Event Notification Report for October 20, 2018
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/19/2018 - 10/20/2018
Agreement State
Event Number: 53683
Rep Org: VIRGINIA RAD MATERIALS PROGRAM
Licensee: ECD MID-ATLANTIC CHANTILLY
Region: 1
City: STERLING State: VA
County: LOUDOUN
License #: 107-314-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ASFAW FENTA
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Licensee: ECD MID-ATLANTIC CHANTILLY
Region: 1
City: STERLING State: VA
County: LOUDOUN
License #: 107-314-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ASFAW FENTA
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 10/22/2018
Notification Time: 12:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/22/2018
Notification Time: 12:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/22/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DONNA JANDA (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
DONNA JANDA (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPOT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following was received from the Commonwealth of Virginia by email:
"On October 20, 2018, the representative of the Virginia Radioactive Materials Program (VRMP) received a telephone call from the licensee that the guide tube of a portable nuclear moisture/density gauge (CPN Model MC-1DRP, Serial number MD50507856) was damaged (bent) by a truck while performing testing at a temporary jobsite in Sterling, Virginia. The gauge contained 10 milliCuries of Cesium-137 and 50 milliCuries of Americium-241/Beryllium. The sources were in the shielded position and the shielding integrity was not damaged. The licensee performed a survey of the gauge and readings observed were between 0.2 and 0.3 mR/hr at three (3) feet distance from the gauge.
"The gauge was put in its transport box and returned to the office. Wipe test samples were taken. Samples were sent to the North East Technical Services for analysis. Results are pending. The VRMP is currently working with the licensee to obtain additional information. This report will be updated when VRMP receives more information."
VA Event Report ID No.: VA-18-006
The following was received from the Commonwealth of Virginia by email:
"On October 20, 2018, the representative of the Virginia Radioactive Materials Program (VRMP) received a telephone call from the licensee that the guide tube of a portable nuclear moisture/density gauge (CPN Model MC-1DRP, Serial number MD50507856) was damaged (bent) by a truck while performing testing at a temporary jobsite in Sterling, Virginia. The gauge contained 10 milliCuries of Cesium-137 and 50 milliCuries of Americium-241/Beryllium. The sources were in the shielded position and the shielding integrity was not damaged. The licensee performed a survey of the gauge and readings observed were between 0.2 and 0.3 mR/hr at three (3) feet distance from the gauge.
"The gauge was put in its transport box and returned to the office. Wipe test samples were taken. Samples were sent to the North East Technical Services for analysis. Results are pending. The VRMP is currently working with the licensee to obtain additional information. This report will be updated when VRMP receives more information."
VA Event Report ID No.: VA-18-006
Agreement State
Event Number: 53684
Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: APPLUS RTD USA, INC.
Region: 1
City: CHARLOTTE State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRAVIS CARTOSKI
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Licensee: APPLUS RTD USA, INC.
Region: 1
City: CHARLOTTE State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRAVIS CARTOSKI
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 10/22/2018
Notification Time: 14:22 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/22/2018
Notification Time: 14:22 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/22/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DONNA JANDA (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
DONNA JANDA (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE FAILED TO RETRACT
The following was received from the State of North Carolina by email:
"On 10/20/18, at 1757 EDT, the office RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] received a call from a crew working a project at Kings Mountain Compressor Station in Kings Mt., NC. The qualified radiographer assigned is Technician 1, with assistant Technician 2. Upon exposure of a 3 inch weld, the source did not retract when attempting to secure the RAM to end exposure. The crew immediately verified and re-verified and secured boundaries and called the RSO as required by operating and emergency procedures.
"The local RSO notified the CRSO [corporate RSO] of the event at 1803 EDT and proceeded to the site. [While] in route to the project site, Technician 4 was notified to go to the Charlotte office to get spare control cables for possible use in recovery operations. Upon arrival at approximately 1830 EDT, the RSO evaluated the site and boundaries and took action to move the source and collimator assembly to a better position to allow stacking of available sand bags in order to minimize boundary area for a more condensed and controllable area. During the movement of the exposure device, positive pressure was applied to the control to prevent the source from moving out of the collimator. Once the exposure device was positioned correctly, sand bags were placed over the source assembly to reduce exposure limits. During this operation, survey meters were used to verify radiation exposures. The radiation area was reduced to 30-35 feet.
"A conversation with the CRSO and calls with additional Applus groups were made in order to identify the closest source recovery tools and equipment in order to attempt recovery of the source.
"[Personnel] added another layer of area markings for control purposes. Contractor site personnel stayed clear of the area without issue during event. No exposure to the general public occurred.
"The recovery kit arrived on site at approximately 1030 EDT, 10/21/18. After review of available equipment, a recovery plan was discussed. Dosimetry, equipment operation, and proper calibrations were verified. All dosimeter pencils were verified at zero at the beginning of the event and monitored at stages during recovery. Actions were broken down in order to balance and reduce exposure to each individual and modified as necessary during event.
"The plan of action was to create a shielded dam with available lead shot and sand bags at the open end of the guide tube, with one bag directly in front of the tube to stop the source assembly at the most shielded position, with the others providing a shielded position for the capsule of the source assembly. The last sand bag on the collimator was left in position up until the last step. Two individuals were directed to quickly remove the last shielding bag while the other utilized an extended tong device to lift the collimator assembly directly upward to propel the source to the established dam of shielding. Survey meters were used to monitor this action to verify the source moved from the previous position to the created shielding dam. All dosimeter pencils were reviewed in order to determine who would be chosen to disconnect damaged connector and then another to make the connection to the functioning control cable. The first person pulled the connection out only far enough to disconnect the damaged connector. The second person performed the re-connection. The survey meter reading at the connection area was approximately 200 mR/hr during these steps. The time of exposure to perform these two events was estimated to be less than 30 seconds, which would have equaled approximately 1.6 mR of exposure to the hands of each individual. From the safe distance of the control cable, the source was retracted to the shielded position of the device and surveyed and secured. At this time, the exposure device and control cable have been returned to the office and tagged with damage tags so no one will use it."
