Event Notification Report for May 08, 2017

THROUGH-WALL LEAKAGE IDENTIFIED ON REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE BOUNDARY DURING TESTING

"On May 8th, 2017 at 0925 [EDT], during the performance of LGS [Limerick Generating Station] leakage testing of the reactor pressure vessel and associated piping, a through-wall leak was identified on an instrument line connected to the N16D nozzle.

"The reactor will be maintained shutdown until pipe repairs and testing are complete."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FAILED SHUTTER PISTON

The following information was obtained from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via fax:

"Event Description: The licensee reported that on May 8, 2017 the indicator light on an AccuRay Model U-3 gauge, serial number 6631901, containing 1 Curie of americium-241 would not change from red (open) to green (closed). The area around the shutter was surveyed and the shutter was determined to be in a closed position. A service provider was contacted and the piston was replaced. All regulatory precautions were taken and no exposures occurred.

"Cause of the Event: Equipment failure.

"Actions: The Department [PA Department of Environmental Protection] will perform a reactive inspection. A service provider has already corrected the problem. More information will be provided upon receipt."

PA Event Report ID No.: PA170010

PART 21 - INTERIM NOTIFICATION OF A POTENTIAL DEFECT ON A PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD

"Ametek Solidstate Controls began a 10 CFR Part 21 evaluation after receiving notification from NextEra Energy Seabrook Station that a 7.5kVA Inverter would prematurely transfer to alternate source at 27A load during commissioning. The X202 Crest factor board (80-9213516-90) was replaced and the unit operated normally.

"Analysis of the failed X202 Crest Factor board identified an SCR on the printed circuit board was turning on prematurely and resulted in a transfer to alternate source or with the absence of the alternate source, to a dead bus. A capacitor was placed across the SCR on the X202 board to protect the SCR from dv/dt turn on. Subsequent testing determined the added capacitor corrected the anomaly.

"In addition to Seabrook, Ametek has recently experienced similar anomalies on two separate occasions. However, these occurrences were discovered during manufacturing and in-house testing phase for new product and were attributed to a SCR failure, excessive noise, and long leads.

"ACTION RECOMMENDED:
Ametek Solidstate Controls recommends installing a 0.22 microfarad capacitor p/n 80-134734-90 across X202 terminals J1-11 to J1-12. This capacitor will have no effect on EMI or seismic qualifications.

"If you wish to acquire the 80-134734-90 capacitor, Ametek Solidstate Controls will work with you to provide spare parts. Please contact Mr. Mark Shreve of our Client Services group at 1-800-222-9079 or 1-614-846-7500 ext. 6332. mark.shreve@ametek.com"

* * *UPDATE FROM ETHAN SALSBURY TO VINCE KLCO ON 6/1/2017 AT 0750 EDT * * *

The following information was excerpted from an Ametek Solidstate Control email:

"Ametek Solidstate Controls began a 10 CFR Part 21 evaluation after receiving notification from NextEra Energy Seabrook Station that a 7.5kVA Inverter would prematurely transfer to alternate source at 27A load during commissioning. The X202 Crest factor board (80-9213516-90) was replaced and the unit operated normally.

"Analysis of the failed X202 Crest Factor board identified an SCR on the printed circuit board was turning on prematurely and resulted in a transfer to alternate source, or with the absence of the alternate source, to a dead bus. A capacitor was placed across the SCR on the X202 board to protect the SCR from dv/dt turn on. Subsequent testing determined the added capacitor corrected the anomaly.

"In addition to Seabrook, Ametek has recently experienced similar anomalies on two separate occasions. However, these occurrences were discovered during manufacturing and in-house testing phase for new product and were attributed to an SCR failure, excessive noise, and long leads.

"Ametek Solidstate Controls recommends installing a 0.22 microfarad capacitor, p/n 80-134734-90 across X202 terminals J1-11 to J1-12. This capacitor will have no effect on EMI, seismic, or aging qualifications.

"If you wish to acquire the 80-134734-90 capacitor, Ametek Solidstate Controls will work with you to provide spare parts. Please contact Mr. Mark Shreve of our Client Services group at 1-800-222-9079 or 1-614-846-7500 ext. 6332. mark.shreve@ametek.com"

Notified R1DO (Bower), R3DO (Daley) and Part 21 Group via email.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CO-60 IRRADIATOR SOURCE DOWN SWITCH FAILURE

"According to 180 NAC 3-026.02 (NRC 10 CFR 30.50) this is the twenty four hour report to the HOO [NRC Headquarters Operations Officer] due to an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed and is required to regulation or license condition and no redundant equipment was available and operable to perform the required safety function.

"The RSO [Radiation Safety Officer], called to report that on May 6th, [2017] at approximately 0645 [CDT] in the morning, Becton Dickinson had a source rack time-out alarm. The Source Rack down switched failed to indicate the rack reached the down position. Upon initial investigations they determined the source was in the down and shielded position. With the help of their service company, Nordion, they bypassed the door interlock and with survey instruments, they ensured the sources were down in the shielded position. No exposure to personnel occurred. Upon initial visual inspection, it appears there may have been a broken [electrical] cable that caused the alarm. Nordion is expected to be on-site today, Monday, May 8, to fix the problem. Will update when we receive the written report."

FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT

"On May 17, 2017, at 1852 [EDT], Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) contractor informed SNC that a contractor Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) collector failed to follow the process defined in both NRC Regulation 10 CFR 26.105(b) and contractor FFD procedures. The collector was fully trained, qualified, and knowledgeable of the process requirements. This determination was made based on initial department investigations and
corroborated via independent investigations performed by the contractor. SNC has determined that this is reportable under 10 CFR 26.719(b)(3)."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and NRC Region II.