Event Notification Report for October 30, 2017
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/29/2017 - 10/30/2017
EVENT NUMBERS
5304153042530435304453045
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53041
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: PAUL GALLANT
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: PAUL GALLANT
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 10/30/2017
Notification Time: 10:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/30/2017
Event Time: 02:47 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2017
Notification Time: 10:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/30/2017
Event Time: 02:47 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
RAY MCKINLEY (R1DO)
RAY MCKINLEY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SEVERE WEATHER CAUSES LOSS OF POWER TO SUPPORT BUILDINGS
There was a loss of power from the local grid which did not affect the power block. The support buildings lost power and a UPS failed which affects computers, switching, and telephones. This includes a loss of the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). The Joint Information Center and Emergency Operations Facility were not affected. Though this is a major loss of communications ability, alternate communications methods are available.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
There was a loss of power from the local grid which did not affect the power block. The support buildings lost power and a UPS failed which affects computers, switching, and telephones. This includes a loss of the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). The Joint Information Center and Emergency Operations Facility were not affected. Though this is a major loss of communications ability, alternate communications methods are available.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53042
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: ALEX RIVAS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: ALEX RIVAS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/30/2017
Notification Time: 12:48 [ET]
Event Date: 10/30/2017
Event Time: 04:04 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2017
Notification Time: 12:48 [ET]
Event Date: 10/30/2017
Event Time: 04:04 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
DEFECTIVE WELD IDENTIFIED ON REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEAL UPPER ROOT
"During a scheduled refueling outage, an inspection of components inside containment revealed a suspected weld defect on 1CV-309B, 1P-1B RCP Labyrinth Seal 1PT-124 Upper Root.
"10 CFR 50.2 (2)(i) defines the reactor coolant pressure boundary as being connected to the reactor coolant system, up to and including the outermost containment isolation valve in system piping which penetrates primary reactor containment. The weld defect is located on the transmitter side of 1CV-309B. This can be isolated from the RCS by shutting 1CV-309B and 1CV-308B, 1P-1B RCP Labyrinth Seal 1PT-124 Lower Root.
"Based on the definition provided in 10 CFR 50.2, the condition is considered reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(ii).
"Unit 1 is currently in mode 3. Repairs for the condition are being determined.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"During a scheduled refueling outage, an inspection of components inside containment revealed a suspected weld defect on 1CV-309B, 1P-1B RCP Labyrinth Seal 1PT-124 Upper Root.
"10 CFR 50.2 (2)(i) defines the reactor coolant pressure boundary as being connected to the reactor coolant system, up to and including the outermost containment isolation valve in system piping which penetrates primary reactor containment. The weld defect is located on the transmitter side of 1CV-309B. This can be isolated from the RCS by shutting 1CV-309B and 1CV-308B, 1P-1B RCP Labyrinth Seal 1PT-124 Lower Root.
"Based on the definition provided in 10 CFR 50.2, the condition is considered reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(ii).
"Unit 1 is currently in mode 3. Repairs for the condition are being determined.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Part 21
Event Number: 53043
Rep Org: AMETEK SOLID STATE CONTROLS
Licensee: AMETEK SOLID STATE CONTROLS
Region: 3
City: COLUMBUS State: OH
County:
License #: N/A
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ETHAN SALSBURY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: AMETEK SOLID STATE CONTROLS
Region: 3
City: COLUMBUS State: OH
County:
License #: N/A
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ETHAN SALSBURY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/30/2017
Notification Time: 12:36 [ET]
Event Date: 10/30/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2017
Notification Time: 12:36 [ET]
Event Date: 10/30/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
RAY MCKINLEY (R1DO)
SHAKUR WALKER (R2DO)
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
RAY MCKINLEY (R1DO)
SHAKUR WALKER (R2DO)
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)
PART 21 - EATON AUXILIARY SWITCH INSTALLED EG FRAME MOLDED CASE CIRCUIT BREAKER POTENTIALLY DEFECTIVE
The following is excerpted from an email received from Ametek:
"COMPONENT DESCRIPTION:
"Eaton auxiliary switches, catalog number AUX2A2BPK installed in EG Frame Molded Case Circuit Breakers (30A - 125A).
"PROBLEM YOU COULD SEE:
"Eaton auxiliary switches manufactured after May 2015 and installed in EG Frame Breakers (30A - 125A) could experience intermittent operation of the auxiliary switch due to a design defect of the auxiliary switch. The design defect of the auxiliary switch can result in the auxiliary switch to fail to change state during breaker operation.
