Event Notification Report for April 30, 2019
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/29/2019 - 04/30/2019
Power Reactor
Event Number: 54121
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: THONG LE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: THONG LE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 06/17/2019
Notification Time: 12:56 [ET]
Event Date: 04/30/2019
Event Time: 06:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/17/2019
Notification Time: 12:56 [ET]
Event Date: 04/30/2019
Event Time: 06:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/17/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
NEIL O'KEEFE (R4DO)
NEIL O'KEEFE (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION DUE TO INVALID ACTUATION OF A GENERAL CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting multiple systems.
"On April 30, 2019, at approximately 0650 CDT, a level 2 containment isolation signal was introduced when a fuse for the Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System was removed for a maintenance clearance. The level 2 containment isolation signal caused a trip of the Division I DC bus back-up charger, leaving only the Division I battery to carry the DC bus. At 0707 CDT the bus was de-energized when another unrelated clearance opened the battery supply breaker to the DC bus causing another containment isolation signal. This event did not affect Shutdown Cooling or any other protected Safety Related Equipment.
"The containment isolation signals caused an isolation of the systems listed below. All components that were not removed from service, gagged in position, already in the expected position due to plant conditions, or de-energized due to plant condition performed as designed.
"Containment Isolation valves for the following systems isolated as expected: Drywell and Containment Floor Drains, Drywell and Containment Equipment Drains, Condensate Makeup, Fire Protection Water, Service Air, Instrument Air, Reactor Water Cleanup, Spent Fuel Cooling and Cleanup, Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water, Chilled Water, Reactor Recirculation, Main Steam Drains, Reactor Building Ventilation, and Fuel Building Ventilation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting multiple systems.
"On April 30, 2019, at approximately 0650 CDT, a level 2 containment isolation signal was introduced when a fuse for the Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System was removed for a maintenance clearance. The level 2 containment isolation signal caused a trip of the Division I DC bus back-up charger, leaving only the Division I battery to carry the DC bus. At 0707 CDT the bus was de-energized when another unrelated clearance opened the battery supply breaker to the DC bus causing another containment isolation signal. This event did not affect Shutdown Cooling or any other protected Safety Related Equipment.
"The containment isolation signals caused an isolation of the systems listed below. All components that were not removed from service, gagged in position, already in the expected position due to plant conditions, or de-energized due to plant condition performed as designed.
"Containment Isolation valves for the following systems isolated as expected: Drywell and Containment Floor Drains, Drywell and Containment Equipment Drains, Condensate Makeup, Fire Protection Water, Service Air, Instrument Air, Reactor Water Cleanup, Spent Fuel Cooling and Cleanup, Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water, Chilled Water, Reactor Recirculation, Main Steam Drains, Reactor Building Ventilation, and Fuel Building Ventilation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Non-Power Reactor
Event Number: 54038
Rep Org: NATIONAL INST OF STANDARDS & TECH
Licensee: U. S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE
Region: 0
City: GAITHERSBURG State: MD
County: MONTGOMERY
License #: TR-5
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000184
NRC Notified By: TOM NEWTON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Licensee: U. S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE
Region: 0
City: GAITHERSBURG State: MD
County: MONTGOMERY
License #: TR-5
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000184
NRC Notified By: TOM NEWTON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 04/30/2019
Notification Time: 14:17 [ET]
Event Date: 04/30/2019
Event Time: 09:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2019
Notification Time: 14:17 [ET]
Event Date: 04/30/2019
Event Time: 09:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1) - DEVIATION FROM T SPEC
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1) - DEVIATION FROM T SPEC
Person (Organization):
XIAOSONG YIN (NRR DLP)
ELIZABETH REED (NRR DLP)
XIAOSONG YIN (NRR DLP)
ELIZABETH REED (NRR DLP)
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATION DUE TO USING THE WRONG PROCEDURE
"On April 30, 2019 at approximately 0900 EDT at the National Bureau of Standards Test Reactor (NBSR) a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) was discussing proposed changes to the area radiation monitor system with NBSR Instrumentation and Control personnel. During this discussion, the SRO realized that the surveillance standard for the radiation monitors had changed in September 2018. The Technical Specification 3.7.1(4) states 'The reactor shall not be operated unless: Two area radiation monitors are operable on floors C-100 and C-200'. To verify operability Technical Specification 4.7.1(4)(b) states 'The Area Radiation Monitors shall be channel tested monthly and channel calibrated annually'. The SRO informed the Chief of Reactor Operations (CRO) that they had incorrectly performed the required monthly channel test in December 2018 and January 2019. The channel test was properly performed in November 2018 and February 2019. The Reactor operated between 12/05/2018 and 12/21/2018 and again between 02/05/2019 and 02/15/2019."
