Event Notification Report for July 14, 2017

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST AND RECOVERED PORTABLE GAUGE

The following was received from the State of Nevada via email:

"It was reported to the Nevada Radiation Control Program duty officer that a portable gauge had been recovered at a temporary job site in Las Vegas, Nevada. The individual who reported the event is a Nevada radioactive material licensee and said on 7/14/2017, at approximately 0735 [PDT], 'a nuclear density gauge was found in North Las Vegas at Cheyenne Ave and Berg St on the road. The gauge was recovered by an employee and quickly brought it to a secure storage location. The gauge was found in good condition and not damaged or source exposed.' At 0930 [PDT] on 7/14/2017, it was reported to the Nevada Radiation Control Program, by the ARSO from the company who lost the gauge, the gauge fell off the tailgate of a transport vehicle at a temporary jobsite, and the operator realized the loss and returned to the site within 5 minutes, but the gauge had already been recovered by [the reporting licensee]. The operator from [the licensee who lost the gauge] was informed that the gauge was recovered by [the reporting licensee] and relayed that information to the ARSO at [the licensee who lost the gauge]. The gauge was intact, no damage, transported back to the owner's storage location, and taken out of service. An investigation of the event will commence [on] 07/17/2017."

Item Number: NV170006

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

LOSS OF THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION SYSTEM

"Oyster Creek Generating Station has experienced a loss of the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system due to an electrical perturbation.

"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during the time TSC ventilation is non-functional, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to a loss of the TSC. An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * UPDATE AT 0537 EDT ON 07/15/17 FROM JIM RITCHIE TO S. SANDIN * * *

TSC ventilation was restored at 0128 EDT on 07/15/17. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis).

PART 21 NOTIFICATION - EATON/CUTLER HAMMER A200 SERIES STARTER

The following information was received by the licensee via email:

"Pursuant to 10 CFR 21, this is a non-emergency notification by Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC concerning a defect in an Eaton/Cutler Hammer A200 series starter that failed while in service at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station. The failed starter was manufactured by Eaton Corporation in 2014 and purchased by Susquehanna from AZZ/NLI as part of an MCC bucket assembly. The starter failed with its contacts stuck in the energized state when it was de-energized. A failure analysis identified the contactor sticking to be due to the pole faces of the coil laminations and those of the armature laminations adhering to one another at normal operating temperatures. There was residue/material on the pole faces which closely matched Polydimethylsiloxane (PDMS) and silicone grease. One of the characteristics of PDMS is that at cooler temperatures it is more of a solid consistency, and at higher temperatures it becomes more viscous and tacky.

"A previous Part 21 report submitted by Curtiss-Wright QualTech NP (Event Notification Number 51611) in December 2015 provided notification of Eaton/Cutler Hammer A200 series starters failures due to silicon based mold release that remained on the molded parts and would come between the moving (magnet) and fixed armatures. The Part 21 stated that when heated for extended period of time, the material would become sticky causing anywhere from a minor delay in opening to a frozen closed condition. Eaton/Cutler Hammer determined that the silicone mold release was first introduced into the manufacturing facility in May 2008 and used periodically until October 2012. According to Eaton/Cutler Hammer, any starters manufactured after January 1, 2013 should be silicon mold release free.

"Following the failure of the 2014 starter at Susquehanna, Eaton Corporation performed an investigation and reconfirmed that silicon mold release was banned from molding production in October 2012 and has not been used since that time. Eaton concluded that the contamination does not appear to be systemic, but rather random and intermittent and that the contamination was most likely introduced either by operators and assemblers on the manufacturing lines, or by others who disassemble and inspect the product after shipment from their plant. Susquehanna does not take the components apart during receipt for testing or visual inspection. Eaton concluded that there is no evidence that the issue is systemic and considers it a random event. Susquehanna has evaluated the condition and has concluded that the condition could create a substantial safety hazard."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

INVALID ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

"This report is being made as required by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an automatic actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system. Because the actuation was invalid, this 60-day telephone notification is being made instead of a written LER [Licensee Event Report], in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1).

"On 07/14/17, at approximately 1453 hours [EDT], an electrical transient occurred due to an off-site lightning strike that de-energized one of the station's two qualified off-site power sources. This resulted in an automatic fast transfer of four 4 kV electrical buses to the alternate off-site source. The fast transfer occurred as designed without complications. The loss of power had numerous impacts on plant equipment that occurred in accordance with plant design, including a Group 2 primary containment isolation on both units. The Group 2 isolation affected multiple systems, including Reactor Water Cleanup, Instrument Nitrogen, and the Drywell Floor Drain.

"The fault on the off-site transmission line immediately cleared after the lightning strike and at 1457 hours [EDT] the transmission system operator gave the station permission to reclose the breaker to the off-site source. Following system restorations and equipment walkdowns, plant operators re-established normal connections to the off-site source on 7/14/17 at 2322 hours [EDT] in accordance with station procedures.

"The containment isolation occurred as a result of the loss of an off-site power source and was not due to actual plant conditions or parameters meeting design criteria for containment isolation. Therefore, this is considered to be an invalid actuation.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification."