Event Notification Report for April 26, 2018
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/25/2018 - 04/26/2018
EVENT NUMBERS
53364533655336653367
Agreement State
Event Number: 53364
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: BLUE CUBE OPERATIONS LLC
Region: 4
City: FREEPORT State: TX
County:
License #: L 06926
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Licensee: BLUE CUBE OPERATIONS LLC
Region: 4
City: FREEPORT State: TX
County:
License #: L 06926
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 04/26/2018
Notification Time: 17:36 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2018
Notification Time: 17:36 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER
The following was received from the state of Texas via email:
"On April 26, 2018, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that while performing routine testing of an Ohmart Vega model SH-F1 gauge containing a 5 milliCurie cesium - 137 source, the shutter would not fully close. The RSO stated open is the normal operating condition for the gauge and it does not create an exposure risk to any individual. The gauge is used for level indication. The RSO stated they have contacted a service company and they will be on site on April 27, 2018, to inspect the gauge. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with - SA-300."
TX Incident #: 9564
The following was received from the state of Texas via email:
"On April 26, 2018, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that while performing routine testing of an Ohmart Vega model SH-F1 gauge containing a 5 milliCurie cesium - 137 source, the shutter would not fully close. The RSO stated open is the normal operating condition for the gauge and it does not create an exposure risk to any individual. The gauge is used for level indication. The RSO stated they have contacted a service company and they will be on site on April 27, 2018, to inspect the gauge. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with - SA-300."
TX Incident #: 9564
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53365
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: MIKE BRANSCUM
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: MIKE BRANSCUM
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 04/26/2018
Notification Time: 18:50 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2018
Event Time: 15:31 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2018
Notification Time: 18:50 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2018
Event Time: 15:31 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INADVERTENT INJECTION OF HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY
"River Bend Station experienced an inadvertent initiation and injection of High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) at 1531 [CDT] on 4/26/2018 while operating at 100 percent power.
"During replacement of Level Transmitter B21-LTN081C 'Reactor Vessel Low Water Level 1', Main Control Room received an inadvertent initiation and injection of High Pressure Core Spray. The HPCS injection valve was open for approximately 40 seconds before the operators manually closed the valve.
"Feedwater Level Control responded per design and maintained Reactor Water Level nominal values. The Division 3 Diesel Generator (DG) also automatically started in response to the actuation signal. The DG did not automatically connect to the Division 3 switchgear since there was not a low voltage condition on the bus.
"The manual closure of the injection isolation valve caused the system to be incapable of responding to an automatic actuation signal. The manual override of the injection isolation valve was reset approximately 16 minutes after the event, restoring the system to its standby condition. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) as a condition that caused ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] discharge to RCS [Reactor Coolant System] and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that caused the loss of function of the HPCS System.
"The Senior NRC Resident inspector has been notified."
"River Bend Station experienced an inadvertent initiation and injection of High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) at 1531 [CDT] on 4/26/2018 while operating at 100 percent power.
"During replacement of Level Transmitter B21-LTN081C 'Reactor Vessel Low Water Level 1', Main Control Room received an inadvertent initiation and injection of High Pressure Core Spray. The HPCS injection valve was open for approximately 40 seconds before the operators manually closed the valve.
"Feedwater Level Control responded per design and maintained Reactor Water Level nominal values. The Division 3 Diesel Generator (DG) also automatically started in response to the actuation signal. The DG did not automatically connect to the Division 3 switchgear since there was not a low voltage condition on the bus.
"The manual closure of the injection isolation valve caused the system to be incapable of responding to an automatic actuation signal. The manual override of the injection isolation valve was reset approximately 16 minutes after the event, restoring the system to its standby condition. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) as a condition that caused ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] discharge to RCS [Reactor Coolant System] and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that caused the loss of function of the HPCS System.
