Event Notification Report for November 12, 2018
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/11/2018 - 11/12/2018
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53736
Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BEN EVANS
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BEN EVANS
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 11/12/2018
Notification Time: 20:52 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/12/2018
Notification Time: 20:52 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/12/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled |
SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"On November 12, 2018, at 1636 EST, with Surry Unit 1 at 100 percent power and Surry Unit 2 defueled, the 'C' Reserve Station Service Transformer (RSST) pilot wire lockout actuated during restoration of the 'C' RSST following transformer replacement. This resulted in electrical isolation of the 'C' RSST, the 'F' Transfer Bus, the Unit 1 'H' Emergency Bus, and the Unit 2 'J' Emergency Bus. The #1 and #3 Emergency Diesel Generators automatically started and loaded onto the 1H and 2J emergency buses, respectively, as designed. Operations entered the appropriate abnormal procedures and stabilized both units. This equipment operated as expected during the event.
"The Surry electrical distribution system was in an off-normal alignment to support 'C' RSST replacement with the dependable alternate power supply from Unit 2 station service backfeed supplying the 1H and 2J emergency buses. The 'C' RSST pilot wire lockout tripped and locked out the station service supply tie breaker to the 'F' Transfer Bus.
"The organization is reviewing the 'C' RSST pilot wire lockout and the required actions for recovery. Surry Unit 1 entered a 6-hour action statement to place the unit in Hot Shutdown due to this partial loss of offsite power. This clock was exited upon reset of the pilot wire lockout, restoring backfeed as a dependable offsite power source. Unit 1 remained at 100 percent power throughout the event.
"No radiological consequences resulted from this event. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to actuation of the #1 and #3 Emergency Diesel Generators.
"The NRC Resident was notified."
"On November 12, 2018, at 1636 EST, with Surry Unit 1 at 100 percent power and Surry Unit 2 defueled, the 'C' Reserve Station Service Transformer (RSST) pilot wire lockout actuated during restoration of the 'C' RSST following transformer replacement. This resulted in electrical isolation of the 'C' RSST, the 'F' Transfer Bus, the Unit 1 'H' Emergency Bus, and the Unit 2 'J' Emergency Bus. The #1 and #3 Emergency Diesel Generators automatically started and loaded onto the 1H and 2J emergency buses, respectively, as designed. Operations entered the appropriate abnormal procedures and stabilized both units. This equipment operated as expected during the event.
"The Surry electrical distribution system was in an off-normal alignment to support 'C' RSST replacement with the dependable alternate power supply from Unit 2 station service backfeed supplying the 1H and 2J emergency buses. The 'C' RSST pilot wire lockout tripped and locked out the station service supply tie breaker to the 'F' Transfer Bus.
"The organization is reviewing the 'C' RSST pilot wire lockout and the required actions for recovery. Surry Unit 1 entered a 6-hour action statement to place the unit in Hot Shutdown due to this partial loss of offsite power. This clock was exited upon reset of the pilot wire lockout, restoring backfeed as a dependable offsite power source. Unit 1 remained at 100 percent power throughout the event.
"No radiological consequences resulted from this event. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to actuation of the #1 and #3 Emergency Diesel Generators.
"The NRC Resident was notified."
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 53735
Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: PHILLIP OLLIS
HQ OPS Officer: OSSY FONT
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: PHILLIP OLLIS
HQ OPS Officer: OSSY FONT
Notification Date: 11/12/2018
Notification Time: 14:06 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/14/2018
Notification Time: 14:06 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/14/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (c) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION/NEWS REL
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (c) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION/NEWS REL
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO FIRE MARSHALL FOR FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM INSPECTION
"At 0930 (EST) on November 12th, 2018, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified per State code requirements that the fire suppression system (Fire Riser 617) for the FMO [Fuel Manufacturing Operations] oil storage warehouse will be taken offline to replace sprinkler heads and conduct the required 5 year inspection. This impairment will begin Tuesday, November 13th. This building is normally unoccupied. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70 Appendix A(c)."
The system will be offline for approximately 8 hours and the NRC will be notified once work is complete.
