performed the step using three-part communication, but there is uncertainty about what was said.
"Due to the amount of time the second technician spent in front of the control room, the first technician assumed Operations reset the RSM to complete the Train B reset.
"The second technician returned to the ESAS cabinet and directed the first technician to perform the reset of Train B EFW Bus 1 Trip. The first technician, expecting his next action to be the trip of Train B EFW Bus 2, placed Bus 2 in the tripped condition. This put both buses of Train B EFW in trip and caused the actuation of P-7A EFW Pump.
"This inadvertent actuation was caused by human error and was not a valid signal resulting from parameter inputs. The 1992 Statements of Consideration define an invalid signal to include human error. Therefore, this actuation is considered invalid.
"This event was entered into ANO's corrective action program for resolution. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The plant responded as expected.
"In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(i) a telephone notification is being made in lieu of submitting a written Licensee Event Report.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."