Event Notification Report for November 01, 2017

UNIT 2 FAILED LLRT SURVEILLANCE TEST DUE TO EXCESSIVE LEAKAGE

"On November 1, 2017 at 1225 CDT, both the 2-220-58A Feed Water Inboard Check Valve and the 2-220-62A Feed Water Outboard Check Valve failed Local Leak Rate Testing (LLRT) acceptance criteria due to excessive leakage. These valves are considered primary containment isolation valves, and as such, are required to ensure that an adequate primary containment boundary is maintained.

"Technical Specification (TS) 5.5.12, 'Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program,' establishes limits for Primary Containment leakage. Based upon the results of the LLRT, Dresden, Unit 2, may not have met the limits for primary containment leakage during the last operating cycle as specified in TS 5.5.12.C.

"Dresden Unit 2 is currently in Mode 5 for a refueling outage and per Dresden TS 3.6.1.1, 'Primary Containment,' Primary Containment is not required in the current mode of operation (i.e., Mode 5). However, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), this event is reportable as a condition that resulted in a principal safety barrier being seriously degraded.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

DESIGN DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED DURING ENGINEERING REVIEW

"At 1425 [CDT] on November 1, 2017, Operations was notified of a condition affecting Unit 3 4kV Shutdown Boards 3EA, 3EB, 3EC, and 3ED. It was discovered that multiple potential transformer (PT) primary fuses are GE type EJ1 size 0.5 AMP which does not coordinate with the PT's secondary fuses.

"A fault on the associated cable could clear the primary PT primary fuses for the 4kV Shutdown Board. This would result in the board tripping 4kV motor loads, disconnecting from Off-site power and connecting to the Emergency Diesel Generator. However, since the PT fuse is cleared, the under-voltage trips on the 4kV motors would remain in if there is no Common Accident Signal (CAS) present. The 4kV motor loads include Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pumps, Core Spray (CS) Pumps, Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Pumps, and Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) pumps.

"Review of NFPA 805 analyses show the cables for all four U3 4kV Shutdown Boards are routed in Fire Area 03-03 and Fire Area 16. Therefore a fire in either area could result in a loss of all four U3 4kV Shutdown Boards motor loads. Cables for 4kV Shutdown Board 3EA and 3EB are both routed in Fire Area 21 which could result in a loss of both Division I Shutdown Board motor loads.

"Compensatory fire watch measures have been established.

"This event requires an 8 hour report in accordance with 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.'

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

"CR 1354129 was initiated in the Corrective Action Program."

PART 21 NOTIFICATION - CHECK VALVE DISC THICKNESS COULD CAUSE VALVE TO STICK OPEN

The following is a summary of the information received from Velan Inc. via facsimile:

Affected item: Velan Inc. Disc (part number 8205-012) in 4NPS Class 150 through 900 Swing Check Valve

Callaway Nuclear Plant discovered that a Velan check valve installed in 1999 was stuck open. Velan investigated and determined that in 1979, a design change increased the thickness of the disc to allow the check valve to be used in higher pressure applications than the original design. In 1985, the valve body cavity was enlarged which would preclude the disc from sticking. Therefore, the only affected valves are the valves manufactured between 1979 and 1985.

Velan's records only go back to 1982 for purchase orders of this valve. Their records indicate 157 discs of this part number were shipped to U.S. utilities.

The following actions are being taken with respect to the disc:
- Cancel disc part number 8502-012
- Create a new disc part number to fit the body geometry of 1985 and before
-Create another disc part number to fit the current body geometry.

All affected utilities will be notified within a week, for information and to determine a course of action. As a minimum, Velan will recall all discs of the aforementioned part number in inventory at these utilities.

For any additional information on this matter please contact Victor Apostolescu at 514-748-7748 x 2134 or at victor.apostolescu@velan.com.

This disc has been purchased by nuclear plants in all four USNRC regions.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOSS OF 2 GENERALLY LICENSED STATIC ELIMINATORS

The following was received from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency via e-mail:

"A graduate student affiliated with the University of Illinois reported the loss of two generally licensed NRD Model P-2042 static eliminators (5 mCi/Po-210, Serial Numbers A2KX694 and A2KX695). They were shipped on March 3, 2017, whereupon he proceeded to perform small neutron experiments. The devices were then put into a storage building and subsequently lost during a move to a new location sometime in November 2017. He believes the devices went to a landfill. At the time of loss they would have decayed to around 1.5 mCi each. By today's date, they would have decayed to approximately 200 uCi each.

"In August of 2018, the general licensee reported it to NRD, Inc., and they referred him to the Illinois Emergency Management Agency. A report was received on the matter on November 19, 2018. The investigation is ongoing."

State of Illinois Item Number IL180043

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POSSIBLE OVEREXPOSURE

The following was excerpted from an email received from the State of Florida:

"Received a notification letter from a licensee [NDE, Inc.] reporting a possible overexposure. According to the [Radiation Safety Officer] RSO for NDE, an employee had the leather pouch that his badge and his pocket dosimeter were in cut open resulting in his badge falling out near where radiography was taking place. The missing badge was discovered during a routine check of his pocket dosimeter which read 2 mRem for the shift. The badge was sent to Landauer for analysis and the recorded dose for the time period of Oct. 10 - Nov. 9, 2017 was 23.420 Rem. After conducting interviews, the RSO concluded that the overexposure was due to the badge being so close to the source, and the employee did not receive the recorded dose. After compiling the daily pocket dosimeter readings, the estimated dose to the employee would have been 57 mRem for that time period."

Incident Number: FL 18-003

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TOTAL DOSE DELIVERED DIFFERED FROM PRESCRIBED DOSE BY GREATER THAN 20%

The following information was received from the State of Wisconsin via email:

"On December 28, 2017, the Wisconsin Department of Health Services (DHS) received notice that the licensee identified a prostate manual brachytherapy procedure where the total dose delivered differed from the prescribed dose by 20% or more. The implant occurred in November 2017 and post-implant dosimetric analysis was performed on December 27, 2017. The prescribed dose was 110 Gy; the dose delivered to the treatment site (D90) was 56.5% of the intended dose.

"DHS inspectors will investigate this medical event.

"Event Report ID No.: WI170023"

The licensee will compensate for the underdose with subsequent scheduled beam therapy.

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.