Event Notification Report for June 05, 2017
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/04/2017 - 06/05/2017
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52788
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRUCE LEITCH
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRUCE LEITCH
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 06/05/2017
Notification Time: 19:40 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2017
Event Time: 13:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/05/2017
Notification Time: 19:40 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2017
Event Time: 13:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/05/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING AND EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEMS INOPERABLE
"At 1352 hours Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on June 5, 2017, during control building damper inspection activities, a control building instrument air line was disconnected. This resulted in the inoperability of the three Control Room Air Conditioning subsystems required by Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.4, 'Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System', and the two Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystems required by TS 3.7.3, 'Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) System. As a result, this condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function for these systems.
"Control Room AC and CREV system operability was restored at 1407 hours with restoration of control building instrument air. Because Brunswick has a shared control room, this report applies to both Units 1 and 2 and is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"This event did not impact public health and safety.
"INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION: The safety significance of this event is considered minimal. The condition existed for approximately 15 minutes. Plant staff took immediate actions to return the equipment to service. For the brief time the Control Room AC and CREV systems were inoperable, performance of plant personnel and equipment in the Control Room was not adversely affected. The maximum Control Room back panel temperature during this event was approximately 70 degrees F.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Control Room AC and CREV system operability was restored at 1407 hours with restoration of control building instrument air.
"During subsequent investigation of the event, it was determined that at approximately 0930 hours on June 5, 2017, both subsystems of CREV were similarity rendered inoperable due to isolation of control building instrument air. Control Room AC was not affected. Operability of CREV was restored at approximately 1009 hours. This loss of the CREV system was not apparent to Operations personnel at the time of the event."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1352 hours Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on June 5, 2017, during control building damper inspection activities, a control building instrument air line was disconnected. This resulted in the inoperability of the three Control Room Air Conditioning subsystems required by Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.4, 'Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System', and the two Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystems required by TS 3.7.3, 'Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) System. As a result, this condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function for these systems.
"Control Room AC and CREV system operability was restored at 1407 hours with restoration of control building instrument air. Because Brunswick has a shared control room, this report applies to both Units 1 and 2 and is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"This event did not impact public health and safety.
"INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION: The safety significance of this event is considered minimal. The condition existed for approximately 15 minutes. Plant staff took immediate actions to return the equipment to service. For the brief time the Control Room AC and CREV systems were inoperable, performance of plant personnel and equipment in the Control Room was not adversely affected. The maximum Control Room back panel temperature during this event was approximately 70 degrees F.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Control Room AC and CREV system operability was restored at 1407 hours with restoration of control building instrument air.
"During subsequent investigation of the event, it was determined that at approximately 0930 hours on June 5, 2017, both subsystems of CREV were similarity rendered inoperable due to isolation of control building instrument air. Control Room AC was not affected. Operability of CREV was restored at approximately 1009 hours. This loss of the CREV system was not apparent to Operations personnel at the time of the event."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Agreement State
Event Number: 52789
Rep Org: SC DIV OF HEALTH & ENV CONTROL
Licensee: MEAD & HUNT, INC.
Region: 1
City: LEXINGTON State: SC
County:
License #: 840
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ANDREW M. ROXBURGH
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: MEAD & HUNT, INC.
Region: 1
City: LEXINGTON State: SC
County:
License #: 840
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ANDREW M. ROXBURGH
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 06/06/2017
Notification Time: 07:34 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2017
Event Time: 16:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/06/2017
Notification Time: 07:34 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2017
Event Time: 16:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/06/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BLAKE WELLING (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
BLAKE WELLING (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TROXLER DENSITY GAUGE DAMAGED AT JOBSITE
The following information was provided by the State of South Carolina via email:
"Event Location: Highway 51 South of Pamplico, SC
"Event Type: Damaged gauge
"Event Description: At approximately 4:30 PM on June 5, 2017, the Department [South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control] was notified by [a representative] of Mead & Hunt, Inc. that it had a density gauge damaged by a trachoe while at a jobsite on Highway 51 South of Pamplico, SC. The on-call duty officer responded to the scene around 7:30 PM and met [the representative]. Upon arriving at the scene, the duty officer observed that the area around the gauge had been properly roped off. The duty officer and [the representative] approached the gauge with survey meter to identify the level of damage. The gauge was a Troxler 3440 containing 8 millicuries of Cs-137. A radiation readings of 12-16 mR/hr on the surfaces of the gauge were observed and found to be within the normal radiation profile for this gauge. The handle of the gauge was broken off causing the gauge to not properly function. The source shutter was found to be completely in the shielded position. The gauge was returned to the licensee's office in Lexington, SC.
