Event Notification Report for September 17, 2017
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/16/2017 - 09/17/2017
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52974
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL NAYLOR
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL NAYLOR
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 09/17/2017
Notification Time: 16:49 [ET]
Event Date: 09/17/2017
Event Time: 09:38 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/17/2017
Notification Time: 16:49 [ET]
Event Date: 09/17/2017
Event Time: 09:38 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/17/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR AND PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM ACTUATIONS
"On September 17, 2017, during planned surveillance activities involving Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 4, unexpected voltage and frequency indications were noted when EDG 4 was synchronized to Emergency Bus E4. With EDG 4 in manual mode, the Operator responded by lowering load to reopen the EDG 4 output breaker. Opening of the EDG 4 output breaker with the breakers from Balance of Plant (BOP) Bus 2C, which normally feeds the Emergency Bus E4, opened; resulted in de-energizing Emergency Bus E4. The EDG 4 voltage regulator and governor automatically reverted to auto control, and EDG 4 reconnected to Emergency Bus E4. Normal frequency and voltage were restored with EDG 4 in auto control.
"The momentary power interruption to Emergency Bus E4 resulted in Unit 2 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 2 (i.e., Drywell Equipment and Floor Drain, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Discharge to Radwaste, and RHR Process Sample), Group 6 (i.e., Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems), and Group 10 (i.e., air isolation to the drywell) isolations. The actuations of Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVS) were completed and the affected equipment responded as designed. Per design, no Unit 1 safety system group isolations or actuations occurred.
"These actuations are being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"Additional Unit 2 actuations included PCIS Group 3 (i.e., Reactor Water Cleanup), Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation (i.e., Secondary Containment isolation), and the automatic start of Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System subsystems A and B. These systems functioned as designed.
"This event did not impact public health and safety. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"The safety significance of this event is minimal. Safety systems functioned as designed following the power perturbation on E4. Plant systems responded as designed. The cause of the event is under investigation."
"On September 17, 2017, during planned surveillance activities involving Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 4, unexpected voltage and frequency indications were noted when EDG 4 was synchronized to Emergency Bus E4. With EDG 4 in manual mode, the Operator responded by lowering load to reopen the EDG 4 output breaker. Opening of the EDG 4 output breaker with the breakers from Balance of Plant (BOP) Bus 2C, which normally feeds the Emergency Bus E4, opened; resulted in de-energizing Emergency Bus E4. The EDG 4 voltage regulator and governor automatically reverted to auto control, and EDG 4 reconnected to Emergency Bus E4. Normal frequency and voltage were restored with EDG 4 in auto control.
"The momentary power interruption to Emergency Bus E4 resulted in Unit 2 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 2 (i.e., Drywell Equipment and Floor Drain, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Discharge to Radwaste, and RHR Process Sample), Group 6 (i.e., Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems), and Group 10 (i.e., air isolation to the drywell) isolations. The actuations of Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVS) were completed and the affected equipment responded as designed. Per design, no Unit 1 safety system group isolations or actuations occurred.
"These actuations are being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"Additional Unit 2 actuations included PCIS Group 3 (i.e., Reactor Water Cleanup), Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation (i.e., Secondary Containment isolation), and the automatic start of Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System subsystems A and B. These systems functioned as designed.
"This event did not impact public health and safety. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"The safety significance of this event is minimal. Safety systems functioned as designed following the power perturbation on E4. Plant systems responded as designed. The cause of the event is under investigation."
Agreement State
Event Number: 52975
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: RMA GROUP
Region: 4
City: RANCHO CORDOVA State: CA
County:
License #: 7565-34
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: NIKA HEWADIKARAM
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE
Licensee: RMA GROUP
Region: 4
City: RANCHO CORDOVA State: CA
County:
License #: 7565-34
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: NIKA HEWADIKARAM
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE
Notification Date: 09/18/2017
Notification Time: 20:08 [ET]
Event Date: 09/17/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/2017
Notification Time: 20:08 [ET]
Event Date: 09/17/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FOUND TROXLER GAUGE
The following is a report emailed from the California Department of Public Health, Radiologic Health Branch (RHB):
"On 09/18/17, RHB received a call from an employee at an unlicensed facility (Clorox Company) in Fairfield, CA, regarding recovery of a lost/stolen moisture density gauge. The gauge is a Troxler Model 3450, S/N 1083 gauge containing approximately 9 mCi of Cs-137 and 44 mCi of Am-241. On Sunday afternoon (09/17/17) one of the Clorox employees noticed a locked container left on the side of the street in front of their facility. On Monday (9/18/17) morning, the locked container was noticed to have been moved farther from the road and closer to their facility. Clorox called Troxler and Fairfield Police, but neither could pick up the container. The Clorox employee then contacted RHB, and received instruction on how to safely store the container until RHB arrives at the facility. RHB picked up the gauge the same day and brought it back to the storage facility at the Richmond Regional office. A survey performed by RHB at the Clorox facility using a Thermo Scientific Rad Eye B20, S/N 30744, calibrated 03/09/17, indicated 0.4 mR/hr at one meter, which is a typical reading for a moisture density gauge in its transportation container. The type A transportation container appeared to be in good condition and was locked with two padlocks. RHB had the padlocks cut, and located a copy of a license indicating the gauge belongs to RMA Group in Rancho Cordova, CA (License # 7565-34). RHB has not received any notification from the licensee regarding a lost or stolen gauge. RHB will be contacting the licensee to follow up on this incident."
California 5010 Number: 091817
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following is a report emailed from the California Department of Public Health, Radiologic Health Branch (RHB):
"On 09/18/17, RHB received a call from an employee at an unlicensed facility (Clorox Company) in Fairfield, CA, regarding recovery of a lost/stolen moisture density gauge. The gauge is a Troxler Model 3450, S/N 1083 gauge containing approximately 9 mCi of Cs-137 and 44 mCi of Am-241. On Sunday afternoon (09/17/17) one of the Clorox employees noticed a locked container left on the side of the street in front of their facility. On Monday (9/18/17) morning, the locked container was noticed to have been moved farther from the road and closer to their facility. Clorox called Troxler and Fairfield Police, but neither could pick up the container. The Clorox employee then contacted RHB, and received instruction on how to safely store the container until RHB arrives at the facility. RHB picked up the gauge the same day and brought it back to the storage facility at the Richmond Regional office. A survey performed by RHB at the Clorox facility using a Thermo Scientific Rad Eye B20, S/N 30744, calibrated 03/09/17, indicated 0.4 mR/hr at one meter, which is a typical reading for a moisture density gauge in its transportation container. The type A transportation container appeared to be in good condition and was locked with two padlocks. RHB had the padlocks cut, and located a copy of a license indicating the gauge belongs to RMA Group in Rancho Cordova, CA (License # 7565-34). RHB has not received any notification from the licensee regarding a lost or stolen gauge. RHB will be contacting the licensee to follow up on this incident."
California 5010 Number: 091817
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf