Event Notification Report for October 18, 2017
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/17/2017 - 10/18/2017
EVENT NUMBERS
53121530245302653022
Part 21
Event Number: 53121
Rep Org: SOR MEASUREMENT AND CONTROL
Licensee: SOR MEASUREMENT AND CONTROL
Region: 4
City: LENEXA State: KS
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MELANIE DIRKS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Licensee: SOR MEASUREMENT AND CONTROL
Region: 4
City: LENEXA State: KS
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MELANIE DIRKS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 12/15/2017
Notification Time: 18:02 [ET]
Event Date: 10/18/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/05/2018
Notification Time: 18:02 [ET]
Event Date: 10/18/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/05/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION 21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION 21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
EN Revision Imported Date : 02/06/18
EN Revision Text: PART 21 - DEVIATION IN ORIGINAL QUALIFICATION TESTING OF SOR SAFETY RELATED SWITCHES
The following is a excerpt from a report received via email:
"On October 18, 2017 a deviation in the original qualification testing of SOR safety-related switches was discovered by a NRC vendor inspection conducted from October 16-20, 2017. SOR continues to evaluate those items cited by NON 99900824/2017-201-01 Items 1 through 3 and other effects on safety related components identified by SOR.
"The qualification test report was written in 1992. Due to the age of the report, SOR continues to retrieve records and consult contracted sources. The evaluation is expected to be completed as soon as possible or by February 27, 2018.
"If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact:
Mike Bequette,
Vice President of Engineering
Email: mbequette@sorinc.com
Tel 913-956-3040"
* * * UPDATE ON 2/5/2018 AT 1719 EST FROM MELANIE DIRKS TO DAVID AIRD * * *
The following is an excerpt from a report received via email:
"SOR has identified the following reportable deviations:
"The Test Report did not account for all [Measuring and Test Equipment] uncertainties. The following are affected:
-Qualified Life
-LOCA [Loss of Coolant Accident] profile
-HELB1 [High Energy Line Break] profile
-HELB2 profile
"During qualification testing, observed repeatability in excess of 1 percent of span was not adequately addressed for some models. The following will be affected:
-Vacuum switches (post LOCA only)
-Temperature switches
"The Test Report presents data that is intended to provide a means to calculate reductions in qualified life depending on the conditions of the end use. However, there is a risk that this information could be overlooked by the end user. Following are the potential contributing factors to qualified life:
-Temperature rise due to electrical load on switch element
-Temperature rise on direct mount temperature switches due to elevated process temperature
"SOR has conducted or is conducting the following corrective actions:
-Provided details in this report regarding the NQ models strings and non-standard models potentially affected
-Identified the contact list of customers potentially affected by this deviation within this notification
-Notifying the utilities as indicated with a copy of this notification attached targeting completion by February 8, 2018
-Revise and update test report 9058-102 to revision 3 targeting completion and availability by February 28, 2018"
Notified R1DO (Powell), R2DO (Heisserer), R3DO (Duncan), R4DO (Deese), and Part 21 Group (via email).
Original EN Text: PART 21 - DEVIATION IN ORIGINAL QUALIFICATION TESTING OF SOR SAFETY RELATED SWITCHES
The following is a excerpt from a report received via email:
"On October 18, 2017 a deviation in the original qualification testing of SOR safety-related switches was discovered by a NRC vendor inspection conducted from October 16-20, 2017. SOR continues to evaluate those items cited by NON 99900824/2017-201-01 Items 1 through 3 and other effects on safety related components identified by SOR.
"The qualification test report was written in 1992. Due to the age of the report, SOR continues to retrieve records and consult contracted sources. The evaluation is expected to be completed as soon as possible or by February 27, 2018.