"A follow-up inspection of the gauge at the licensee's facility in Lexington, SC will be conducted on June 6, 2017."
The following information was provided by the State of South Carolina via email:
"Event Location: Highway 51 South of Pamplico, SC
"Event Type: Damaged gauge
"Event Description: At approximately 4:30 PM on June 5, 2017, the Department [South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control] was notified by [a representative] of Mead & Hunt, Inc. that it had a density gauge damaged by a trachoe while at a jobsite on Highway 51 South of Pamplico, SC. The on-call duty officer responded to the scene around 7:30 PM and met [the representative]. Upon arriving at the scene, the duty officer observed that the area around the gauge had been properly roped off. The duty officer and [the representative] approached the gauge with survey meter to identify the level of damage. The gauge was a Troxler 3440 containing 8 millicuries of Cs-137. A radiation readings of 12-16 mR/hr on the surfaces of the gauge were observed and found to be within the normal radiation profile for this gauge. The handle of the gauge was broken off causing the gauge to not properly function. The source shutter was found to be completely in the shielded position. The gauge was returned to the licensee's office in Lexington, SC.
"A follow-up inspection of the gauge at the licensee's facility in Lexington, SC will be conducted on June 6, 2017."
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Part 21
Event Number: 52857
Rep Org: CRANE NUCLEAR, INC.
Licensee: CRANE NUCLEAR, INC.
Region: 3
City: BOLINGBROOK State: IL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SAMSON KAY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Licensee: CRANE NUCLEAR, INC.
Region: 3
City: BOLINGBROOK State: IL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SAMSON KAY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 07/13/2017
Notification Time: 17:59 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2018
Notification Time: 17:59 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTORS (EMAIL)
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTORS (EMAIL)
PART 21 - DEFECTIVE SAFETY RELATED VALVES
The following was excerpted from a letter by Crane Nuclear, Inc.:
"The plug valve designs provided for XOMOX model figure numbers 037AX, 067EG, and 037. These valves have been identified as used in nuclear and/or safety related applications.
"The stem for the Subject valve models was identified as being undersized based on allowable yield stress analysis of the stem while in torsion. The high stress condition was due to the high torque required to seat/unseat the plug when installed with a Ultra High Molecular Weight Polyethylene (UHMWPE) sleeve material. High friction factor inherent with this material causes torsional stress to exceed the upper limit of yield strength of the valve which could result in fatigue/yielding of the stem, thus preventing the valve from opening and closing while in service. Historical research performed thus far has not identified any notifications from the customer(s) regarding stem failure of the subject valves, indicating that the valves may still be in operation with no performance related or operating issues.
"The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be token to complete the action.
"Notifications letters have been sent to the affected plants advising them of the condition, and recommending that the sleeve material be replaced with a lower friction Polytetrafluorethylene (PTFE) material that would significantly reduce the required input operating torque, thereby reducing the risk of failure of the stem material.
"XOMOX has been advised to modify design calculations to provide a larger margin for allowable yield strength of the stem material to ensure the stem is properly sized when Ultra High Molecular Weight Polyethylene (UHMWPE) sleeve material is used.
"Crane will continue to review XOMOX records to determine if any other sites are impacted, which we expect to complete by August 31, 2017.
"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Samson Kay, Manager of Engineering at (630) 226-4983 or Jennifer Bregovy, Manager of Quality and Safety at (630) 226-4949."
The following facilities received these safety related orders: TVA Sequoyah, Pennsylvania Power & Light Susquehanna.
