Event Notification Report for April 02, 2017
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/01/2017 - 04/02/2017
Agreement State
Event Number: 52656
Rep Org: OR DEPT OF HEALTH RAD PROTECTION
Licensee: JRT CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
Region: 4
City: MERLIN State: OR
County:
License #: 91180
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TODD CARPENTER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: JRT CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
Region: 4
City: MERLIN State: OR
County:
License #: 91180
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TODD CARPENTER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 04/02/2017
Notification Time: 10:36 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2017
Notification Time: 10:36 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
THOMAS HIPSCHMAN (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
THOMAS HIPSCHMAN (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
OREGON AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
An Oregon state licensee reported that a Campbell Pacific moisture density gauge model CPN-MC3 (serial number MC380304170) was stolen from a jobsite in Merlin, OR sometime late last night or early this morning. The licensee reported that the gauge was properly secured in a temporary storage building when the building was burglarized. The gauge and other equipment were stolen during the burglary. The licensee has contacted the local police department.
The gauge contains 10 mCi of Cs-137 and 10 mCi of Am-241/Be.
The state of Oregon will be contacting state and county officials to request public notification about the stolen gauge.
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
An Oregon state licensee reported that a Campbell Pacific moisture density gauge model CPN-MC3 (serial number MC380304170) was stolen from a jobsite in Merlin, OR sometime late last night or early this morning. The licensee reported that the gauge was properly secured in a temporary storage building when the building was burglarized. The gauge and other equipment were stolen during the burglary. The licensee has contacted the local police department.
The gauge contains 10 mCi of Cs-137 and 10 mCi of Am-241/Be.
The state of Oregon will be contacting state and county officials to request public notification about the stolen gauge.
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52772
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE KOCH
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE KOCH
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/26/2017
Notification Time: 13:22 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2017
Event Time: 21:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/2017
Notification Time: 13:22 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2017
Event Time: 21:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting multiple Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs).
"On April 2, 2017 at approximately 2127 Eastern Daylight Time, during performance of a reactor vessel leak check, all four inboard MSIVs closed as a result of actuation of the Main Steam Line (MSL) high flow instrumentation. The high flow signal was spurious on two channels with no flow in the MSLs. Since an actual high flow condition did not exist at the time of the actuation, the actuation was considered invalid. The MSIVs functioned as designed on actuation of the MSL high flow instrumentation. All outboard MSIVs were closed at the time of the actuation.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting multiple Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs).
"On April 2, 2017 at approximately 2127 Eastern Daylight Time, during performance of a reactor vessel leak check, all four inboard MSIVs closed as a result of actuation of the Main Steam Line (MSL) high flow instrumentation. The high flow signal was spurious on two channels with no flow in the MSLs. Since an actual high flow condition did not exist at the time of the actuation, the actuation was considered invalid. The MSIVs functioned as designed on actuation of the MSL high flow instrumentation. All outboard MSIVs were closed at the time of the actuation.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."