"If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact:
Mike Bequette,
Vice President of Engineering
Email: mbequette@sorinc.com
Tel 913-956-3040"
Agreement State
Event Number: 53024
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: L3 TECHNOLOGIES
Region: 1
City: WILMINGTON State: MA
County:
License #: G0766
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT LOCKE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Licensee: L3 TECHNOLOGIES
Region: 1
City: WILMINGTON State: MA
County:
License #: G0766
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT LOCKE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 10/18/2017
Notification Time: 14:16 [ET]
Event Date: 10/18/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/18/2017
Notification Time: 14:16 [ET]
Event Date: 10/18/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/18/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING SEALED SOURCE
The following information was received via e-mail:
"L3 Technologies reported a leaking foil sealed source to the Agency (Massachusetts Radiation Control Program). A wipe of the source was taken on Monday, 10/16/17 and results were received on Wednesday, 10/18/17. The leak test was measured at 0.0089 microCuries.
"Source Information: Ni-63, 15 mCi, Model # 19233, Serial # L7947.
"Device Information: Hewlett Packard Model # 5890, Serial # C-128/83.
"The foil source is housed in a gas chromatograph unit that has not been used in many years. The unit is covered and locked away in a storage room. Personnel do not routinely access the unit. Leak tests have been performed every 6 months. There is no immediate risk of contamination at the facility.
"The licensee expressed that they will appropriately dispose of the source and unit.
"The licensee is required to submit a written report to the Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] within 30 days."
The following information was received via e-mail:
"L3 Technologies reported a leaking foil sealed source to the Agency (Massachusetts Radiation Control Program). A wipe of the source was taken on Monday, 10/16/17 and results were received on Wednesday, 10/18/17. The leak test was measured at 0.0089 microCuries.
"Source Information: Ni-63, 15 mCi, Model # 19233, Serial # L7947.
"Device Information: Hewlett Packard Model # 5890, Serial # C-128/83.
"The foil source is housed in a gas chromatograph unit that has not been used in many years. The unit is covered and locked away in a storage room. Personnel do not routinely access the unit. Leak tests have been performed every 6 months. There is no immediate risk of contamination at the facility.
"The licensee expressed that they will appropriately dispose of the source and unit.
"The licensee is required to submit a written report to the Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] within 30 days."
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 53026
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: NANCY PARR
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: NANCY PARR
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 10/19/2017
Notification Time: 10:03 [ET]
Event Date: 10/18/2017
Event Time: 10:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2017
Notification Time: 10:03 [ET]
Event Date: 10/18/2017
Event Time: 10:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(1) - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(1) - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION
Person (Organization):
SHANE SANDAL (R2DO)
GRETCHEN RIVERA-CAPE (NMSS)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
SHANE SANDAL (R2DO)
GRETCHEN RIVERA-CAPE (NMSS)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
INDIVIDUAL CONTAMINATED WHILE OFFLOADING URANYL NITRATE
"24 Hour Event Notification based on 10 CFR 70.50(b)(1) for an unplanned contamination event that requires access to the contaminated area to be restricted for more than 24 hours, by imposing additional radiological controls or by prohibiting entry into the area.
"On October 18, 2017 at approximately 1005 EDT, while operators were unloading a LR-230 container of liquid uranyl nitrate, the liquid offload hose became disconnected from the container fitting. The event resulted in a uranyl nitrate exposure to one operator and a release in the offloading area. The estimated quantity of spilled solution was 6-8 gallons.
"The operator used the emergency shower and was cleared by Health Physics and Medical personnel. Operations and Health Physics personnel cleaned up the spill of low-enriched uranyl nitrate. While decontamination efforts are essentially complete, efforts continue to assure there is no smearable contamination.
"This event has been entered into the facility Corrective Action Prevention And Learning system (CAPAL)."
"24 Hour Event Notification based on 10 CFR 70.50(b)(1) for an unplanned contamination event that requires access to the contaminated area to be restricted for more than 24 hours, by imposing additional radiological controls or by prohibiting entry into the area.
"On October 18, 2017 at approximately 1005 EDT, while operators were unloading a LR-230 container of liquid uranyl nitrate, the liquid offload hose became disconnected from the container fitting. The event resulted in a uranyl nitrate exposure to one operator and a release in the offloading area. The estimated quantity of spilled solution was 6-8 gallons.
