Event Notification Report for May 10, 2017

RESEARCH TEST REACTOR - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATION

"On Wednesday May 10, 2017 at approximately [1700 EDT], the Reactor Operator (RO) that was signed in on the reactor console logbook completed a ['key on'] checklist in preparation for a routine reactor startup. The RO left the control room and brought the log book to the reactor bridge for the Designated Senior Reactor Operator (DSRO) to sign off for the ['key on'] startup. The RO immediately realized his mistake concerning the procedural requirement for a reactor operator to be present in the control room at all times when the reactor is not secured (procedure OP-103), and returned to the control room.

"The DSRO followed the RO to the control room and observed that the reactor key was in the on position, the control rods were all fully inserted, and reactor power was at residual levels. The reactor was shutdown, but was not secured. The DSRO determined that this constituted a violation of procedure OP-103 and could be a Reportable Occurrence as defined under Technical Specification 1.2.24 h.

"The DSRO reviewed Technical Specification (TS) 6.6.2, Action to be Taken in the Event of a Reportable Occurrence. The DSRO determined that under TS 6.6.2a that reactor conditions had been returned to normal by the presence of the licensed operator in the control room. The DSRO then signed the Key On checklist authorization for reactor startup and the reactor was started.

"The DSRO spoke with the Manager of Engineering and Operations (MEO) by telephone about this matter at approximately 1800 on May 10, 2017. The MEO concurred that procedure OP-103 was violated and would be reportable to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The DSRO and MEO agreed to discuss this matter with the Director, Nuclear Reactor Program and the Reactor Health Physicist on May 11, 2017. The MEO stated on May 11, 2017 that TS 6.1.3a, the specification implemented by procedure OP-103, was not met. It was agreed that required notifications to NRC would be made by [1700] on May 11, 2017 to meet the 24 hour notification requirement."

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO INADVERTENT SIREN ACTUATION

"At approximately 0755 CDT, on May 10, 2017, Pierce County inadvertently actuated their sirens while performing a scheduled weekly cancel test. All fifty two (52) Pierce County sirens actuated county wide for approximately 11 seconds before Pierce County Dispatch canceled the activation. This 4-hour non-emergency report is being made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Offsite Notification. Capability to notify the public was never degraded during this time. All Emergency Notification sirens remain in service. No press release is planned at this time. The license has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - INOPERABLE SHUTTERS ON TWO STORED GAUGES

The following information was received from the state of Texas via email:

"On May 10, 2017, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee that during routine testing it found the shutters on two Berthold model LB8010 nuclear gauges that were in storage were inoperable. The shutters were in the closed position. Each gauge contains a 20 milliCurie cesium - 137 source. One source handle was reported as missing and the other handle rotates around the shutter's operating shaft, but does not turn the shaft. The licensee has contacted the manufacture to inspect and repair or replace the gauges. The gauges are not an exposure risk to members of the general public or the licensee's work force. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident #: I 9486

APPENDIX J LOCAL LEAKAGE EXCEEDED ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

"On Wednesday May 10, 2017, at 1411 EDT, with the reactor at 0 percent core thermal power (CTP), Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) was in a Refueling Outage, performing a review of Local Leak Rate Testing results, when it was concluded that PNPS had exceeded its Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix J, Option B, Type B and C Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) leakage criteria.

"Previously, on April 22, 2017, when PNPS was performing LLRT of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) steam exhaust line check valves, both valves failed to meet their LLRT acceptance criteria specified in plant procedures. Neither of the check valves seated acceptably. Based on the ongoing evaluation of these test exceedances, it was concluded that these test results cause the plant to exceed the overall as-found minimum path Appendix J acceptance criteria of 0.6 La (126.3 SLM [Standard Liters per Minute]).

"Further investigation is ongoing.

"This event has no impact on the health and safety of the public.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), any event or condition that resulted in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principle safety barriers, being seriously degraded.

"The licensee will notify the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency."