Event Notification Report for June 16, 2017
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/15/2017 - 06/16/2017
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 52811
Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: PHILLIP OLLIS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: PHILLIP OLLIS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 06/16/2017
Notification Time: 18:20 [ET]
Event Date: 06/16/2017
Event Time: 17:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/2017
Notification Time: 18:20 [ET]
Event Date: 06/16/2017
Event Time: 17:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
OMAR LOPEZ (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
OMAR LOPEZ (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
UNANALYZED CONDITION IDENTIFIED
"At 1700 EDT on June 16, 2017 it was determined that an unanalyzed condition was identified that failed to meet performance criteria. This report is conservatively being made in accordance with 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(1).
"In the powder process, a non-radioactive additive is added to a can of uranium in a hood. A previous process hazard analysis (PHA) determined that a criticality in the associated HEPA filters was not credible during this step. A recent update to a criticality analysis identified a potential condition where small amounts of uranium could build up in the HEPA filter over decades. The ISA [Integrated Safety Analysis] team met and decided that current safety controls will need to be implemented as IROFS [items relied on for safety] to assure that performance criteria are met. The operation is currently shut down and no unsafe condition existed.
"Safety Significance of Events: At no time was an unsafe condition present.
"Safety Equipment Status: The operation was shutdown.
"Status of Corrective Actions: Additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and extent of cause are being investigated."
"At 1700 EDT on June 16, 2017 it was determined that an unanalyzed condition was identified that failed to meet performance criteria. This report is conservatively being made in accordance with 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(1).
"In the powder process, a non-radioactive additive is added to a can of uranium in a hood. A previous process hazard analysis (PHA) determined that a criticality in the associated HEPA filters was not credible during this step. A recent update to a criticality analysis identified a potential condition where small amounts of uranium could build up in the HEPA filter over decades. The ISA [Integrated Safety Analysis] team met and decided that current safety controls will need to be implemented as IROFS [items relied on for safety] to assure that performance criteria are met. The operation is currently shut down and no unsafe condition existed.
"Safety Significance of Events: At no time was an unsafe condition present.
"Safety Equipment Status: The operation was shutdown.
"Status of Corrective Actions: Additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and extent of cause are being investigated."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52812
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: JEREMY GALLOWAY
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: JEREMY GALLOWAY
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 06/17/2017
Notification Time: 00:32 [ET]
Event Date: 06/16/2017
Event Time: 16:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/17/2017
Notification Time: 00:32 [ET]
Event Date: 06/16/2017
Event Time: 16:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/17/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
OMAR LOPEZ (R2DO)
OMAR LOPEZ (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION DUE TO KEOWEE DAM UNITS BEING DECLARED INOPERABLE
"Keowee Hydro Units [KHU] 1 and 2 were both declared inoperable at 1635 [EDT] on 6-16-17 due to discovery of breaker 1GSC-1 (KHU-1) in the intermediate position, and breaker 2GSC-1 (KHU-2) in the open position. Keowee Hydro Units are required to be operable per TS [Technical Specification] 3.8.1 (AC Sources - Operating), TS 3.8.2 (AC Sources - Shutdown), and TS 3.7.10 (Protected Service Water, applies only to KHU aligned to the Overhead Power Path). All Tech Spec required conditions were entered, and all required actions completed. Both Standby Buses were energized from a Lee Combustion Turbine via an isolated power path at 1715 [EDT] on 6-16-17 in accordance with TS 3.8.1 Condition (I), Required Action (I.1).
"It has been determined by station personnel that a loss of safety function did occur between 1635 [EDT] (when the Keowee Hydro Units were declared inoperable) and 1715 [EDT] (when the Standby Buses were energized from a Lee Combustion Turbine via an isolated power path).
"Investigation has determined the cause of breakers 1GSC-1 and 2GSC-1 being out of their required closed position to be inadvertent bumping while performing station work activities. Breakers 1GSC-1 and 2GSC-1 have been reclosed, and both Keowee Hydro Units have been declared operable as of 2351 [EDT] on 6-16-17."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Keowee Hydro Units [KHU] 1 and 2 were both declared inoperable at 1635 [EDT] on 6-16-17 due to discovery of breaker 1GSC-1 (KHU-1) in the intermediate position, and breaker 2GSC-1 (KHU-2) in the open position. Keowee Hydro Units are required to be operable per TS [Technical Specification] 3.8.1 (AC Sources - Operating), TS 3.8.2 (AC Sources - Shutdown), and TS 3.7.10 (Protected Service Water, applies only to KHU aligned to the Overhead Power Path). All Tech Spec required conditions were entered, and all required actions completed. Both Standby Buses were energized from a Lee Combustion Turbine via an isolated power path at 1715 [EDT] on 6-16-17 in accordance with TS 3.8.1 Condition (I), Required Action (I.1).
"It has been determined by station personnel that a loss of safety function did occur between 1635 [EDT] (when the Keowee Hydro Units were declared inoperable) and 1715 [EDT] (when the Standby Buses were energized from a Lee Combustion Turbine via an isolated power path).
"Investigation has determined the cause of breakers 1GSC-1 and 2GSC-1 being out of their required closed position to be inadvertent bumping while performing station work activities. Breakers 1GSC-1 and 2GSC-1 have been reclosed, and both Keowee Hydro Units have been declared operable as of 2351 [EDT] on 6-16-17."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.