"CAUSE:
"Ametek Solidstate Controls identified intermittent auxiliary switch operation during testing. Eaton confirmed a problem with the auxiliary switches used in EG Frame Breakers manufactured since May of 2015. The auxiliary switch in the EG frame breakers may not operate reliably, resulting in the auxiliary switch returning to, or staying in, its shelf state. The auxiliary switch is being redesigned to improve the mechanical interface reliability between the breaker mechanism and the auxiliary switch.
"EFFECT ON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE:
"The breaker overcurrent protection and shunt trip function are not affected by this defect. If the auxiliary switch defect occurs in the DC Input breaker (B1) while the system is operating, the static switch will transfer the load to Bypass (alternate Source) and the Inverter will shut down. If the defect occurs during startup, the Inverter will not start. If the auxiliary switch defect is present in any other breaker, it will result in a failure to annunciate a breaker closed indicator. A list of affected equipment with the breaker locations is provided below.
"ACTION REQUIRED:
"Replacement auxiliary switches from Eaton are expected to be available sometime in the second quarter of 2018. An immediate solution is not available. For circuit breakers in the B1 position, Ametek Solidstate Controls recommends replacing the auxiliary switch as soon as a redesigned auxiliary switch is available.
"For all other breakers, the state of the breaker should be verified prior to performing any maintenance until the auxiliary switch can be replaced. In this situation, the auxiliary switch should be replaced at the earliest convenience.
"AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS CORRECTIVE ACTION:
"If you wish to replace the auxiliary switches, Ametek Solidstate Controls will work with you to arrange replacements. Please contact Mr. Mark Shreve of our Client Services group at 1-800- 222-9079 or 1-614-846-7500 ext. 6332. mark.shreve@ametek.com
"A copy [including Eaton EG Frame Part Number, Ametek Part Number, Serial Number, Equipment Part No., Customer, Breaker Location and Total] will also be provided to the affected licensees - Ameren, TVA, Southern Nuclear, Duke, and Krsko."
Curtiss Wright also received eight (8) of the suspect breakers.
The following is excerpted from an email received from Ametek:
"COMPONENT DESCRIPTION:
"Eaton auxiliary switches, catalog number AUX2A2BPK installed in EG Frame Molded Case Circuit Breakers (30A - 125A).
"PROBLEM YOU COULD SEE:
"Eaton auxiliary switches manufactured after May 2015 and installed in EG Frame Breakers (30A - 125A) could experience intermittent operation of the auxiliary switch due to a design defect of the auxiliary switch. The design defect of the auxiliary switch can result in the auxiliary switch to fail to change state during breaker operation.
"CAUSE:
"Ametek Solidstate Controls identified intermittent auxiliary switch operation during testing. Eaton confirmed a problem with the auxiliary switches used in EG Frame Breakers manufactured since May of 2015. The auxiliary switch in the EG frame breakers may not operate reliably, resulting in the auxiliary switch returning to, or staying in, its shelf state. The auxiliary switch is being redesigned to improve the mechanical interface reliability between the breaker mechanism and the auxiliary switch.
"EFFECT ON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE:
"The breaker overcurrent protection and shunt trip function are not affected by this defect. If the auxiliary switch defect occurs in the DC Input breaker (B1) while the system is operating, the static switch will transfer the load to Bypass (alternate Source) and the Inverter will shut down. If the defect occurs during startup, the Inverter will not start. If the auxiliary switch defect is present in any other breaker, it will result in a failure to annunciate a breaker closed indicator. A list of affected equipment with the breaker locations is provided below.
"ACTION REQUIRED:
"Replacement auxiliary switches from Eaton are expected to be available sometime in the second quarter of 2018. An immediate solution is not available. For circuit breakers in the B1 position, Ametek Solidstate Controls recommends replacing the auxiliary switch as soon as a redesigned auxiliary switch is available.
"For all other breakers, the state of the breaker should be verified prior to performing any maintenance until the auxiliary switch can be replaced. In this situation, the auxiliary switch should be replaced at the earliest convenience.
"AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS CORRECTIVE ACTION:
"If you wish to replace the auxiliary switches, Ametek Solidstate Controls will work with you to arrange replacements. Please contact Mr. Mark Shreve of our Client Services group at 1-800- 222-9079 or 1-614-846-7500 ext. 6332. mark.shreve@ametek.com
"A copy [including Eaton EG Frame Part Number, Ametek Part Number, Serial Number, Equipment Part No., Customer, Breaker Location and Total] will also be provided to the affected licensees - Ameren, TVA, Southern Nuclear, Duke, and Krsko."