The licensee will notify the NRC Region and the State of North Carolina
* * * UPDATE ON 11/14/18 AT 1547 FROM PHILLIP OLLIS TO BETHANY CECERE * * *
"Fire Riser 617 and the supporting system was restored to service at approximately 1300 EST, 11/14/18. The NHC Deputy Fire Marshall was notified via telephone of the return to service."
Notified R2DO (Sandal) and NMSS Events Notification (by email).
"At 0930 (EST) on November 12th, 2018, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified per State code requirements that the fire suppression system (Fire Riser 617) for the FMO [Fuel Manufacturing Operations] oil storage warehouse will be taken offline to replace sprinkler heads and conduct the required 5 year inspection. This impairment will begin Tuesday, November 13th. This building is normally unoccupied. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70 Appendix A(c)."
The system will be offline for approximately 8 hours and the NRC will be notified once work is complete.
The licensee will notify the NRC Region and the State of North Carolina
* * * UPDATE ON 11/14/18 AT 1547 FROM PHILLIP OLLIS TO BETHANY CECERE * * *
"Fire Riser 617 and the supporting system was restored to service at approximately 1300 EST, 11/14/18. The NHC Deputy Fire Marshall was notified via telephone of the return to service."
Notified R2DO (Sandal) and NMSS Events Notification (by email).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53817
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: NICHOLAS HIGHTOWER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFFREY WHITED
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: NICHOLAS HIGHTOWER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFFREY WHITED
Notification Date: 01/08/2019
Notification Time: 08:12 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/2018
Event Time: 13:31 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/08/2019
Notification Time: 08:12 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/2018
Event Time: 13:31 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/08/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
FRANK EHRHARDT (R2DO)
FRANK EHRHARDT (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"On November 12, 2018, at 1331 EST, Unit 1 secondary containment isolated and Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) systems started on Unit 1 and Unit 2 due to a blown fuse. The blown fuse was caused by a degraded refuel floor radiation monitoring relay, causing the radiation monitor to trip and resulted in an invalid actuation of the Unit 1 Group 10 and Group 11 primary containment isolation valves, all Unit 1 secondary containment isolation valves, and auto start of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SBGT system. The Unit 1 Fission Product Monitor isolated and tripped and both Unit 1 H202 Analyzers isolated.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) since the containment isolation and auto-start of SBGT on both units was not part of a pre-planned sequence and the event resulted in the invalid actuation of general containment isolation valves in more than one system.
"All primary and secondary containment isolation valves, with the exception of the 2T41F003A, Refueling Floor Inboard Vent Supply Isolation valve, functioned successfully. The refuel floor inboard vent supply isolation valve failed to travel fully closed on the secondary containment isolation signal and was therefore declared inoperable. The 2T41F003B refuel floor outboard vent supply isolation valve was verified to go fully closed and therefore isolation of that associated penetration line was successful. After assistance from maintenance, the valve was verified to be fully closed.
"All SBGT systems functioned successfully. The associated fuse and relay were replaced, and secondary containment was returned to normal service.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"On November 12, 2018, at 1331 EST, Unit 1 secondary containment isolated and Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) systems started on Unit 1 and Unit 2 due to a blown fuse. The blown fuse was caused by a degraded refuel floor radiation monitoring relay, causing the radiation monitor to trip and resulted in an invalid actuation of the Unit 1 Group 10 and Group 11 primary containment isolation valves, all Unit 1 secondary containment isolation valves, and auto start of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SBGT system. The Unit 1 Fission Product Monitor isolated and tripped and both Unit 1 H202 Analyzers isolated.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) since the containment isolation and auto-start of SBGT on both units was not part of a pre-planned sequence and the event resulted in the invalid actuation of general containment isolation valves in more than one system.
"All primary and secondary containment isolation valves, with the exception of the 2T41F003A, Refueling Floor Inboard Vent Supply Isolation valve, functioned successfully. The refuel floor inboard vent supply isolation valve failed to travel fully closed on the secondary containment isolation signal and was therefore declared inoperable. The 2T41F003B refuel floor outboard vent supply isolation valve was verified to go fully closed and therefore isolation of that associated penetration line was successful. After assistance from maintenance, the valve was verified to be fully closed.
"All SBGT systems functioned successfully. The associated fuse and relay were replaced, and secondary containment was returned to normal service.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."