* * * UPDATE AT 1205 EDT ON 8/29/17 FROM SAMSON KAY TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following information was received via fax:
"Crane Nuclear (CNI) has initiate the final phase of the Part 21 research and is currently reviewing over 15,000 documents from the original XOMOX Canada historical archive to determine if any other nuclear sites were impacted by the subject Part 21. The investigation encompasses sales orders spanning from 1968 to 1992. CNI expects to complete the review by 10/30/2017."
Point of Contact: Samson Kay (630-226-4983) or Jennifer Bregovy (630-226-4949)
Notified the R1DO (Cook), R2DO (Lopez), and Part 21 Resources (via e-mail).
* * * UPDATE AT 1627 EDT ON 11/01/17 FROM SAMSON KAY TO S. SANDIN VIA FAX * * *
The following information was provided as an update:
"Crane Nuclear (CNI) has completed approximately 40% of the review of the historical archive and will not be able to complete the review by the previously requested 10/30/2017 deadline.
"The historical review covers the following scope:
-XOMOX UK DEVON, ENGLAND - Safety-Related and N-Stamped Valves/Parts issued between 1987 - 1993
-XOMOX Canada & XOMOX A&M - Safety-Related Parts from 1979 - 1993
-XOMOX Cincinnati TUFFLINE - Safety-Related and N-Stamped Valves and Parts issued between 1970 -1993
-XOMOX Crane Nuclear - Safety-Related and N-Stamped Valves and Parts issued from 2001 until present.
"Note: Parts and valves were no longer supplied by XOMOX as safety-related or nuclear after 1993 until Crane Nuclear acquired XOMOX in June 29, 2001.
"The following sites . . . were identified as a safety-related valves effected by this letter. All sites were supplied to customer 'Delaval' which no longer exists. At the current pace of review, CNI expects to complete the review of the historical archive by 1/30/2018."
Delaval supplied valves to these Original Plant Name(s); TVA (doesn't show which plant), Comanche Peak Units 1&2, Columbia, Cleveland Electric, Midland Nuclear Power Plant Units 1&2 and TVA, - Hartsville and Phipps Bend Nuclear Plants both of which were cancelled before completion.
Notified R1DO (McKinley), R2DO (Ehrhardt), R3DO (Duncan), R4DO (Werner) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors via email.
* * * UPDATE AT 1553 EDT ON 01/31/18 FROM JOYCE HAMMAN TO DONG PARK * * *
The following information was provided as an update via fax:
"The historical research is complete. Our review of the records from 1973 through 2001 identified 25 valves that were supplied with a stem-sleeve material combination that could exceed the upper limit of yield strength of the valve, which could result in fatigue/yielding of the stem, thus preventing the valve from opening and closing while in service. Those valves were supplied to:
"Northeast Utilities, Millstone; Houston Lighting & Power, South Texas Project; Niagara Mohawk, Nine Mile Point; Transamerican Delavel, Oakland; Power Systems, Rocky Mount; Bechtel Energy Corp., 5 Miles West Wadsworth; Pennsylvania Power & Light, Susquehanna; NY Power Authority, Fitzpatrick; TVA, Sequoyah; Omaha Public Power, Ft. Calhoun.
"Notification letters have been sent to some of the affected plants advising them of the condition, and recommending that the sleeve material be replaced with a lower friction Polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) material that would significantly reduce the required input operating torque, thereby reducing the risk of failure of the stem material. Crane will complete the notifications to the other sites no later than 2/9/18.
"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me, Joyce Hamman, Director, Safety & Quality at (678) 451-2280, Burt Anderson, Site Leader, at (630) 226-4990, or Samson Kay, Engineering Manager at (630) 226-4983."
