Event Notification Report for March 27, 2017
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/26/2017 - 03/27/2017
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52641
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [3] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-AP1000,[4] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: AMANDA PUGH
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [3] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-AP1000,[4] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: AMANDA PUGH
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 03/27/2017
Notification Time: 16:02 [ET]
Event Date: 03/27/2017
Event Time: 09:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/27/2017
Notification Time: 16:02 [ET]
Event Date: 03/27/2017
Event Time: 09:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/27/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)
FFD GROUP (EMAI)
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)
FFD GROUP (EMAI)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Under Construction | 0 | Under Construction |
| 4 | N | N | 0 | Under Construction | 0 | Under Construction |
FITNESS-FOR- DUTY TEST POSITIVE FOR NON-LICENSED CONTRACTOR
A non-licensed contractor employee had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the site has been terminated.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
A non-licensed contractor employee had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the site has been terminated.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Part 21
Event Number: 52642
Rep Org: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC.
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC.
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM HORNER
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC.
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM HORNER
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 03/27/2017
Notification Time: 16:51 [ET]
Event Date: 03/27/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/27/2017
Notification Time: 16:51 [ET]
Event Date: 03/27/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/27/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
THOMAS HIPSCHMAN (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
THOMAS HIPSCHMAN (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)
PART 21 - IDENTIFICATION OF FAILED DIODE SURGE SUPPRESSOR WITH INTERNAL MANUFACTURING DEFECT
The following information is excerpted from an Engine Systems, Inc. (ESI) report received via fax:
"COMPONENT:
"Diode Surge Suppressor
"Allen-Bradley P/N: 199-FSMZ-1
"SUMMARY:
"Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) began a 10CFR21 evaluation on February 10, 2017 after receiving notification from FirstEnergy Corp - Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) of a manufacturing defect in a diode supplied by ESI. The evaluation was concluded on March 27, 2017 and it was determined that this issue is a reportable defect as defined by 10CFR21. The manufacturing defect identified was in a diode of the same date code as two diodes that failed while installed at PNPP. The failed diodes resulted In loss of class 1E control power which could have prevented the emergency diesel generator set from performing its safety related function.
"Discussion:
In January 2007, ESI supplied a governor system upgrade to PNPP. The upgrade replaced the existing Woodward EGB-35C governor/actuator, EGA control (w/ resistor box), and MOP with an EGB-35P governor/actuator, 2301A control, and DRU. The electrical components were housed in a control panel assembly. To support the slow start feature of the new system, 4 relays were used, each of which used a surge suppressor (flyback) diode.
"PNPP experienced two failures in 2016 of the aforementioned diodes supplied by ESI. The diodes are Allen Bradley part number 199-FSMZ-1 and they were installed across the coils of Allen-Bradley 700DC series relays. The Allen-Bradley date code stamped on the side of the diodes is BX9. The failure in both cases resulted in a short circuit condition that resulted in a loss of class 1E control power to the EDG.
"Root cause evaluation:
"The root cause of the failure is determined to be a manufacturing defect internal to the diode. Though an analysis of the diodes that failed at PNPP was unable to be performed due to their condition, the analysis performed on a degraded diode of the same date code, BX9, detected an internal manufacturing defect.
Affected Users:
A listing of users with suspect diodes includes FirstEnergy - Perry, Entergy - Grand Gulf, Progress - Shearon Harris, and Duke - Shearon Harris. A total quantity of 34 diodes are suspect.
"Corrective Action:
"All affected users . . . [identified above] . . . should perform the following:
"1. Review their inventory for suspect diodes listed in Table 1. Any suspect diodes should be removed from inventory and discarded.
"2. Determine if suspect diodes listed in Table 1 have been installed. Thus far, ESI has identified degraded diodes from date codes BX9 and ZX9 and it is possible that diodes from the other date codes are degraded as well. ESI has been unable to determine an expected service life. Therefore, the recommendation is to remove or replace any installed suspect diodes as soon as possible. Note that the applications for which this diode has been supplied (Enterprise engine control panels) used the same style Allen-Bradley relays as original equipment but without diode surge suppressors. It is therefore acceptable to remove the diodes and expect no change or impact to the existing equipment.
"To prevent recurrence of this issue, the following has been Implemented by ESI:
"1. The test procedure for the diode has been enhanced to increase the test voltage and decrease the allowable leakage current. Although this was not the cause of the failure, it may have prevented identification of a degraded condition. This corrective action has already been implemented.
"2. A review has been performed of other diodes supplied by ESI and at this time only this one part number is affected. A typical diode would be procured and/or sold under the diode manufacturer part number; whereas in this case it was procured from the relay manufacturer. Testing was performed using typical relay values in lieu of the diode manufacturer's acceptance criteria."
