Event Notification Report for April 17, 2017

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE

The following information was provided by the State of California via email:

"On 04/17/17, Ninyo & Moore RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] contacted RHB [California Radiologic Health Branch] to report a moisture density gauge incident happened at a construction site in the City of Hayward, CA. The gauge involved was a Troxler 3430, S/N T343 32379 containing 8 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241. The gauge was backed into by a Bobcat. Technician was performing a density test and happened to be about 12 feet away from the gauge at the time of the incident. After the incident, the technician requested the personnel to clear the area. The gauge source rod was bent and could not be retracted into the shielded position. The area was isolated and the gauge was placed next to a concrete slab until help arrived. The RSO immediately contacted a gauge vendor, PNT [Pacific Nuclear Technology], and the RSO from PNT arrived on site within a short period of time. He placed a lead pig around the exposed source rod, loaded up the gauge in his truck and took it away for repair. PNT performed a survey around the incident site and no contamination was detected. RHB will be following up on this incident."

CA 5010 Number: 041717

AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS

"On April 17, 2017, at 0004 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), an automatic actuation of the four Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) was received. At the time of the event, Unit 2 was in the process of starting the main turbine following a refueling outage. Operations personnel tripped the main turbine due to elevated bearing vibrations. When the main turbine was tripped, Power Circuit Breakers (PCBs) 29A and 29B failed to open. This caused a main generator primary lockout due to generator reverse power and the subsequent automatic actuation of all four EDGs. All emergency buses remained energized from offsite power and therefore, the EDGs did not tie to their respective buses. The protective relaying and EDGs responded per design to this event. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the EDGs. Due to the shared configuration of the Brunswick electrical system, both Unit 1 and Unit 2 are affected.

"This event did not impact public health and safety. The NRC Resident lnspector has been notified."

UNACCOUNTED STRONTIUM-90 SOURCES

The U.S. Coast Guard did not properly dispose of Inflight Blade Inspection Systems (IBIS) containing 100 microCurie, Sr-90 sources during the retirement of 72 HH-52 aircrafts from 1987 to 1989 and 50 HH-3 aircrafts from 1990 to 1994. The HH-52 contain 3 canisters and HH-3 contain 5 canisters, each canister contain a 100 microCurie, Sr-90 source. Most canisters were retrieved and returned to the manufacture, General Nucleonics, Inc.

The licensee has notified R1 (Jackson).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web

60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION

"On April 17, 2017 at 1120 EDT, following scheduled maintenance, the Reactor Protection System (RPS) 'A' bus was returned to its normal supply, the RPS 'A' motor generator (MG) set. The RPS MG set had been running loaded for 1 hour when the RPS 'A' bus tripped. Maintenance personnel had connected probes of a grounded oscilloscope to check for proper operation of the MG set, resulting in the RPS 'A' bus trip. The controlling procedure did not contain a caution about using only an ungrounded oscilloscope. The trip of the RPS 'A' MG set resulted in a half scram and an invalid isolation signal causing primary containment isolation valves in multiple systems to isolate.

"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A) since the containment isolation was not part of a pre-planned sequence and the event resulted in the invalid actuation of general containment isolation valves in more than one system.

"Corrective actions include revising the governing procedure with the proper precaution and limitation to require the use of an ungrounded oscilloscope. A training needs analysis will also be performed to cover the lessons learned from this event.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."