Event Notification Report for September 11, 2018
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/10/2018 - 09/11/2018
EVENT NUMBERS
535975359853593535945359553682
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53597
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RODNEY COONS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RODNEY COONS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 09/11/2018
Notification Time: 18:42 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2018
Notification Time: 18:42 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN HANNA (R3DO)
JOHN HANNA (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION
"On 9/10/2018, the 11 Core Spray (CSP) loop was placed in service to support quarterly surveillance testing. With the 11 CSP pump in service it was identified that the check valves isolating the 11 CSP system from the keep fill supply were leaking by. At 1129 CDT on 9/11/2018, it was identified that this leakage may have exceeded the leakage rate assumptions made in the dose analysis calculation for emergency core cooling system (ECCS) leakage outside containment following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). Therefore, this is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"The potential ECCS leak pathway has been isolated. There is no impact to health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"On 9/10/2018, the 11 Core Spray (CSP) loop was placed in service to support quarterly surveillance testing. With the 11 CSP pump in service it was identified that the check valves isolating the 11 CSP system from the keep fill supply were leaking by. At 1129 CDT on 9/11/2018, it was identified that this leakage may have exceeded the leakage rate assumptions made in the dose analysis calculation for emergency core cooling system (ECCS) leakage outside containment following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). Therefore, this is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"The potential ECCS leak pathway has been isolated. There is no impact to health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53598
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ANDREW TERERAKIS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ANDREW TERERAKIS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 09/11/2018
Notification Time: 23:23 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2018
Notification Time: 23:23 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | 0 |
WELD DEFECT ON PRESSURIZER INTERFACE
"At 2200 EDT on September 11, 2018, during inspections as part of the pressurizer bare metal inspection program, an apparent weld defect was identified on Class 1 pressurizer level piping at the piping to pressurizer interface. The reactor is currently defueled in a refueling outage. Appropriate repairs will be made during the refueling outage."
NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"At 2200 EDT on September 11, 2018, during inspections as part of the pressurizer bare metal inspection program, an apparent weld defect was identified on Class 1 pressurizer level piping at the piping to pressurizer interface. The reactor is currently defueled in a refueling outage. Appropriate repairs will be made during the refueling outage."
NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53593
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JUSTIN GALLAGHER
HQ OPS Officer: OSSY FONT
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JUSTIN GALLAGHER
HQ OPS Officer: OSSY FONT
Notification Date: 09/11/2018
Notification Time: 05:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2018
Notification Time: 05:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 97 | Power Operation | 97 | Power Operation |
CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"At 0113 EDT on September 11, 2018, it was discovered both trains of CREVS [control room emergency ventilation system] were simultaneously inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The door to the main control room habitability zone from the turbine building was left open and unattended for about a minute, breaking the pressure boundary in the room, resulting in an alarm. The door was closed, clearing the alarm and the CREVS was considered operable.
"At 0113 EDT on September 11, 2018, it was discovered both trains of CREVS [control room emergency ventilation system] were simultaneously inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The door to the main control room habitability zone from the turbine building was left open and unattended for about a minute, breaking the pressure boundary in the room, resulting in an alarm. The door was closed, clearing the alarm and the CREVS was considered operable.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53594
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TOM DINGEL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TOM DINGEL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 09/11/2018
Notification Time: 17:14 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2018
Notification Time: 17:14 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
RAY MCKINLEY (R1DO)
RAY MCKINLEY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 97 | Power Operation | 97 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 88 | Power Operation | 88 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION NON-FUNCTIONAL
"On September 11, 2018 the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation was discovered to be non-functional during system testing. At 1310 EDT, an air leak was identified that prevented the modulating dampers to operate as designed to maintain required pressure. The air leak was not able to be repaired within a 60 minute period. This failure affected the ability of the TSC ventilation system to maintain adequate radiological habitability in the event of an emergency with an airborne radiological release. All other capabilities of the TSC are unaffected by this emergent condition. The air leak has been repaired and post maintenance testing was completed satisfactory at 1654 [EDT], restoring the TSC ventilation to a functional condition.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of an emergency response facility because of the unavailability of the ventilation system."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"On September 11, 2018 the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation was discovered to be non-functional during system testing. At 1310 EDT, an air leak was identified that prevented the modulating dampers to operate as designed to maintain required pressure. The air leak was not able to be repaired within a 60 minute period. This failure affected the ability of the TSC ventilation system to maintain adequate radiological habitability in the event of an emergency with an airborne radiological release. All other capabilities of the TSC are unaffected by this emergent condition. The air leak has been repaired and post maintenance testing was completed satisfactory at 1654 [EDT], restoring the TSC ventilation to a functional condition.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of an emergency response facility because of the unavailability of the ventilation system."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53595
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [3] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-AP1000,[4] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: KARA STACY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [3] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-AP1000,[4] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: KARA STACY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 09/11/2018
Notification Time: 17:53 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2018
Notification Time: 17:53 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
FFD GROUP (EMAIL)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
FFD GROUP (EMAIL)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Under Construction | 0 | Under Construction |
| 4 | N | N | 0 | Under Construction | 0 | Under Construction |
CONTRACTOR SUPERVISOR TESTS POSITIVE ON FITNESS-FOR-DUTY TEST
"At 1430 EDT on September 11, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for drugs during a Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"At 1430 EDT on September 11, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for drugs during a Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Agreement State
Event Number: 53682
Rep Org: NEW YORK STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH
Licensee: TERRACON CONSULTANTS, INC.
