Event Notification Report for September 12, 2017
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/11/2017 - 09/12/2017
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52964
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: EDWARD BURNS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: EDWARD BURNS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 09/12/2017
Notification Time: 14:20 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2017
Event Time: 11:31 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2017
Notification Time: 14:20 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2017
Event Time: 11:31 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM PIPING FAILURE
"On September 12, 2017 at 1131 CDT, both Unit 3 Standby Liquid Control system (SLC) subsystems were declared inoperable for a through wall leak on the common discharge piping. With both subsystems inoperable, the SLC system was unable to fulfill its safety function.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) for an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of a system that is needed to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for a system that was unavailable for accident mitigation.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
With both trains of SLC inoperable, the licensee entered an 8-hr. action statement to restore at least one train to operability. If unable to do so, then the plant will enter a 12-hr. shutdown action statement.
"On September 12, 2017 at 1131 CDT, both Unit 3 Standby Liquid Control system (SLC) subsystems were declared inoperable for a through wall leak on the common discharge piping. With both subsystems inoperable, the SLC system was unable to fulfill its safety function.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) for an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of a system that is needed to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for a system that was unavailable for accident mitigation.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
With both trains of SLC inoperable, the licensee entered an 8-hr. action statement to restore at least one train to operability. If unable to do so, then the plant will enter a 12-hr. shutdown action statement.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52966
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JEFFERY KUETHER-ULBERG
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JEFFERY KUETHER-ULBERG
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 09/12/2017
Notification Time: 19:11 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2017
Event Time: 12:28 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2017
Notification Time: 19:11 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2017
Event Time: 12:28 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JEREMY GROOM (R4DO)
JEREMY GROOM (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT PRESSURE MOMENTARILY ABOVE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMIT
"On September 12, 2017, at 1228 PDT, Reactor Building (Secondary Containment) pressure momentarily rose above the Technical Specification (TS) limit. Secondary Containment was declared inoperable and TS Action Statement 3.6.4.1.A was entered. The pressure rise was due to unexpected isolation of the supply and exhaust valves in the Reactor Building ventilation system due to an electrical transient on the power panel feeding the valve operators' solenoid pilot valves during maintenance. The cause of the electrical transient is under investigation.
"The Reactor Building differential pressure controller restored the building pressure to within limits. The Control Room operators reopened the Reactor Building ventilation supply and exhaust valves. Secondary Containment was declared operable at 1228 PDT and TS Action Statement 3.6.4.1.A was exited.
"This condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material and accident mitigation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On September 12, 2017, at 1228 PDT, Reactor Building (Secondary Containment) pressure momentarily rose above the Technical Specification (TS) limit. Secondary Containment was declared inoperable and TS Action Statement 3.6.4.1.A was entered. The pressure rise was due to unexpected isolation of the supply and exhaust valves in the Reactor Building ventilation system due to an electrical transient on the power panel feeding the valve operators' solenoid pilot valves during maintenance. The cause of the electrical transient is under investigation.
"The Reactor Building differential pressure controller restored the building pressure to within limits. The Control Room operators reopened the Reactor Building ventilation supply and exhaust valves. Secondary Containment was declared operable at 1228 PDT and TS Action Statement 3.6.4.1.A was exited.
"This condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material and accident mitigation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.