NC tracking number: 180043
The following was received from the State of North Carolina by email:
"On 10/20/18, at 1757 EDT, the office RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] received a call from a crew working a project at Kings Mountain Compressor Station in Kings Mt., NC. The qualified radiographer assigned is Technician 1, with assistant Technician 2. Upon exposure of a 3 inch weld, the source did not retract when attempting to secure the RAM to end exposure. The crew immediately verified and re-verified and secured boundaries and called the RSO as required by operating and emergency procedures.
"The local RSO notified the CRSO [corporate RSO] of the event at 1803 EDT and proceeded to the site. [While] in route to the project site, Technician 4 was notified to go to the Charlotte office to get spare control cables for possible use in recovery operations. Upon arrival at approximately 1830 EDT, the RSO evaluated the site and boundaries and took action to move the source and collimator assembly to a better position to allow stacking of available sand bags in order to minimize boundary area for a more condensed and controllable area. During the movement of the exposure device, positive pressure was applied to the control to prevent the source from moving out of the collimator. Once the exposure device was positioned correctly, sand bags were placed over the source assembly to reduce exposure limits. During this operation, survey meters were used to verify radiation exposures. The radiation area was reduced to 30-35 feet.
"A conversation with the CRSO and calls with additional Applus groups were made in order to identify the closest source recovery tools and equipment in order to attempt recovery of the source.
"[Personnel] added another layer of area markings for control purposes. Contractor site personnel stayed clear of the area without issue during event. No exposure to the general public occurred.
"The recovery kit arrived on site at approximately 1030 EDT, 10/21/18. After review of available equipment, a recovery plan was discussed. Dosimetry, equipment operation, and proper calibrations were verified. All dosimeter pencils were verified at zero at the beginning of the event and monitored at stages during recovery. Actions were broken down in order to balance and reduce exposure to each individual and modified as necessary during event.
"The plan of action was to create a shielded dam with available lead shot and sand bags at the open end of the guide tube, with one bag directly in front of the tube to stop the source assembly at the most shielded position, with the others providing a shielded position for the capsule of the source assembly. The last sand bag on the collimator was left in position up until the last step. Two individuals were directed to quickly remove the last shielding bag while the other utilized an extended tong device to lift the collimator assembly directly upward to propel the source to the established dam of shielding. Survey meters were used to monitor this action to verify the source moved from the previous position to the created shielding dam. All dosimeter pencils were reviewed in order to determine who would be chosen to disconnect damaged connector and then another to make the connection to the functioning control cable. The first person pulled the connection out only far enough to disconnect the damaged connector. The second person performed the re-connection. The survey meter reading at the connection area was approximately 200 mR/hr during these steps. The time of exposure to perform these two events was estimated to be less than 30 seconds, which would have equaled approximately 1.6 mR of exposure to the hands of each individual. From the safe distance of the control cable, the source was retracted to the shielded position of the device and surveyed and secured. At this time, the exposure device and control cable have been returned to the office and tagged with damage tags so no one will use it."
NC tracking number: 180043
Agreement State
Event Number: 53679
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: DESERT NDT LLC
Region: 4
City: ABILENE State: TX
County:
License #: LICEN-RAM-L06462
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARTHUR TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Licensee: DESERT NDT LLC
Region: 4
City: ABILENE State: TX
County:
License #: LICEN-RAM-L06462
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARTHUR TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 10/21/2018
Notification Time: 16:19 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/2018
Notification Time: 16:19 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
GREG PICK (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE FAILURE TO RETRACT
The following information was received via E-mail:
"On October 20, 2018, the agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that one of its radiography crews was unable to return an 80 curie iridium-192 source to the fully shielded position in an INC IR 100 exposure device. The RSO stated that the event occurred near Pecos, Texas. The RSO stated that the radiographers had established a 2 millirem boundary.
"An individual listed on their license responded to perform the source retrieval. The location where the event occurred was remote and the event did not present an exposure risk to any individual. The RSO stated that there are very few people at the site.
"Once the individual who was sent to retrieve the source arrived, they inspected the exposure device and guide tube. The inspection discovered the radiographers had bent the guide tube to get it through some pipes and the angle of the bend was what had prevented the source from being retracted. The guide tube was straightened and the source was retracted to the fully shielded position at 2100 hours. The guide tube was inspected and did not have any damage. The RSO stated that no overexposures had occurred."
Texas Incident Number: 9622
The following information was received via E-mail:
"On October 20, 2018, the agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that one of its radiography crews was unable to return an 80 curie iridium-192 source to the fully shielded position in an INC IR 100 exposure device. The RSO stated that the event occurred near Pecos, Texas. The RSO stated that the radiographers had established a 2 millirem boundary.
"An individual listed on their license responded to perform the source retrieval. The location where the event occurred was remote and the event did not present an exposure risk to any individual. The RSO stated that there are very few people at the site.
"Once the individual who was sent to retrieve the source arrived, they inspected the exposure device and guide tube. The inspection discovered the radiographers had bent the guide tube to get it through some pipes and the angle of the bend was what had prevented the source from being retracted. The guide tube was straightened and the source was retracted to the fully shielded position at 2100 hours. The guide tube was inspected and did not have any damage. The RSO stated that no overexposures had occurred."
Texas Incident Number: 9622