Notified R1DO (Janda), R2DO (Heisserer), R3DO (Dickson), R4DO (Deese) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors via email.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1308 EDT ON 03/21/18 FROM SAMSON KAY TO DONG PARK * * *
The following information was provided as an update via fax:
"Crane reviewed diagnostic testing of 106 XOMOX plug valves for the purpose of validating the assumed torque values specified by XOMOX guidance. From the review of the diagnostic testing, we determined that on average, the actual torque required to stroke the valve (also referred to as the 'break torque') was approximately 56%-67% lower than the calculated value based on the UHMWPE sleeve material for valves with a 150 lbs. pressure class. Statistical analysis confirmed that the test results were within a 95% confidence interval. Consequently, a conservative factor of at least 56% can be applied to the published XOMOX torque value when evaluating stem stress. Applying this factor to the valves previously identified under this Part 21 confirmed that stress limits are below the material allowable for yield strength. This conclusion is supported by operating history (e.g., no reported stem failures) in the field.
"Based on these findings, Crane Nuclear, confirms that a condition adverse to quality and safety does not exist and that a Part 21 no longer applies. CNI, requests this Part 21 to be retracted.
"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me, Joyce Hamman, Director, Safety & Quality at (678) 451-2280, Burt Anderson, Site Leader, at (630) 226-4990, or Samson Kay, Engineering Manager at (630) 226-4983."
Notified R1DO (McKinley), R2DO (Sandal), R3DO (Duncan), R4DO (Groom) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors via email.
The following was excerpted from a letter by Crane Nuclear, Inc.:
"The plug valve designs provided for XOMOX model figure numbers 037AX, 067EG, and 037. These valves have been identified as used in nuclear and/or safety related applications.
"The stem for the Subject valve models was identified as being undersized based on allowable yield stress analysis of the stem while in torsion. The high stress condition was due to the high torque required to seat/unseat the plug when installed with a Ultra High Molecular Weight Polyethylene (UHMWPE) sleeve material. High friction factor inherent with this material causes torsional stress to exceed the upper limit of yield strength of the valve which could result in fatigue/yielding of the stem, thus preventing the valve from opening and closing while in service. Historical research performed thus far has not identified any notifications from the customer(s) regarding stem failure of the subject valves, indicating that the valves may still be in operation with no performance related or operating issues.
"The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be token to complete the action.
"Notifications letters have been sent to the affected plants advising them of the condition, and recommending that the sleeve material be replaced with a lower friction Polytetrafluorethylene (PTFE) material that would significantly reduce the required input operating torque, thereby reducing the risk of failure of the stem material.
"XOMOX has been advised to modify design calculations to provide a larger margin for allowable yield strength of the stem material to ensure the stem is properly sized when Ultra High Molecular Weight Polyethylene (UHMWPE) sleeve material is used.
"Crane will continue to review XOMOX records to determine if any other sites are impacted, which we expect to complete by August 31, 2017.
"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Samson Kay, Manager of Engineering at (630) 226-4983 or Jennifer Bregovy, Manager of Quality and Safety at (630) 226-4949."
The following facilities received these safety related orders: TVA Sequoyah, Pennsylvania Power & Light Susquehanna.
* * * UPDATE AT 1205 EDT ON 8/29/17 FROM SAMSON KAY TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following information was received via fax:
"Crane Nuclear (CNI) has initiate the final phase of the Part 21 research and is currently reviewing over 15,000 documents from the original XOMOX Canada historical archive to determine if any other nuclear sites were impacted by the subject Part 21. The investigation encompasses sales orders spanning from 1968 to 1992. CNI expects to complete the review by 10/30/2017."
Point of Contact: Samson Kay (630-226-4983) or Jennifer Bregovy (630-226-4949)
Notified the R1DO (Cook), R2DO (Lopez), and Part 21 Resources (via e-mail).
* * * UPDATE AT 1627 EDT ON 11/01/17 FROM SAMSON KAY TO S. SANDIN VIA FAX * * *
The following information was provided as an update:
"Crane Nuclear (CNI) has completed approximately 40% of the review of the historical archive and will not be able to complete the review by the previously requested 10/30/2017 deadline.