"On April 30, 2019 at approximately 0900 EDT at the National Bureau of Standards Test Reactor (NBSR) a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) was discussing proposed changes to the area radiation monitor system with NBSR Instrumentation and Control personnel. During this discussion, the SRO realized that the surveillance standard for the radiation monitors had changed in September 2018. The Technical Specification 3.7.1(4) states 'The reactor shall not be operated unless: Two area radiation monitors are operable on floors C-100 and C-200'. To verify operability Technical Specification 4.7.1(4)(b) states 'The Area Radiation Monitors shall be channel tested monthly and channel calibrated annually'. The SRO informed the Chief of Reactor Operations (CRO) that they had incorrectly performed the required monthly channel test in December 2018 and January 2019. The channel test was properly performed in November 2018 and February 2019. The Reactor operated between 12/05/2018 and 12/21/2018 and again between 02/05/2019 and 02/15/2019."
Agreement State
Event Number: 54039
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: GEOLABS WESTLAKE VILLAGE
Region: 4
City: WESTLAKE VILLAGE State: CA
County: VENTURA
License #: 2450-19
Agreement: Y
Docket: 043019
NRC Notified By: DONALD OESTERLE
HQ OPS Officer: BRIAN LIN
Licensee: GEOLABS WESTLAKE VILLAGE
Region: 4
City: WESTLAKE VILLAGE State: CA
County: VENTURA
License #: 2450-19
Agreement: Y
Docket: 043019
NRC Notified By: DONALD OESTERLE
HQ OPS Officer: BRIAN LIN
Notification Date: 04/30/2019
Notification Time: 15:16 [ET]
Event Date: 04/30/2019
Event Time: 11:15 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2019
Notification Time: 15:16 [ET]
Event Date: 04/30/2019
Event Time: 11:15 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB (EMAIL)
CNSNS (MEXICO) (EMAIL)
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB (EMAIL)
CNSNS (MEXICO) (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN NUCLEAR DENSITY GAUGE
The following report was received from the State of California via email:
"The RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] of Geolabs reported to the RHB [Radiation Health Branch] that his gauge technician had reported a CPN MC-3 (serial number M37067701) was stolen. The CPN gauge contains 10 milliCuries of Cs-137 and 50 milliCuries of Americium-241, and was inside its Type A transportation container. The technician was transporting the CPN gauge to a temporary job site. The RSO will be contacting the Ventura County Sheriff's Dept. to report the theft and take a statement from the technician. This is an ongoing investigation."
California 5010 number: 043019
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following report was received from the State of California via email:
"The RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] of Geolabs reported to the RHB [Radiation Health Branch] that his gauge technician had reported a CPN MC-3 (serial number M37067701) was stolen. The CPN gauge contains 10 milliCuries of Cs-137 and 50 milliCuries of Americium-241, and was inside its Type A transportation container. The technician was transporting the CPN gauge to a temporary job site. The RSO will be contacting the Ventura County Sheriff's Dept. to report the theft and take a statement from the technician. This is an ongoing investigation."
California 5010 number: 043019
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf