Event Notification Report for October 02, 2017
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/01/2017 - 10/02/2017
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52998
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: SHANNON GAYDOS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: SHANNON GAYDOS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 10/03/2017
Notification Time: 15:52 [ET]
Event Date: 10/02/2017
Event Time: 11:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2017
Notification Time: 15:52 [ET]
Event Date: 10/02/2017
Event Time: 11:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 96 | Power Operation | 96 | Power Operation |
INITIAL PART 21 NOTIFICATION - CAMERON MODEL 752B DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS
"This report is made per 10 CFR Part 21.21(d)(3)(i) on the identification of a defect or a failure to comply.
"By the letter dated August 31, 2017, Westinghouse notified Callaway Plant that they were unable to complete a 10 CFR 21.21(a) evaluation for a product advisory which was issued by Cameron Measurement Systems for a concern with the Model 752B transmitter product line. The product advisory identified the potential for instability in the transmitter output signal under certain grounding conditions. Callaway was supplied transmitters that could be affected under Westinghouse part numbers 8765D64G03, 8765D64G04, and 8765D64G05. The Westinghouse notification letter served as the transfer of reporting responsibilities for this concern from Westinghouse to Callaway in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(b).
"The 10 CFR Part 21 evaluation is based on the technical information provided by Westinghouse. The notification letter describes that shifts up to 10-20 percent of instrument scale (1.6-3.2mA) can be observed within the transmitter output under the grounding conditions such as those introduced by the original equipment manufacturer during testing. Westinghouse evaluations concluded that such instabilities would be self-revealing within plant applications for which the transmitter output signal was supplied to a Westinghouse 7300 system, assuming the transmitter stanchion was grounded. Not all transmitters within this product line were subject to this concern.
"On 10/02/2017 Callaway personnel completed the 10 CFR Part 21 evaluation. Of the transmitters identified above, only one is currently installed at Callaway in location BNLT0930, Refueling Water Storage Tank Protection A Level Transmitter. No instabilities (oscillations) have been observed in this transmitter but plans are being made to replace the transmitter.
"If one of the susceptible transmitters were installed for RCS flow application (low flow reactor trip function), the allowed sensor drift to accommodate changes in transmitter performance would be required to be limited to 1percent of instrument span per an 18-month operating period. Current margin available within the set point uncertainty analysis for this Reactor Trip function is 0.62 percent of instrument span. The observed shift in output of 10-20 percent of instrument span would thus exceed the available margin for this protective function. Therefore, the safety function for this device could not be assured for all transmitter configurations. This condition could create a substantial safety hazard due to the loss of safety function of a basic component which meets the criteria of major degradation of essential safety-related equipment.
"For the situation at Callaway, no other reporting criteria apply since there is no evidence that the installed transmitter BNLT0930 is susceptible to the concerns noted in the product advisory.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this issue."
"This report is made per 10 CFR Part 21.21(d)(3)(i) on the identification of a defect or a failure to comply.
"By the letter dated August 31, 2017, Westinghouse notified Callaway Plant that they were unable to complete a 10 CFR 21.21(a) evaluation for a product advisory which was issued by Cameron Measurement Systems for a concern with the Model 752B transmitter product line. The product advisory identified the potential for instability in the transmitter output signal under certain grounding conditions. Callaway was supplied transmitters that could be affected under Westinghouse part numbers 8765D64G03, 8765D64G04, and 8765D64G05. The Westinghouse notification letter served as the transfer of reporting responsibilities for this concern from Westinghouse to Callaway in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(b).
"The 10 CFR Part 21 evaluation is based on the technical information provided by Westinghouse. The notification letter describes that shifts up to 10-20 percent of instrument scale (1.6-3.2mA) can be observed within the transmitter output under the grounding conditions such as those introduced by the original equipment manufacturer during testing. Westinghouse evaluations concluded that such instabilities would be self-revealing within plant applications for which the transmitter output signal was supplied to a Westinghouse 7300 system, assuming the transmitter stanchion was grounded. Not all transmitters within this product line were subject to this concern.