"The operator used the emergency shower and was cleared by Health Physics and Medical personnel. Operations and Health Physics personnel cleaned up the spill of low-enriched uranyl nitrate. While decontamination efforts are essentially complete, efforts continue to assure there is no smearable contamination.
"This event has been entered into the facility Corrective Action Prevention And Learning system (CAPAL)."
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53022
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ARIC HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ARIC HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 10/18/2017
Notification Time: 05:27 [ET]
Event Date: 10/18/2017
Event Time: 02:09 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/14/2017
Notification Time: 05:27 [ET]
Event Date: 10/18/2017
Event Time: 02:09 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/14/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE
"Eight hour report due to HPCl [High Pressure Coolant Injection] inoperability.
"HPCl valve operability testing was performed on October 18, 2017. Following satisfactory completion of opening stroke timing, the control switch for HPCI-MOV-MO19, HPCI Injection Valve, was taken to close. The valve indicates that it moved to an intermediate position, but it has not indicated that it has fully closed. This resulted in the valve being declared inoperable. This valve is normally closed and automatically opens on a HPCI initiation signal.
"HPCl was previously declared inoperable at time 0136 [CDT] on October 18 for surveillance testing. Entry was made into Tech Spec LCO 3.5.1 Condition C - HPCI System Inoperable at that time. Required Actions for Condition C are to verify by administrative means RCIC System is operable within 1 hour and restore HPCI System to operable status within 14 days. RClC was verified operable by administrative means concurrent with declaration of HPCI inoperable.
"Troubleshooting activities for HPCI are being planned.
"HPCI is a single train safety system. This report is submitted as a condition that at time of discovery could prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of an SSC [structures, systems, and components] needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"This condition has been entered into the CNS Corrective Action Program."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 11/14/17 AT 0849 EST FROM DAVID VAN DER KAMP TO BETHANY CECERE * * *
"CNS is retracting the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on October 18, 2017 at 0209 CDT (EN# 53022). Subsequent evaluation concluded HPCI-MOV-MO19 was still capable of performing its safety function with the failed torque switch identified during troubleshooting and would have supported the operability of the HPCI system. HPCI-MOV-MO19 only has a safety function to open to support HPCI safety function. The failed torque switch only affects the close function of the valve; therefore the HPCI system remained fully capable of performing its required safety function and was operable with the identified condition.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R4DO (Haire).
"Eight hour report due to HPCl [High Pressure Coolant Injection] inoperability.
"HPCl valve operability testing was performed on October 18, 2017. Following satisfactory completion of opening stroke timing, the control switch for HPCI-MOV-MO19, HPCI Injection Valve, was taken to close. The valve indicates that it moved to an intermediate position, but it has not indicated that it has fully closed. This resulted in the valve being declared inoperable. This valve is normally closed and automatically opens on a HPCI initiation signal.
"HPCl was previously declared inoperable at time 0136 [CDT] on October 18 for surveillance testing. Entry was made into Tech Spec LCO 3.5.1 Condition C - HPCI System Inoperable at that time. Required Actions for Condition C are to verify by administrative means RCIC System is operable within 1 hour and restore HPCI System to operable status within 14 days. RClC was verified operable by administrative means concurrent with declaration of HPCI inoperable.
"Troubleshooting activities for HPCI are being planned.
"HPCI is a single train safety system. This report is submitted as a condition that at time of discovery could prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of an SSC [structures, systems, and components] needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"This condition has been entered into the CNS Corrective Action Program."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 11/14/17 AT 0849 EST FROM DAVID VAN DER KAMP TO BETHANY CECERE * * *
"CNS is retracting the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on October 18, 2017 at 0209 CDT (EN# 53022). Subsequent evaluation concluded HPCI-MOV-MO19 was still capable of performing its safety function with the failed torque switch identified during troubleshooting and would have supported the operability of the HPCI system. HPCI-MOV-MO19 only has a safety function to open to support HPCI safety function. The failed torque switch only affects the close function of the valve; therefore the HPCI system remained fully capable of performing its required safety function and was operable with the identified condition.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R4DO (Haire).