Event Notification Report for January 17, 2018
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/16/2018 - 01/17/2018
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53170
Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: RODNEY ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: RODNEY ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 01/17/2018
Notification Time: 15:08 [ET]
Event Date: 01/17/2018
Event Time: 09:52 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/17/2018
Notification Time: 15:08 [ET]
Event Date: 01/17/2018
Event Time: 09:52 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/17/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
AUTO-START OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DUE TO TRANSFORMER FUSES BEING DISCONNECTED
"At 0952 EST on 01/17/2018 with Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating at 100 percent, the normal supply breaker to the Unit 1J Emergency Bus tripped open due to an under-voltage condition when the potential transformer fuses were inadvertently disconnected. This resulted in a loss of power to the Unit 1J Emergency Bus from its normal off-site power supply. Number 3 Emergency Diesel Generator automatically started on an under-voltage signal and loaded onto the Unit 1J Emergency Bus, as designed.
"All equipment performed as expected during the event and there were no unexplained occurrences. Maintenance has verified the fuses have been reconnected and at 1221 EST, off-site power was restored to Unit 1J Emergency Bus. At 1254 EST Number 3 Emergency Diesel Generator was secured in accordance with Station Operating procedures.
"All Electrical distribution systems have been restored to a normal alignment.
"There were no radiation releases due to this event, nor were there any personnel injuries or contamination events.
"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to the auto start of Number 3 Emergency Diesel Generator."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0952 EST on 01/17/2018 with Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating at 100 percent, the normal supply breaker to the Unit 1J Emergency Bus tripped open due to an under-voltage condition when the potential transformer fuses were inadvertently disconnected. This resulted in a loss of power to the Unit 1J Emergency Bus from its normal off-site power supply. Number 3 Emergency Diesel Generator automatically started on an under-voltage signal and loaded onto the Unit 1J Emergency Bus, as designed.
"All equipment performed as expected during the event and there were no unexplained occurrences. Maintenance has verified the fuses have been reconnected and at 1221 EST, off-site power was restored to Unit 1J Emergency Bus. At 1254 EST Number 3 Emergency Diesel Generator was secured in accordance with Station Operating procedures.
"All Electrical distribution systems have been restored to a normal alignment.
"There were no radiation releases due to this event, nor were there any personnel injuries or contamination events.
"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to the auto start of Number 3 Emergency Diesel Generator."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53173
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ANDREW WALDMANN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ANDREW WALDMANN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/17/2018
Notification Time: 22:41 [ET]
Event Date: 01/17/2018
Event Time: 20:02 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/17/2018
Notification Time: 22:41 [ET]
Event Date: 01/17/2018
Event Time: 20:02 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/17/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SHIELD BUILDING INOPERABLE
"At 2002 EST on January 17, 2018, annulus differential pressure exceeded its pressure limit. At that time, the Shield Building was declared inoperable requiring entry into Technical Specification 3.6.15, Conditions A and B. Action was taken by field operators to swap annulus vacuum control dampers to restore annulus differential pressure. At 2024 EST, annulus differential pressure was restored to required limits, the Shield Building was declared operable, and LCO 3.6.15, Conditions A and B were exited.
"The temporary loss of the Shield Building resulted from a failure of the annulus vacuum control system to maintain the required differential pressure. Manual swap-over of pressure control to the backup damper restored differential pressure to required limits allowing exit from TS LCO 3.6.15 and restoration of the Shield Building safety function.
"The Shield Building ensures that the release of radioactive material from the containment atmosphere is restricted to those leakage paths and associated leakage rates assumed in the accident analysis during a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS) would have automatically started and performed its design function to maintain annulus vacuum within required limits.
"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"At 2002 EST on January 17, 2018, annulus differential pressure exceeded its pressure limit. At that time, the Shield Building was declared inoperable requiring entry into Technical Specification 3.6.15, Conditions A and B. Action was taken by field operators to swap annulus vacuum control dampers to restore annulus differential pressure. At 2024 EST, annulus differential pressure was restored to required limits, the Shield Building was declared operable, and LCO 3.6.15, Conditions A and B were exited.
"The temporary loss of the Shield Building resulted from a failure of the annulus vacuum control system to maintain the required differential pressure. Manual swap-over of pressure control to the backup damper restored differential pressure to required limits allowing exit from TS LCO 3.6.15 and restoration of the Shield Building safety function.
"The Shield Building ensures that the release of radioactive material from the containment atmosphere is restricted to those leakage paths and associated leakage rates assumed in the accident analysis during a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS) would have automatically started and performed its design function to maintain annulus vacuum within required limits.
"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Non-Power Reactor
Event Number: 53174
Rep Org: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECH
Licensee: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Region: 0
City: CAMBRIDGE State: MA
County: MIDDLESEX
License #: R-37
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000020
NRC Notified By: JOHN FOSTER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Licensee: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Region: 0
City: CAMBRIDGE State: MA
County: MIDDLESEX
License #: R-37
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000020
NRC Notified By: JOHN FOSTER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 01/18/2018
Notification Time: 10:03 [ET]
Event Date: 01/17/2018
Event Time: 12:28 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/18/2018
Notification Time: 10:03 [ET]
Event Date: 01/17/2018
Event Time: 12:28 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/18/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
PATRICK BOYLE (PM-M)
ELIZABETH REED (NPR)
PATRICK BOYLE (PM-M)
ELIZABETH REED (NPR)
NON-POWER REACTOR MANUALLY SCRAMMED
"Technical Specification 3.2.3 item 1 requires that a minimum of two level channels be operable and set to scram the reactor at less than 7.4MW. A reactor startup was in progress to 1MW for training with one of three level channels out-of-commission. The reactor reached 1MW at 1219 EST on 1/17/18. The shift supervisor was completing the checklist that requires observing level channels to verify they are responding. The shift supervisor noticed that only one channel was responding and scrammed the reactor at 1228 EST. Preliminary investigation found a faulty connection point at the detector signal cable. Corrective actions and retesting is ongoing."
"Technical Specification 3.2.3 item 1 requires that a minimum of two level channels be operable and set to scram the reactor at less than 7.4MW. A reactor startup was in progress to 1MW for training with one of three level channels out-of-commission. The reactor reached 1MW at 1219 EST on 1/17/18. The shift supervisor was completing the checklist that requires observing level channels to verify they are responding. The shift supervisor noticed that only one channel was responding and scrammed the reactor at 1228 EST. Preliminary investigation found a faulty connection point at the detector signal cable. Corrective actions and retesting is ongoing."