"On 10/02/2017 Callaway personnel completed the 10 CFR Part 21 evaluation. Of the transmitters identified above, only one is currently installed at Callaway in location BNLT0930, Refueling Water Storage Tank Protection A Level Transmitter. No instabilities (oscillations) have been observed in this transmitter but plans are being made to replace the transmitter.
"If one of the susceptible transmitters were installed for RCS flow application (low flow reactor trip function), the allowed sensor drift to accommodate changes in transmitter performance would be required to be limited to 1percent of instrument span per an 18-month operating period. Current margin available within the set point uncertainty analysis for this Reactor Trip function is 0.62 percent of instrument span. The observed shift in output of 10-20 percent of instrument span would thus exceed the available margin for this protective function. Therefore, the safety function for this device could not be assured for all transmitter configurations. This condition could create a substantial safety hazard due to the loss of safety function of a basic component which meets the criteria of major degradation of essential safety-related equipment.
"For the situation at Callaway, no other reporting criteria apply since there is no evidence that the installed transmitter BNLT0930 is susceptible to the concerns noted in the product advisory.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this issue."
Agreement State
Event Number: 52997
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: ACUREN INSPECTION, INC.
Region: 4
City: LaPORT State: TX
County:
License #: 01774
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Licensee: ACUREN INSPECTION, INC.
Region: 4
City: LaPORT State: TX
County:
License #: 01774
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 10/03/2017
Notification Time: 12:15 [ET]
Event Date: 10/02/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2017
Notification Time: 12:15 [ET]
Event Date: 10/02/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE DISCONNECTED WHILE WORKING IN THE FIELD
The following report was received from the Texas Department of State Health Service via email:
"On October 2, 2017, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee that one of its radiography crews had experienced a source disconnect while working at a field site. The radiography crew was using a QSA 880D exposure device containing a 75 curie iridium-192 source. The radiographers had completed a shot and as they approached the exposure device their alarming rate meters alarmed. The radiographers retreated to the end of the crank out device and attempted to retract the source. The source could not be retracted. The radiographers contacted their radiation safety officer (RSO) who responded to the scene. The RSO was able to drive the source into the collimator and place shielding over the source. The RSO inspected the drive cable and found that the drive cable had pulled out of the drive cable connector to the source pigtail. The RSO connected a new crank out device to the source and was able to retract the source into the fully shielded position in the camera. The RSO stated he inspected the drive cable at the connection and it appeared the cable had been stretched. The RSO stated the connector had obvious crimp marks on it. The RSO stated the equipment would be returned to the manufacturer for inspection. No individual received an overexposure due to this event. No member of the general public received any exposure from this event. The Agency has requested additional information from the licensee. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #:I 9515
The following report was received from the Texas Department of State Health Service via email:
"On October 2, 2017, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee that one of its radiography crews had experienced a source disconnect while working at a field site. The radiography crew was using a QSA 880D exposure device containing a 75 curie iridium-192 source. The radiographers had completed a shot and as they approached the exposure device their alarming rate meters alarmed. The radiographers retreated to the end of the crank out device and attempted to retract the source. The source could not be retracted. The radiographers contacted their radiation safety officer (RSO) who responded to the scene. The RSO was able to drive the source into the collimator and place shielding over the source. The RSO inspected the drive cable and found that the drive cable had pulled out of the drive cable connector to the source pigtail. The RSO connected a new crank out device to the source and was able to retract the source into the fully shielded position in the camera. The RSO stated he inspected the drive cable at the connection and it appeared the cable had been stretched. The RSO stated the connector had obvious crimp marks on it. The RSO stated the equipment would be returned to the manufacturer for inspection. No individual received an overexposure due to this event. No member of the general public received any exposure from this event. The Agency has requested additional information from the licensee. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #:I 9515