"The historical review covers the following scope:
-XOMOX UK DEVON, ENGLAND - Safety-Related and N-Stamped Valves/Parts issued between 1987 - 1993
-XOMOX Canada & XOMOX A&M - Safety-Related Parts from 1979 - 1993
-XOMOX Cincinnati TUFFLINE - Safety-Related and N-Stamped Valves and Parts issued between 1970 -1993
-XOMOX Crane Nuclear - Safety-Related and N-Stamped Valves and Parts issued from 2001 until present.
"Note: Parts and valves were no longer supplied by XOMOX as safety-related or nuclear after 1993 until Crane Nuclear acquired XOMOX in June 29, 2001.
"The following sites . . . were identified as a safety-related valves effected by this letter. All sites were supplied to customer 'Delaval' which no longer exists. At the current pace of review, CNI expects to complete the review of the historical archive by 1/30/2018."
Delaval supplied valves to these Original Plant Name(s); TVA (doesn't show which plant), Comanche Peak Units 1&2, Columbia, Cleveland Electric, Midland Nuclear Power Plant Units 1&2 and TVA, - Hartsville and Phipps Bend Nuclear Plants both of which were cancelled before completion.
Notified R1DO (McKinley), R2DO (Ehrhardt), R3DO (Duncan), R4DO (Werner) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors via email.
* * * UPDATE AT 1553 EDT ON 01/31/18 FROM JOYCE HAMMAN TO DONG PARK * * *
The following information was provided as an update via fax:
"The historical research is complete. Our review of the records from 1973 through 2001 identified 25 valves that were supplied with a stem-sleeve material combination that could exceed the upper limit of yield strength of the valve, which could result in fatigue/yielding of the stem, thus preventing the valve from opening and closing while in service. Those valves were supplied to:
"Northeast Utilities, Millstone; Houston Lighting & Power, South Texas Project; Niagara Mohawk, Nine Mile Point; Transamerican Delavel, Oakland; Power Systems, Rocky Mount; Bechtel Energy Corp., 5 Miles West Wadsworth; Pennsylvania Power & Light, Susquehanna; NY Power Authority, Fitzpatrick; TVA, Sequoyah; Omaha Public Power, Ft. Calhoun.
"Notification letters have been sent to some of the affected plants advising them of the condition, and recommending that the sleeve material be replaced with a lower friction Polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) material that would significantly reduce the required input operating torque, thereby reducing the risk of failure of the stem material. Crane will complete the notifications to the other sites no later than 2/9/18.
"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me, Joyce Hamman, Director, Safety & Quality at (678) 451-2280, Burt Anderson, Site Leader, at (630) 226-4990, or Samson Kay, Engineering Manager at (630) 226-4983."
Notified R1DO (Janda), R2DO (Heisserer), R3DO (Dickson), R4DO (Deese) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors via email.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1308 EDT ON 03/21/18 FROM SAMSON KAY TO DONG PARK * * *
The following information was provided as an update via fax:
"Crane reviewed diagnostic testing of 106 XOMOX plug valves for the purpose of validating the assumed torque values specified by XOMOX guidance. From the review of the diagnostic testing, we determined that on average, the actual torque required to stroke the valve (also referred to as the 'break torque') was approximately 56%-67% lower than the calculated value based on the UHMWPE sleeve material for valves with a 150 lbs. pressure class. Statistical analysis confirmed that the test results were within a 95% confidence interval. Consequently, a conservative factor of at least 56% can be applied to the published XOMOX torque value when evaluating stem stress. Applying this factor to the valves previously identified under this Part 21 confirmed that stress limits are below the material allowable for yield strength. This conclusion is supported by operating history (e.g., no reported stem failures) in the field.
"Based on these findings, Crane Nuclear, confirms that a condition adverse to quality and safety does not exist and that a Part 21 no longer applies. CNI, requests this Part 21 to be retracted.
"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me, Joyce Hamman, Director, Safety & Quality at (678) 451-2280, Burt Anderson, Site Leader, at (630) 226-4990, or Samson Kay, Engineering Manager at (630) 226-4983."
Notified R1DO (McKinley), R2DO (Sandal), R3DO (Duncan), R4DO (Groom) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors via email.