Event Notification Report for March 31, 2018
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/30/2018 - 03/31/2018
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53305
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ADAM HUKILL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ADAM HUKILL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 03/31/2018
Notification Time: 19:33 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2018
Notification Time: 19:33 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled |
ONE HEAD PENETRATION NOT ACCEPTABLE DURING PENETRATION EXAMINATIONS
"On March 31, 2018, during the Indian Point Unit 2 refueling outage, with the reactor defueled and the head removed and located on the head stand, and all fuel from the reactor vessel removed and located in the spent fuel pool, while performing planned examinations on the 97 reactor vessel head penetrations, it was determined that one penetration could not be dispositioned as acceptable per the requirements of 10CFR50.55a for the reactor coolant system pressure boundary. The examinations are being performed to the meet the requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D), and ASME Code Case N-729-4, to find potential flaws/indications well before they increase to a degree that could potentially challenge the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. All other reactor vessel head penetrations have had a bare metal visual inspection completed with no other indications identified. The station is currently performing the remaining non-destructive examinations required by Code Case N-729-4.
"Repairs are currently being planned, and will be completed prior to entering Mode 5 from the current refueling outage.
"This is reportable, pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) since the as found indications did not meet the applicable acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Code Case N-729-4 to remain in-service without repair.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. "
The licensee has also notified the NY Public Service Commission.
"On March 31, 2018, during the Indian Point Unit 2 refueling outage, with the reactor defueled and the head removed and located on the head stand, and all fuel from the reactor vessel removed and located in the spent fuel pool, while performing planned examinations on the 97 reactor vessel head penetrations, it was determined that one penetration could not be dispositioned as acceptable per the requirements of 10CFR50.55a for the reactor coolant system pressure boundary. The examinations are being performed to the meet the requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D), and ASME Code Case N-729-4, to find potential flaws/indications well before they increase to a degree that could potentially challenge the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. All other reactor vessel head penetrations have had a bare metal visual inspection completed with no other indications identified. The station is currently performing the remaining non-destructive examinations required by Code Case N-729-4.
"Repairs are currently being planned, and will be completed prior to entering Mode 5 from the current refueling outage.
"This is reportable, pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) since the as found indications did not meet the applicable acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Code Case N-729-4 to remain in-service without repair.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. "
The licensee has also notified the NY Public Service Commission.
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 53306
Rep Org: THE NACHER CORPORATION
Licensee: THE NACHER CORPORATION
Region: 4
City: OFFSHORE State: LA
County: OFFSHORE
License #: LA 13065-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID BOUDREAUX
HQ OPS Officer: THOMAS KENDZIA
Licensee: THE NACHER CORPORATION
Region: 4
City: OFFSHORE State: LA
County: OFFSHORE
License #: LA 13065-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID BOUDREAUX
HQ OPS Officer: THOMAS KENDZIA
Notification Date: 03/31/2018
Notification Time: 20:57 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2018
Event Time: 16:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2018
Notification Time: 20:57 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2018
Event Time: 16:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
GUIDE TUBE DISCONNECTED WITH RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE NOT RETRACTED
The following is a synopsis of the information received during phone notification:
On March 31, 2018 at about 1630 CDT, radiography was being conducted on an offshore platform at the +10 foot level. During an exposure the technician (radiographer) noted that the source did not appear to be retracting. The technician observed that the guide tube had become disconnected. The technician lifted the guide tube to align the source cable and the assistant (radiographer) cranked in the source. The technician estimated he held the guide tube for 2 to 5 seconds for the source to be retrieved. The whole evolution took an estimated 30 to 60 seconds. The technicians then shutdown the operation and called the Radiological Safety Officer (RSO).
The technician and assistant's whole body dosimetry was read and the technician received 7 mR, and the assistant no millirem (mR). The device that malfunctioned was a Source Product Equipment Company (SPEC) model 150 with a model G60 source of IR 192 with an activity of 77 curies. The RSO calculated the technician's dose to the hand to be 630 mR.
The RSO stated that since this is an offshore operation he was reporting this event to the NRC under a reciprocity agreement. The RSO stated that he would be making a report to the state of Louisiana, and to NRC Region 4 as a courtesy.
The following is a synopsis of the information received during phone notification:
On March 31, 2018 at about 1630 CDT, radiography was being conducted on an offshore platform at the +10 foot level. During an exposure the technician (radiographer) noted that the source did not appear to be retracting. The technician observed that the guide tube had become disconnected. The technician lifted the guide tube to align the source cable and the assistant (radiographer) cranked in the source. The technician estimated he held the guide tube for 2 to 5 seconds for the source to be retrieved. The whole evolution took an estimated 30 to 60 seconds. The technicians then shutdown the operation and called the Radiological Safety Officer (RSO).
The technician and assistant's whole body dosimetry was read and the technician received 7 mR, and the assistant no millirem (mR). The device that malfunctioned was a Source Product Equipment Company (SPEC) model 150 with a model G60 source of IR 192 with an activity of 77 curies. The RSO calculated the technician's dose to the hand to be 630 mR.
The RSO stated that since this is an offshore operation he was reporting this event to the NRC under a reciprocity agreement. The RSO stated that he would be making a report to the state of Louisiana, and to NRC Region 4 as a courtesy.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53304
Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: WESLEY MARSHALL
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: WESLEY MARSHALL
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 03/31/2018
Notification Time: 10:00 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2018
Event Time: 02:06 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2018
Notification Time: 10:00 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2018
Event Time: 02:06 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INOPERABLE DUE TO FAILED SURVEILLANCE TEST
"At 0206 [CDT] on March 31, 2018, with the plant in Mode 1 at 100% rated core thermal power, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station experienced a loss of Secondary Containment. During the performance of a Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) drawn down test with Auxiliary Building train bay door (1A319A) as the secondary containment boundary, Grand Gulf was unable to maintain secondary containment pressure, as required by SR [surveillance requirement] 3.6.4.1.4, greater than or equal to 0.266 inches of water vacuum for 1 hour. Following initial vacuum draw down, secondary containment pressure degraded to 0.225 inches of water vacuum with operators in the field reporting air leakage from door 1A319A. The test was secured and Secondary Containment was declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.6.1.4 A.1 was entered. Following completion of the failed surveillance test, Secondary Containment was returned to an operable status at 0315 hours on March 31, 2018, by returning the system to a previously known operable configuration by closing doors 1A310, 1A312 and 1A319. This is being report under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0206 [CDT] on March 31, 2018, with the plant in Mode 1 at 100% rated core thermal power, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station experienced a loss of Secondary Containment. During the performance of a Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) drawn down test with Auxiliary Building train bay door (1A319A) as the secondary containment boundary, Grand Gulf was unable to maintain secondary containment pressure, as required by SR [surveillance requirement] 3.6.4.1.4, greater than or equal to 0.266 inches of water vacuum for 1 hour. Following initial vacuum draw down, secondary containment pressure degraded to 0.225 inches of water vacuum with operators in the field reporting air leakage from door 1A319A. The test was secured and Secondary Containment was declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.6.1.4 A.1 was entered. Following completion of the failed surveillance test, Secondary Containment was returned to an operable status at 0315 hours on March 31, 2018, by returning the system to a previously known operable configuration by closing doors 1A310, 1A312 and 1A319. This is being report under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.