Region: 1
City: ROCHESTER State: NY
County:
License #: C3209
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DANIEL J. SAMSON
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Licensee: TERRACON CONSULTANTS, INC.
Region: 1
City: ROCHESTER State: NY
County:
License #: C3209
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DANIEL J. SAMSON
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 10/22/2018
Notification Time: 12:24 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/22/2018
Notification Time: 12:24 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/22/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DONNA JANDA (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
DONNA JANDA (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following was received from the State of New York by fax:
"Terracon Consultants reported that a moisture/density gauge [Troxler model 3430P, serial #70428, containing 0.30 GBq (8 mCi) Cs137 and 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) Am-Be source] was damaged at a mass fill project in Rochester, NY. The source manufacturer and serial number are not yet available.
"While at a mass fill project in Rochester, NY, a technician had completed a round of density testing and placed the gauge within a roped off area at the end of the fill area. He then walked to his truck approximately 100 feet away to get water. During that time, a 10-ton single drum roller moving in reverse headed towards the roped off area and gauge. The technician noticed the operator approaching the gauge as he walked back towards it and yelled and tried to gain the attention of the roller operator. The rear rubber tire of the roller impacted the side of the gauge and damaged the plastic covering. The technician cordoned off the area 15 feet around the gauge and surveyed the operator and roller.
"The technician called their office manager and a regional manager (who happened to be in their office) and went to the site and surveyed the gauge and all parties/equipment involved and it did not appear that the gauge was leaking. The gauge was visually inspected for damage and it appeared that only the top case was damaged, the gauge was still operational, and the source rod was fully enclosed in the gauge. The gauge was returned to its transport case and returned to its permanent storage location in Rochester, NY. The gauge will be transported for repair and leak testing.
"An internal root cause analysis and follow up training with the technician will be set in place with their corporate RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] in the next few days."
NY EVENT REPORT ID NO. NY-18-02
The following was received from the State of New York by fax:
"Terracon Consultants reported that a moisture/density gauge [Troxler model 3430P, serial #70428, containing 0.30 GBq (8 mCi) Cs137 and 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) Am-Be source] was damaged at a mass fill project in Rochester, NY. The source manufacturer and serial number are not yet available.
"While at a mass fill project in Rochester, NY, a technician had completed a round of density testing and placed the gauge within a roped off area at the end of the fill area. He then walked to his truck approximately 100 feet away to get water. During that time, a 10-ton single drum roller moving in reverse headed towards the roped off area and gauge. The technician noticed the operator approaching the gauge as he walked back towards it and yelled and tried to gain the attention of the roller operator. The rear rubber tire of the roller impacted the side of the gauge and damaged the plastic covering. The technician cordoned off the area 15 feet around the gauge and surveyed the operator and roller.
"The technician called their office manager and a regional manager (who happened to be in their office) and went to the site and surveyed the gauge and all parties/equipment involved and it did not appear that the gauge was leaking. The gauge was visually inspected for damage and it appeared that only the top case was damaged, the gauge was still operational, and the source rod was fully enclosed in the gauge. The gauge was returned to its transport case and returned to its permanent storage location in Rochester, NY. The gauge will be transported for repair and leak testing.
"An internal root cause analysis and follow up training with the technician will be set in place with their corporate RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] in the next few days."
NY EVENT REPORT ID NO. NY-18-02