If you have any questions, you may call:
Tom Horner
Quality Assurance Manager
Tel: (252) 977-2720
ESI Report ID: 10CFR21-0116, dated 03/27/17
The following information is excerpted from an Engine Systems, Inc. (ESI) report received via fax:
"COMPONENT:
"Diode Surge Suppressor
"Allen-Bradley P/N: 199-FSMZ-1
"SUMMARY:
"Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) began a 10CFR21 evaluation on February 10, 2017 after receiving notification from FirstEnergy Corp - Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) of a manufacturing defect in a diode supplied by ESI. The evaluation was concluded on March 27, 2017 and it was determined that this issue is a reportable defect as defined by 10CFR21. The manufacturing defect identified was in a diode of the same date code as two diodes that failed while installed at PNPP. The failed diodes resulted In loss of class 1E control power which could have prevented the emergency diesel generator set from performing its safety related function.
"Discussion:
In January 2007, ESI supplied a governor system upgrade to PNPP. The upgrade replaced the existing Woodward EGB-35C governor/actuator, EGA control (w/ resistor box), and MOP with an EGB-35P governor/actuator, 2301A control, and DRU. The electrical components were housed in a control panel assembly. To support the slow start feature of the new system, 4 relays were used, each of which used a surge suppressor (flyback) diode.
"PNPP experienced two failures in 2016 of the aforementioned diodes supplied by ESI. The diodes are Allen Bradley part number 199-FSMZ-1 and they were installed across the coils of Allen-Bradley 700DC series relays. The Allen-Bradley date code stamped on the side of the diodes is BX9. The failure in both cases resulted in a short circuit condition that resulted in a loss of class 1E control power to the EDG.
"Root cause evaluation:
"The root cause of the failure is determined to be a manufacturing defect internal to the diode. Though an analysis of the diodes that failed at PNPP was unable to be performed due to their condition, the analysis performed on a degraded diode of the same date code, BX9, detected an internal manufacturing defect.
Affected Users:
A listing of users with suspect diodes includes FirstEnergy - Perry, Entergy - Grand Gulf, Progress - Shearon Harris, and Duke - Shearon Harris. A total quantity of 34 diodes are suspect.
"Corrective Action:
"All affected users . . . [identified above] . . . should perform the following:
"1. Review their inventory for suspect diodes listed in Table 1. Any suspect diodes should be removed from inventory and discarded.
"2. Determine if suspect diodes listed in Table 1 have been installed. Thus far, ESI has identified degraded diodes from date codes BX9 and ZX9 and it is possible that diodes from the other date codes are degraded as well. ESI has been unable to determine an expected service life. Therefore, the recommendation is to remove or replace any installed suspect diodes as soon as possible. Note that the applications for which this diode has been supplied (Enterprise engine control panels) used the same style Allen-Bradley relays as original equipment but without diode surge suppressors. It is therefore acceptable to remove the diodes and expect no change or impact to the existing equipment.
"To prevent recurrence of this issue, the following has been Implemented by ESI:
"1. The test procedure for the diode has been enhanced to increase the test voltage and decrease the allowable leakage current. Although this was not the cause of the failure, it may have prevented identification of a degraded condition. This corrective action has already been implemented.
"2. A review has been performed of other diodes supplied by ESI and at this time only this one part number is affected. A typical diode would be procured and/or sold under the diode manufacturer part number; whereas in this case it was procured from the relay manufacturer. Testing was performed using typical relay values in lieu of the diode manufacturer's acceptance criteria."
If you have any questions, you may call:
Tom Horner
Quality Assurance Manager
Tel: (252) 977-2720
ESI Report ID: 10CFR21-0116, dated 03/27/17
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52643
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: KEVIN OROURKE
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: KEVIN OROURKE
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 03/27/2017
Notification Time: 21:54 [ET]
Event Date: 03/27/2017
Event Time: 18:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/27/2017
Notification Time: 21:54 [ET]
Event Date: 03/27/2017
Event Time: 18:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/27/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BILL COOK (R1DO)
BILL COOK (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO INADVERTENT ISOLATION
"On March 27, 2017, at 1825 hours EDT, with the reactor at 100 percent core thermal power and steady state conditions, technicians inadvertently caused a High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System isolation, by testing the incorrect temperature switches in the TIP [Traversing In-core Probe] room. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) was performing testing on the temperature switches for Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC), but the HPCI temperature switches were inadvertently actuated causing HPCI to isolate.
"The Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Action Statement 3.5.c.2 has been entered and the planned testing has been secured pending further investigation. PNPS is providing an 8-hour non-emergency notification that the HPCI System was declared inoperable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. HPCI was returned to Operable within 40 minutes."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
"On March 27, 2017, at 1825 hours EDT, with the reactor at 100 percent core thermal power and steady state conditions, technicians inadvertently caused a High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System isolation, by testing the incorrect temperature switches in the TIP [Traversing In-core Probe] room. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) was performing testing on the temperature switches for Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC), but the HPCI temperature switches were inadvertently actuated causing HPCI to isolate.
"The Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Action Statement 3.5.c.2 has been entered and the planned testing has been secured pending further investigation. PNPS is providing an 8-hour non-emergency notification that the HPCI System was declared inoperable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. HPCI was returned to Operable within 40 minutes."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.