Event Notification Report for June 02, 2017

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DECLARED INOPERABLE

"On 6/2/2017 at 0241 CDT, Clinton Power Station entered Mode 2 with secondary containment boundary doors propped open. Specifically, both doors for Reactor Water Cleanup (RT) 'B' pump room were propped open with welding cables routed through pump room doors to perform welding in the RT pump room.

"At 0300 CDT, a Senior Reactor Operator identified that the doors were propped open and Secondary Containment was declared inoperable. LCO 3.6.4.1 Required Action A.1 was entered to restore Secondary Containment to Operable in four hours.

"At 0324 CDT, the cabling for the welding machine was removed and the doors were closed.

"Investigation determined that authorization had been granted while in mode 4, when secondary containment was not required to be operable. The doors were propped open at the beginning of the shift, prior to the mode change to mode 2 (0241 CDT).

"This loss of secondary containment is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

PENETRATION ROOM FILTRATION BOUNDARY INOPERABLE

"This notification is being made as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) due to both trains of Penetration Room Filtration [PRF] being inoperable due to an inoperable PRF Boundary. At 0920 [CDT] on 6/2/2017, a gap was discovered between an electrical penetration room ceiling and the containment wall where seismic gap material was noted to be missing. The gap was subsequently closed and PRF testing completed sat. The condition was exited at 1345 [CDT].

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION ON 7/25/17 AT 1725 EDT FROM MATT STANLEY TO DONG PARK * * *

"On 6/2/17 at 1707 CDT Farley Nuclear Plant notified the NRC Operations Center of an entry into Technical Specification 3.7.12 Condition B for Unit 1 loss of two trains of Penetration Room Filtration (PRF). At 0920 [CDT] on 6/2/2017, a gap had been discovered between an electrical penetration and containment where seismic gap material was noted to be missing. The report was made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) under Event Notification 52785. Upon further engineering review and satisfactory testing to support operability, Farley has determined that the configuration did not meet the criteria for a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function, and is retracting the notification.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R2DO (Blamey).

PART 21 NOTIFICATION - POTENTIAL DEFECT IN ETR14 CLASS TE CONNECTIVITY RELAYS

TE Connectivity reported that one of their relays, TE Part Number 7-1423177-5, ETR141B3BNC2023004, failed at TVA Labs during normal continuously energized operation. An investigation conducted with TVA Labs identified that a mis-oriented capacitor may have caused the failure. Although the failure occurred with only one part number, all relays in the ETR14 family with date codes from 1604 to 1650 contain the suspect capacitor. A root cause analysis is underway by the vendor.

If you have any questions or require any additional information, please contact me by email or telephone:

Terry Ducker
Quality Manager
TE Connectivity
Aerospace, Defense and Marine Division
1396 Charlotte Highway
Fairview, NC 28730

E-mail: duckert@te.com
Telephone: 828-338-1063
Fax: 828-338-1101


Quantity Supplied - Customer:

41 - Alabama Power
5 - ATC Nuclear
3 - Curtiss-Wright Nuclear
10 - Curtiss-Wright/QualTech NP
2 - Duke Energy Progress/Harris
16 - Energy Northwest/Columbia
4 - Engine Systems Inc
2 - Entergy/Pilgrim
39 - Entergy/River Bend
25 - Exelon/Limerick
2 - Exelon/Oyster Creek
12 - Exelon/Peach Bottom
2 - GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy
2 - Georgia Power/Hatch
2 - Nextera Energy Point Beach
5 - Talen Energy/Susquehanna
2 - TE/Germany
4 - TE/UK
6 - TVA/Browns Ferry
4 - TVA/Sequoyah
2 - TVA/Watts Bar Unit 1
9 - Xcel Energy/Monticello