Event Notification Report for March 02, 2018
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/01/2018 - 03/02/2018
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53242
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: KENNETH GRACIA
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: KENNETH GRACIA
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 03/03/2018
Notification Time: 02:19 [ET]
Event Date: 03/02/2018
Event Time: 23:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/03/2018
Notification Time: 02:19 [ET]
Event Date: 03/02/2018
Event Time: 23:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/03/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
BRICE BICKETT (R1DO)
BO PHAM (IRD)
BRICE BICKETT (R1DO)
BO PHAM (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POTENTIAL LOSS OF OFFSITE RESPONSE CAPABILITIES
"At 2315 EST on March 2, 2018, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) determined, based on information received from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, that there may be a potential loss of offsite response capabilities due to ongoing severe natural hazard conditions (i.e., major winter storm) along the coast of Massachusetts. According to information received by PNPS, towns within the 10 Mile EP Radius could be hampered in implementing some protective actions specified in the emergency plan in the unlikely event an emergency were to occur. There is no condition at the Station that would warrant implementation of any emergency plan at this time. PNPS continues to operate safely and is monitoring the weather conditions closely. The Station maintains emergency assessment, response, and communication capability.
"This report is being made conservatively in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability. As stated previously, the Station maintains emergency assessment, response, and communication capability.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"At 2315 EST on March 2, 2018, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) determined, based on information received from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, that there may be a potential loss of offsite response capabilities due to ongoing severe natural hazard conditions (i.e., major winter storm) along the coast of Massachusetts. According to information received by PNPS, towns within the 10 Mile EP Radius could be hampered in implementing some protective actions specified in the emergency plan in the unlikely event an emergency were to occur. There is no condition at the Station that would warrant implementation of any emergency plan at this time. PNPS continues to operate safely and is monitoring the weather conditions closely. The Station maintains emergency assessment, response, and communication capability.
"This report is being made conservatively in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability. As stated previously, the Station maintains emergency assessment, response, and communication capability.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Agreement State
Event Number: 53243
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: ADVANCED CORROSION TECHNOLOGIES & TRAINING LLC
Region: 4
City: PORT NECHES State: TX
County:
License #: 06508
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRIS MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH
Licensee: ADVANCED CORROSION TECHNOLOGIES & TRAINING LLC
Region: 4
City: PORT NECHES State: TX
County:
License #: 06508
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRIS MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH
Notification Date: 03/03/2018
Notification Time: 18:39 [ET]
Event Date: 03/02/2018
Event Time: 12:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/03/2018
Notification Time: 18:39 [ET]
Event Date: 03/02/2018
Event Time: 12:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/03/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE RETRACTION FAILURE
The following information was obtained from the State of Texas via email:
"On March 3, 2018, the Agency [Texas Department of State and Health Services] received notice that a source retraction failure had occurred on March 2, 2018 around 1200 CST. The camera was a QSA Global 880D with a 61 Curie Iridium-192 source. During source retrieval the crank cables snapped and the source was just outside the camera. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) reported to the scene and covered up the source with shielding. The RSO made multiple trips to cover the source with lead and after he completed the operation he noticed his 0-200 mrem pocket dosimeter was off scale. The RSO will send off his film badge for an emergency reading on March 5, 2018. No other personnel received any excessive dose from the event.
"Additional information will be supplied as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I-9550
The following information was obtained from the State of Texas via email:
"On March 3, 2018, the Agency [Texas Department of State and Health Services] received notice that a source retraction failure had occurred on March 2, 2018 around 1200 CST. The camera was a QSA Global 880D with a 61 Curie Iridium-192 source. During source retrieval the crank cables snapped and the source was just outside the camera. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) reported to the scene and covered up the source with shielding. The RSO made multiple trips to cover the source with lead and after he completed the operation he noticed his 0-200 mrem pocket dosimeter was off scale. The RSO will send off his film badge for an emergency reading on March 5, 2018. No other personnel received any excessive dose from the event.
"Additional information will be supplied as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I-9550
Agreement State
Event Number: 53250
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: HOUSTON METHODIST
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 00457
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: IRENE CASARES
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Licensee: HOUSTON METHODIST
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 00457
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: IRENE CASARES
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 03/07/2018
Notification Time: 17:20 [ET]
Event Date: 03/02/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/07/2018
Notification Time: 17:20 [ET]
Event Date: 03/02/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/07/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION
The following was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On March 7, 2018 Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] received notification that a Novoste device jammed with no exposure consequence to the patient. Licensee stated two attempts to complete the therapy procedure had taken place, there was no dose to the patient that would be classified as a medical event. The initial attempt with a beta-rail catheter was not successfully completed. The source train (16, Sr 90) did not move along the beta-rail catheter as expected, the source train was not retracted back into the device robotically. The source train in the Novoste device failed to go into the expected treatment position and stayed in the robotic interventional cardiology device for about 1.5 minutes during the intravascular brachytherapy procedure. The interventional catheter with the indicator source train was removed by the doctor (which he wasn't supposed to do). When the train could not be robotically remove back into the device through the beta rail catheter, the source removal from the patient had to be done manually. The source train was retrieved in 15 seconds and placed back into the Novoste device. The treatment was stopped. The patient was surveyed to confirm no sources in the patient. It was believed the beta catheter developed a kink and could not retract the sources. The second attempt was with a new beta rail catheter and source reset. The treatment continued without any incidents. The source returned to the device without any problems."
Incident # 9552
The following was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On March 7, 2018 Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] received notification that a Novoste device jammed with no exposure consequence to the patient. Licensee stated two attempts to complete the therapy procedure had taken place, there was no dose to the patient that would be classified as a medical event. The initial attempt with a beta-rail catheter was not successfully completed. The source train (16, Sr 90) did not move along the beta-rail catheter as expected, the source train was not retracted back into the device robotically. The source train in the Novoste device failed to go into the expected treatment position and stayed in the robotic interventional cardiology device for about 1.5 minutes during the intravascular brachytherapy procedure. The interventional catheter with the indicator source train was removed by the doctor (which he wasn't supposed to do). When the train could not be robotically remove back into the device through the beta rail catheter, the source removal from the patient had to be done manually. The source train was retrieved in 15 seconds and placed back into the Novoste device. The treatment was stopped. The patient was surveyed to confirm no sources in the patient. It was believed the beta catheter developed a kink and could not retract the sources. The second attempt was with a new beta rail catheter and source reset. The treatment continued without any incidents. The source returned to the device without any problems."
Incident # 9552