"The Senior NRC Resident inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53366
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: SARAH MCDANIEL
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: SARAH MCDANIEL
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 04/26/2018
Notification Time: 20:23 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2018
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2018
Notification Time: 20:23 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2018
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Refueling |
LOSS OF EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY
"This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because planned maintenance activities were performed on April 23rd through April 25th on the seismic monitoring system without viable compensatory measures established.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because planned maintenance activities were performed on April 23rd through April 25th on the seismic monitoring system without viable compensatory measures established.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 53367
Rep Org: DESERT NDT LLC DBA SHAWCOR
Licensee: DESERT NDT LLC DBA SHAWCOR
Region: 4
City: ABILENE State: TX
County:
License #: 42-35224-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LANE WATTS
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Licensee: DESERT NDT LLC DBA SHAWCOR
Region: 4
City: ABILENE State: TX
County:
License #: 42-35224-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LANE WATTS
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 04/27/2018
Notification Time: 12:48 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2018
Event Time: 12:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2018
Notification Time: 12:48 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2018
Event Time: 12:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
DAVE WERKHEISER (R1DO)
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
DAVE WERKHEISER (R1DO)
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
UNABLE TO RETRACT SOURCE DUE TO GUIDE TUBE DAMAGE
The following report was excerpted using information provided via email:
"On Thursday, April 26, 2018, a crew was performing radiographic operations. At approximately 12:30 p.m. (CST), the crew experienced an incident wherein a 2-inch diameter, 8-foot long pipe rolled off a 2-1/2-foot tall table, resulting in the guide tube being used by the crew to be smashed [under the] pipe. The dent in the guide tube prevented the source from being returned to the fully shielded position.
"Exact Location of Event: Pennsboro, WV
"Licensed Material Involved:
SPEC-150 Exposure Device (s/n 2056)
SPEC G-60 Source (s/n ZA0905)
lr-192
45 curies
"Corrective Action Taken/Planned:
To immediately correct the problem and retrieve the source, allowing it to be returned to the fully shielded position, the black sheathing on the outside of the guide tube was removed in the damaged area. Using a hammer, the damaged area was rounded out enough to allow the source to be returned to the fully shielded position.
"The guide tube involved in this incident has been removed from service and will be destroyed as to prevent it from being reused.
"Retraining on these types of situations will be provided to all employees, and this incident specifically, will be discussed during this quarter's safety meetings within all company locations.
"To prevent a reoccurrence of an incident of this type, we have made plans with the company for whom we were providing radiography for to stage and brace piping moving forward.
"Extent of Exposure:
The personnel responsible for performing source retrieval recorded a total dose of 60 mR during the retrieval.
"As soon as this event occurred, the crew performing radiographic operations immediately reassessed and set up appropriate 2 mR/hr boundaries, notified their Site RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] and Branch Manager, and maintained constant visual surveillance until source retrieval personnel arrived at the jobsite. At no time were any unmonitored employees in any immediate danger of being overexposed, nor were any of our company personnel, all of whom were utilizing proper radiation detection equipment."
The following report was excerpted using information provided via email:
"On Thursday, April 26, 2018, a crew was performing radiographic operations. At approximately 12:30 p.m. (CST), the crew experienced an incident wherein a 2-inch diameter, 8-foot long pipe rolled off a 2-1/2-foot tall table, resulting in the guide tube being used by the crew to be smashed [under the] pipe. The dent in the guide tube prevented the source from being returned to the fully shielded position.
"Exact Location of Event: Pennsboro, WV
"Licensed Material Involved:
SPEC-150 Exposure Device (s/n 2056)
SPEC G-60 Source (s/n ZA0905)
lr-192
45 curies
"Corrective Action Taken/Planned:
To immediately correct the problem and retrieve the source, allowing it to be returned to the fully shielded position, the black sheathing on the outside of the guide tube was removed in the damaged area. Using a hammer, the damaged area was rounded out enough to allow the source to be returned to the fully shielded position.
"The guide tube involved in this incident has been removed from service and will be destroyed as to prevent it from being reused.
"Retraining on these types of situations will be provided to all employees, and this incident specifically, will be discussed during this quarter's safety meetings within all company locations.
"To prevent a reoccurrence of an incident of this type, we have made plans with the company for whom we were providing radiography for to stage and brace piping moving forward.
"Extent of Exposure:
The personnel responsible for performing source retrieval recorded a total dose of 60 mR during the retrieval.
"As soon as this event occurred, the crew performing radiographic operations immediately reassessed and set up appropriate 2 mR/hr boundaries, notified their Site RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] and Branch Manager, and maintained constant visual surveillance until source retrieval personnel arrived at the jobsite. At no time were any unmonitored employees in any immediate danger of being overexposed, nor were any of our company personnel, all of whom were utilizing proper radiation detection equipment."