Curtiss Wright also received eight (8) of the suspect breakers.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53044
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN McILNAY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN McILNAY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/30/2017
Notification Time: 15:50 [ET]
Event Date: 10/30/2017
Event Time: 09:42 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2017
Notification Time: 15:50 [ET]
Event Date: 10/30/2017
Event Time: 09:42 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
SHAKUR WALKER (R2DO)
SHAKUR WALKER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TEMPORARY LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE BOUNDARY
"At 0942 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on October 30, 2017, a Main Control Room (MCR) alarm was received for low control room positive pressure.
"At 0943 EDT, a Control Room Envelope (CRE) door was found ajar and immediately closed. Technical Specification 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) was declared not met for both trains and Condition B entered.
"At 0945 EDT the alarm cleared, CREVS was declared operable and LCO 3.7.10, Condition B was exited.
"The safety function of the CRE boundary is to ensure the in-leakage of unfiltered air into the CRE will not exceed the in-leakage assumed in the licensing basis analysis of Design Basis Accident (DBA) consequences to CRE occupants. From 0942 EDT to 0943 EDT WBN [Watts Bar Nuclear] was unable to validate that CREVS could fulfill its required Safety Function.
"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"At 0942 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on October 30, 2017, a Main Control Room (MCR) alarm was received for low control room positive pressure.
"At 0943 EDT, a Control Room Envelope (CRE) door was found ajar and immediately closed. Technical Specification 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) was declared not met for both trains and Condition B entered.
"At 0945 EDT the alarm cleared, CREVS was declared operable and LCO 3.7.10, Condition B was exited.
"The safety function of the CRE boundary is to ensure the in-leakage of unfiltered air into the CRE will not exceed the in-leakage assumed in the licensing basis analysis of Design Basis Accident (DBA) consequences to CRE occupants. From 0942 EDT to 0943 EDT WBN [Watts Bar Nuclear] was unable to validate that CREVS could fulfill its required Safety Function.
"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Agreement State
Event Number: 53045
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: KRAZAN & ASSOCIATES, INC.
Region: 4
City: MODESTO State: CA
County:
License #: 4247-10
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: K. ARUNIKA HEWADIKARAM
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: KRAZAN & ASSOCIATES, INC.
Region: 4
City: MODESTO State: CA
County:
License #: 4247-10
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: K. ARUNIKA HEWADIKARAM
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/30/2017
Notification Time: 19:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/30/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2017
Notification Time: 19:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/30/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
CNSNS (MEXICO) (EMAI)
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
CNSNS (MEXICO) (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was received from the State of California via email:
"On 10/30/17, California Office of Emergency Services contacted RHB [Radiologic Health Branch] to report a lost moisture density gauge. The lost gauge is a Troxler Model 3440, S/N 23171, containing 9 mCi of Cs-137 and 44 mCi of Am241/Be. According to the RSO [Radiation Safety Officer], the gauge user left the gauge on the tailgate of his truck without properly securing it, and drove off to the next job site. A passing driver alerted the gauge user of a falling object from his truck at the intersection of Floyd Street and Oakdale Street in Modesto, CA. The user immediately went back to the intersection, but was unable to locate the gauge. The RSO has notified the Modesto Police Department of this incident. He will be posting a reward for the safe return of the gauge on Craigslist. The RHB will be following up on this investigation.
"5010 Number: 103017"
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following information was received from the State of California via email:
"On 10/30/17, California Office of Emergency Services contacted RHB [Radiologic Health Branch] to report a lost moisture density gauge. The lost gauge is a Troxler Model 3440, S/N 23171, containing 9 mCi of Cs-137 and 44 mCi of Am241/Be. According to the RSO [Radiation Safety Officer], the gauge user left the gauge on the tailgate of his truck without properly securing it, and drove off to the next job site. A passing driver alerted the gauge user of a falling object from his truck at the intersection of Floyd Street and Oakdale Street in Modesto, CA. The user immediately went back to the intersection, but was unable to locate the gauge. The RSO has notified the Modesto Police Department of this incident. He will be posting a reward for the safe return of the gauge on Craigslist. The RHB will be following up on this investigation.
"5010 Number: 103017"
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf