Event Notification Report for November 07, 2017

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST URANIUM SOURCE

"The RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, phoned to report a missing/lost source of 3 microcuries of U-235, 90% enriched, 1.4 grams, form metallic (non-dispersible). The source package was received and surveyed on 10/30/2017, surface 90microrad/hr and 11microrad/hr at 1 meter. The source was then delivered to the Office of the Professor who ordered the source where it sat to be taken to a research area. The package was placed under a desk next to a trash can and a recycle can in the Professor's office. The Professor forgot about the package and never delivered it to the research area, but saw the source on November 3rd under the desk, then failed to deliver the source once again and the source was left over the weekend. On Monday, November 6th, when the Professor remembered the source, the source was gone. On November 7th the Professor reported the lost/missing source to the RSO. The RSO immediately started an investigation. The garbage in the Professor's office was collected on Monday evening, November 6th. The dumpster the trash went to was emptied Tuesday morning, November 7th, into the normal waste stream. The RSO looked through all the dumpsters and was unable to find the package.

Because of the low activity of the source it would probably not be detected at the landfill. The RSO is emailing a preliminary report, ASAP. This is an ongoing investigation."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

UNIT 1 AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO MAIN UNIT GENERATOR OVER CURRENT

"On November 7, at 0504 [EST], BVPS [Beaver Valley Power Station] Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor trip due to Main Unit Generator over current. The Auxiliary Feedwater system activated and remains in service. Offsite power supply is available. Normal and Emergency busses are being supplied by Offsite power. One Source Range channel failed to energize due to its corresponding Intermediate Range instrument being under compensated. It was manually energized and is not indicating as expected. The second Source Range instrument energized but is reading erratically. Both Source Range instruments have been declared inoperable and the appropriate Technical Specification has been complied with by making the Control Rods not capable of withdrawal and isolating all dilution flow paths. Plant trip response was as expected without complications, and all control rods fully inserted in the core. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3.

"This event is being reported as an actuation of the Reactor Protection system 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and a Specified System Actuation (Auxiliary Feedwater System) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"BVPS Unit 2 is unaffected by this event and remains at 100% power in Mode 1.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

LOSS OF INBOUND COMMERCIAL LINES AND FTS LINES TO FACILITY

"On November 7, 2017, at approximately 0337 (CST) hours, Waterford 3 [WF3] Control Room received a phone call from Entergy's Load Dispatcher to inform us that the NRC was unable to call Waterford 3 by ENS [emergency notification system] phone or by PABX [private automatic branch exchange] phone. The NRC was called by the Waterford 3 Control Room using the PABX at 0339 (CST) hours. However, the ENS phone could not call the NRC. Also, outside lines were not able to call in to Waterford 3.

"Offsite prompt Public Warning Sirens were available at all times. State and Local notification capability was available via PABX. WF3 Emergency Response Organization notification capability was available at all times. WF3 site Emergency Response Facility intercommunications were available at all times.

"This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to a loss of offsite communications capability.

"ENS communication and full PABX functionality was reestablished at 0452 (CST) on November 7, 2017.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

UNIT 1 HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION INOPERABLE

"On November 7, 2017 at 1810 [CST], Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI), was manually isolated following failure of the remote turbine trip pushbutton to function. Unit 1 HPCI Operability Testing was in progress to the point of securing the HPCI turbine with the remote manual pushbutton. The pushbutton failed to trip the turbine resulting in operator action to lower the flow controller setpoint and isolating the HPCI steam line. HPCI remains isolated and is Inoperable pending resolution of the Turbine Trip circuitry.

"This event is being reported as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The HPCI system is a single train system and the loss of HPCI could impact the plant ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was confirmed operable.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP ON TURBINE TRIP

"On 11/7/2017 at 1957 [EST], VC Summer Nuclear Station automatically tripped due to a turbine trip. The cause of the turbine trip is under investigation at this time.

"All systems responded as expected. All Control Rods fully inserted and all Emergency Feedwater pumps started as required. The plant is stable in Mode 3.

"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"The unit is currently stable in Mode 3 with decay heat removal via the Main Steam to the Main Condenser.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The licensee will notify the South Carolina State Emergency Management Division, the Fairfield, Richland, Lexington and Newberry Counties.

* * * UPDATE FROM BETH DALICK TO VINCE KLCO ON 11/8/17 AT 1409 EST * * *

"All systems responded as expected, with the exception of 'B' Steam Generator Feedwater Isolation Valve XVG1611 B-FW. This valve did not appear to automatically close and was slow to indicate closed from the Main Control Board. All Control Rods fully inserted and all Emergency Feedwater pumps started as required. The plant is stable in Mode 3."

Notified the R2DO (Musser).

LOST IODINE-125 IMPLANT SEED

The following is an excerpt from the 30 day report submitted from George Washington University Hospital:

"On Tuesday, 11/7/2017, one of the pathologists' assistants completed the first seed case of the new week. After placing the seed in the vial which included the prior week's seeds, she counted only 10 seeds. However, there should have been 11; e.g. 10 from the previous week plus the new one from the current week.

"Radiation safety confirmed that there were 10 seeds in the vial. Since only 10 lot numbers were written on the vial, this suggests that only 10 seeds were ever placed in the vial (as opposed to 11 being put in the vial, and one of them falling out at some point.)

"Radiation safety confirmed that there were 11 flow sheets. Each flow sheet was initialized by a pathologists' assistant that the seed had been recovered and stored in the cabinet. This suggests that one of the pathologists' assistants was distracted and signed the sheet without placing the seed in the vial as per procedure.

"The pathology laboratory was surveyed by two individuals from the Radiation Safety Office. The surveys covered all areas of the lab including the work stations, sinks, floors, waste specimens, desks, and storage cabinets. The seed was not located.

"The licensed material that has been lost is a single I-125 seed, made by IsoAid for the localization of nonpalpable breast lesions. The seed is a sealed source approximately 5 mm in length. It had a nominal activity of 200 microCi on October 24, 2017."


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf