Event Notification Report for April 06, 2017
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/05/2017 - 04/06/2017
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52668
Facility: SUMMER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-AP1000,[3] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: GREGORT TRAVERS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-AP1000,[3] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: GREGORT TRAVERS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 04/06/2017
Notification Time: 15:58 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/2017
Event Time: 09:48 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/06/2017
Notification Time: 15:58 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/2017
Event Time: 09:48 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/06/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
FFD GROUP (EMAI)
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
FFD GROUP (EMAI)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Under Construction | 0 | Under Construction |
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Under Construction | 0 | Under Construction |
FITNESS FOR DUTY VIOLATION
A contractor manager had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a pre-access test. The employee's access to the construction site has been revoked.
The licensee notified the NRC Unit 2 & 3 Resident Inspector.
A contractor manager had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a pre-access test. The employee's access to the construction site has been revoked.
The licensee notified the NRC Unit 2 & 3 Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52669
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHARLES BROESCHE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHARLES BROESCHE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 04/06/2017
Notification Time: 22:40 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/2017
Event Time: 16:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2017
Notification Time: 22:40 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/2017
Event Time: 16:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
TEMPORARY LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE BOUNDARY
"At 1620 EDT on April 6, 2017, a Main Control Room (MCR) door was found ajar. At that time, both control room ventilation filtrations trains (CREVS) were declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.10, condition B, due to the inoperability of the Control Room Envelope (CRE). At 1623 EDT, the door was closed, CREVS was declared operable and LCO 3.7.10, Condition B was exited.
"The safety function of the CRE boundary is to ensure the in-leakage of unfiltered air into the CRE will not exceed the in-leakage assumed in the licensing basis analysis of Design Basis Accident (DBA) consequences to CRE occupants. Additionally, it ensures that the occupants are protected from hazardous chemicals and smoke.
"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * RETRACTION FROM DAVID ALLEN TO S. SANDIN ON 5/18/17 AT 1459 EDT * * *
"Event Notification EN 52669, made on 4/06/2017, is being retracted because additional reviews have been performed supporting that a loss of safety function did not occur.
"Watts Bar Unit 2 has concluded that there was no loss of safety function, because when the door was found open it was capable of being closed and able to support the control room envelope function. A simulation performed on 04/07/17 also showed that with the door in question opened 1-2 inches that the control room pressure would have remained above the TS required positive pressure of 0.125 inches of water.
"The control room envelope is designed such that the door is expected to be opened to allow personnel entry and exit, and thus positive pressures in the control room will fluctuate. The event that occurred is similar to a number of individuals entering and exiting the control room in series. Since the control room envelope function was not lost, this event is not reportable and NRC Event Number 52669 is being retracted. The basis for this conclusion will be provided to the NRC Resident Inspector."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Blamey).
"At 1620 EDT on April 6, 2017, a Main Control Room (MCR) door was found ajar. At that time, both control room ventilation filtrations trains (CREVS) were declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.10, condition B, due to the inoperability of the Control Room Envelope (CRE). At 1623 EDT, the door was closed, CREVS was declared operable and LCO 3.7.10, Condition B was exited.
"The safety function of the CRE boundary is to ensure the in-leakage of unfiltered air into the CRE will not exceed the in-leakage assumed in the licensing basis analysis of Design Basis Accident (DBA) consequences to CRE occupants. Additionally, it ensures that the occupants are protected from hazardous chemicals and smoke.
"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * RETRACTION FROM DAVID ALLEN TO S. SANDIN ON 5/18/17 AT 1459 EDT * * *
"Event Notification EN 52669, made on 4/06/2017, is being retracted because additional reviews have been performed supporting that a loss of safety function did not occur.
"Watts Bar Unit 2 has concluded that there was no loss of safety function, because when the door was found open it was capable of being closed and able to support the control room envelope function. A simulation performed on 04/07/17 also showed that with the door in question opened 1-2 inches that the control room pressure would have remained above the TS required positive pressure of 0.125 inches of water.
"The control room envelope is designed such that the door is expected to be opened to allow personnel entry and exit, and thus positive pressures in the control room will fluctuate. The event that occurred is similar to a number of individuals entering and exiting the control room in series. Since the control room envelope function was not lost, this event is not reportable and NRC Event Number 52669 is being retracted. The basis for this conclusion will be provided to the NRC Resident Inspector."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Blamey).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52778
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK TURKAL
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK TURKAL
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 05/31/2017
Notification Time: 07:50 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/2017
Event Time: 12:12 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/31/2017
Notification Time: 07:50 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/2017
Event Time: 12:12 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/31/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
INVALID ACTUATION OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS
"This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER submittal, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).
"On April 6, 2017, at 1212 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), an invalid actuation of emergency diesel generators (EDGs) 1, 2. 3. and 4 occurred. In support of maintenance associated with the onsite electrical distribution system, activities were in progress to power the 2C balance-of-plant (BOP) bus from the startup auxiliary transformer (SAT) followed by de-energization of the 2D BOP bus. However, flexible links between the SAT and the 2D BOP bus had not been installed. As a result, under voltage sensing relay (27SX) was not energized and an invalid SAT secondary side under voltage EDG auto start signal was generated. There was no actual under voltage on the SAT, no loss of power, and all emergency buses continued to be powered by the unit auxiliary transformer (UAT).
"The EDGs responded properly to the auto-start signal. The actuation was complete, in that the EDGs successfully started and ran unloaded. The EDGs were returned to standby status by 1415 EDT. Since no actual under voltage condition existed which required the EDGs to start, and the start was not in response to actual plant conditions satisfying the requirements for initiation, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation.
"This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER submittal, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).
"On April 6, 2017, at 1212 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), an invalid actuation of emergency diesel generators (EDGs) 1, 2. 3. and 4 occurred. In support of maintenance associated with the onsite electrical distribution system, activities were in progress to power the 2C balance-of-plant (BOP) bus from the startup auxiliary transformer (SAT) followed by de-energization of the 2D BOP bus. However, flexible links between the SAT and the 2D BOP bus had not been installed. As a result, under voltage sensing relay (27SX) was not energized and an invalid SAT secondary side under voltage EDG auto start signal was generated. There was no actual under voltage on the SAT, no loss of power, and all emergency buses continued to be powered by the unit auxiliary transformer (UAT).
"The EDGs responded properly to the auto-start signal. The actuation was complete, in that the EDGs successfully started and ran unloaded. The EDGs were returned to standby status by 1415 EDT. Since no actual under voltage condition existed which required the EDGs to start, and the start was not in response to actual plant conditions satisfying the requirements for initiation, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation.
"This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.