Event Notification Report for June 27, 2018
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/26/2018 - 06/27/2018
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53477
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: ROBERT WARNER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: ROBERT WARNER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 06/28/2018
Notification Time: 05:37 [ET]
Event Date: 06/27/2018
Event Time: 23:12 [MST]
Last Update Date: 06/28/2018
Notification Time: 05:37 [ET]
Event Date: 06/27/2018
Event Time: 23:12 [MST]
Last Update Date: 06/28/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
RYAN ALEXANDER (R4DO)
RYAN ALEXANDER (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP ON LOW STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS [Emergency Notification System] or under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.
"On June 27th, 2018 at approximately 2310 Mountain Standard Time (MST), in Palo Verde Unit 3, the #1 Steam Generator Economizer valve started closing. This caused Steam Generator #1 water level to decrease. Both Feed water pumps speed increased to raise Steam Generator level. At approximately 2311 [MST], the B Main Feed water pump tripped resulting in a Reactor Power Cutback. Steam Generator #1 level continued to decrease resulting in an Automatic Reactor Trip on Low Steam Generator #1 water level. All control rods inserted to shut down the Reactor to Mode 3 using Main Feed water and Steam Bypass. Post trip Steam Generator #1 level then increased and at approximately 2316 [MST] a Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS) was received on high Steam Generator level. The 'B' Auxiliary Feed water pump was manually started to maintain Steam Generator water levels and Steam Generator pressure was controlled using the Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs).
"Following the reactor trip, all CEAs [Control Element Assemblies] inserted fully into the core. All systems operated as expected. No emergency plan classification was required per the Emergency Plan. Safety related busses remained powered during the event from offsite power and the offsite power grid is stable. No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event or complicated operator response. Unit 3 is stable and in Mode 3 feeding Steam Generators with Auxiliary Feed water Pump 'B'. The event did not result in any challenges to fission product barriers and there were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was informed of the Unit 3 reactor trip."
Unit 1and Unit 2 were unaffected by the Unit 3 trip.
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS [Emergency Notification System] or under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.
"On June 27th, 2018 at approximately 2310 Mountain Standard Time (MST), in Palo Verde Unit 3, the #1 Steam Generator Economizer valve started closing. This caused Steam Generator #1 water level to decrease. Both Feed water pumps speed increased to raise Steam Generator level. At approximately 2311 [MST], the B Main Feed water pump tripped resulting in a Reactor Power Cutback. Steam Generator #1 level continued to decrease resulting in an Automatic Reactor Trip on Low Steam Generator #1 water level. All control rods inserted to shut down the Reactor to Mode 3 using Main Feed water and Steam Bypass. Post trip Steam Generator #1 level then increased and at approximately 2316 [MST] a Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS) was received on high Steam Generator level. The 'B' Auxiliary Feed water pump was manually started to maintain Steam Generator water levels and Steam Generator pressure was controlled using the Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs).
"Following the reactor trip, all CEAs [Control Element Assemblies] inserted fully into the core. All systems operated as expected. No emergency plan classification was required per the Emergency Plan. Safety related busses remained powered during the event from offsite power and the offsite power grid is stable. No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event or complicated operator response. Unit 3 is stable and in Mode 3 feeding Steam Generators with Auxiliary Feed water Pump 'B'. The event did not result in any challenges to fission product barriers and there were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was informed of the Unit 3 reactor trip."
Unit 1and Unit 2 were unaffected by the Unit 3 trip.
Agreement State
Event Number: 53478
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: IIA FIELD SERVICES
Region: 4
City: ABILENE State: TX
County:
License #: L06933
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARTHUR TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: IIA FIELD SERVICES
Region: 4
City: ABILENE State: TX
County:
License #: L06933
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARTHUR TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 06/28/2018
Notification Time: 10:10 [ET]
Event Date: 06/27/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/28/2018
Notification Time: 10:10 [ET]
Event Date: 06/27/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/28/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RYAN ALEXANDER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
RYAN ALEXANDER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE DISCONNECT
The following information was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On June 27, 2018, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee's corporate radiation safety officer (CRSO) that one of his radiography crew had experienced a source disconnect. The crew was using a QSA 880D exposure device containing a 113.1 Curie iridium - 192 source. After completing the first shot on a new location on the pipeline, the crew could not get the source to return to the exposure device. The crew contacted the CRSO and set up new barriers at 2 millirem. The CRSO and a second individual qualified for source retrieval arrived at the site at 1743 hours. The retrieval team (RT) surveyed the guide tube and determined the source was in the collimator. The RT removed the guide tube from the exposure device and removed the camera from the area. Using a set of long tongs, the guide tube was removed from the pipe and the source slid down the guide tube until the connector was exposed. They could see the drive cable had broken near the connector. The source was shielded with bags of lead shot. The CRSO disconnected the broken drive cable from the source pigtail and connected the pigtail to a new drive cable that had been installed on the camera. The source was retracted to the shielded position in the camera. The camera and crank out device and drive cable will be sent to the manufacturer for inspection. No overexposures occurred as a result of this event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident # - 9590
The following information was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On June 27, 2018, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee's corporate radiation safety officer (CRSO) that one of his radiography crew had experienced a source disconnect. The crew was using a QSA 880D exposure device containing a 113.1 Curie iridium - 192 source. After completing the first shot on a new location on the pipeline, the crew could not get the source to return to the exposure device. The crew contacted the CRSO and set up new barriers at 2 millirem. The CRSO and a second individual qualified for source retrieval arrived at the site at 1743 hours. The retrieval team (RT) surveyed the guide tube and determined the source was in the collimator. The RT removed the guide tube from the exposure device and removed the camera from the area. Using a set of long tongs, the guide tube was removed from the pipe and the source slid down the guide tube until the connector was exposed. They could see the drive cable had broken near the connector. The source was shielded with bags of lead shot. The CRSO disconnected the broken drive cable from the source pigtail and connected the pigtail to a new drive cable that had been installed on the camera. The source was retracted to the shielded position in the camera. The camera and crank out device and drive cable will be sent to the manufacturer for inspection. No overexposures occurred as a result of this event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident # - 9590