Event Notification Report for March 23, 2017
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/22/2017 - 03/23/2017
EVENT NUMBERS
526355263652637526305263152632
Agreement State
Event Number: 52635
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS MD ANDERSON CANCER CENTER
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 52635
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: IRENE CASARES
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS MD ANDERSON CANCER CENTER
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 52635
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: IRENE CASARES
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 03/23/2017
Notification Time: 18:13 [ET]
Event Date: 03/23/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/24/2017
Notification Time: 18:13 [ET]
Event Date: 03/23/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/24/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PACKAGE RECEIVED WITH REMOVABLE CONTAMINATION
The following report was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services via email:
"On March 23, 2017 the radiation safety officer [RSO] from a hospital called stating a package was received from BTX Global Logistics (31x2130417) containing a Germania-Gallium generator. The device was intact and not leaking although the outside of the package had removable contamination at 21,866 dpm over a 300 cm squared area. The RSO stated she contacted the delivery service. She [the RSO] explained that the device she received wasn't leaking and the contamination may be inside their vehicle. She [the RSO] stated that the package was received at 1221 [CDT] at the hospital. Her staff confirmed the device was not leaking and the contamination was on the outside of the package. Investigation ongoing. Updates to be provided as received."
* * * UPDATE AT 1211 EDT ON 3/24/17 FROM CHRIS MOORE TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
The following update was received from the Texas Department of Health Services via email:
"On March 23, 2017 the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) from The University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center called stating a package was received from BTX Global Logistics (31x2130417) at 1221 containing a Germania-Gallium generator. The device was intact in a package although the bottom of the package was contaminated. The highest level of contamination was 466 dpm per square cm based on 777,425 dpm over a 16 inch by 16 inch area of the box. The inside of the box was not contaminated and the generator was not leaking. The only spread of contamination from the box was onto a cart used to transport the generator from the loading dock to the lab. The cart was decontaminated. The contamination appears to be a low energy beta emitter with a short life in the 2-3 hour range. The contamination cannot be detected by a GM or scintillator probe only by the use of liquid scintillation counter. The hospital is attempting to identify the radionuclide. The Agency [Texas Department of Health Services] surveyed the transport vehicle, contents and driver for the delivery vehicle with a pancake probe for contamination on March 23, 2017. This was completed prior to understanding that it would not be detectable with available probes so today the vehicle will be surveyed with wipes. The package was picked up from Houston Intercontinental Airport on the evening of March 22, 2017 after clearing customs from a [common carrier] Aircraft flying from Germany. BTX Global Logistics picked up the package on March 22, 2017, placed it in their warehouse until it was delivered on March 23, 2017. Both times while the package was being transported in the vehicle, there were no other packages in the vehicle. There were no other deliveries of radioactive material in this vehicle over the last 2 days. The investigation is ongoing."
Texas Incident #: I 9474.
Notified the R4DO (Drake) and NMSS Events (Email).
The following report was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services via email:
"On March 23, 2017 the radiation safety officer [RSO] from a hospital called stating a package was received from BTX Global Logistics (31x2130417) containing a Germania-Gallium generator. The device was intact and not leaking although the outside of the package had removable contamination at 21,866 dpm over a 300 cm squared area. The RSO stated she contacted the delivery service. She [the RSO] explained that the device she received wasn't leaking and the contamination may be inside their vehicle. She [the RSO] stated that the package was received at 1221 [CDT] at the hospital. Her staff confirmed the device was not leaking and the contamination was on the outside of the package. Investigation ongoing. Updates to be provided as received."
* * * UPDATE AT 1211 EDT ON 3/24/17 FROM CHRIS MOORE TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
The following update was received from the Texas Department of Health Services via email:
"On March 23, 2017 the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) from The University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center called stating a package was received from BTX Global Logistics (31x2130417) at 1221 containing a Germania-Gallium generator. The device was intact in a package although the bottom of the package was contaminated. The highest level of contamination was 466 dpm per square cm based on 777,425 dpm over a 16 inch by 16 inch area of the box. The inside of the box was not contaminated and the generator was not leaking. The only spread of contamination from the box was onto a cart used to transport the generator from the loading dock to the lab. The cart was decontaminated. The contamination appears to be a low energy beta emitter with a short life in the 2-3 hour range. The contamination cannot be detected by a GM or scintillator probe only by the use of liquid scintillation counter. The hospital is attempting to identify the radionuclide. The Agency [Texas Department of Health Services] surveyed the transport vehicle, contents and driver for the delivery vehicle with a pancake probe for contamination on March 23, 2017. This was completed prior to understanding that it would not be detectable with available probes so today the vehicle will be surveyed with wipes. The package was picked up from Houston Intercontinental Airport on the evening of March 22, 2017 after clearing customs from a [common carrier] Aircraft flying from Germany. BTX Global Logistics picked up the package on March 22, 2017, placed it in their warehouse until it was delivered on March 23, 2017. Both times while the package was being transported in the vehicle, there were no other packages in the vehicle. There were no other deliveries of radioactive material in this vehicle over the last 2 days. The investigation is ongoing."
Texas Incident #: I 9474.
Notified the R4DO (Drake) and NMSS Events (Email).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52636
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RYAN RODE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RYAN RODE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 03/23/2017
Notification Time: 21:06 [ET]
Event Date: 03/23/2017
Event Time: 03:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2017
Notification Time: 21:06 [ET]
Event Date: 03/23/2017
Event Time: 03:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
ROBERT ORLIKOWSKI (R3DO)
FFD GROUP (EMAI)
ROBERT ORLIKOWSKI (R3DO)
FFD GROUP (EMAI)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
SIGNIFICANT FFD POLICY VIOLATIONS OR PROGRAMMATIC FAILURES
"On 3/23/17, at 0325 hours CDT, it was discovered that a prohibited item was present in the protected area from 0508-1718 hours on 3/22/17, which resulted in a reportable condition pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719(b)(1).
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"On 3/23/17, at 0325 hours CDT, it was discovered that a prohibited item was present in the protected area from 0508-1718 hours on 3/22/17, which resulted in a reportable condition pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719(b)(1).
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Agreement State
Event Number: 52637
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: BLUE CUBE OPERATIONS LLC
Region: 4
City: PLAQUEMINE State: LA
County:
License #: LA-133286-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES PATE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: BLUE CUBE OPERATIONS LLC
Region: 4
City: PLAQUEMINE State: LA
County:
License #: LA-133286-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES PATE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 03/24/2017
Notification Time: 11:48 [ET]
Event Date: 03/23/2017
Event Time: 11:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/24/2017
Notification Time: 11:48 [ET]
Event Date: 03/23/2017
Event Time: 11:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/24/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED GAUGE SHUTTER MALFUNCTION
The following information was received from the State of Louisiana via fax:
"On March 24, 2017, LDEQ [Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality] was notified by Blue Cube Operations LLC, that during an annual equipment inspection, it was determined that a level density gauge shutter was malfunctioning.
"The density gauge was a TN Technologies Inc. Model: 5202, and equipped with a TN Technologies Inc. Model 57157C sealed source - serial number: GK-9492. Initial source activity was 500 mCi [Cs-137], after decay correction, it is 341.78 mCi.
"No release or exposure to personnel. Blue Cube Operations plans to repair the shutter to the level density gauge.
"Event Report ID No.: LA170004"
The following information was received from the State of Louisiana via fax:
"On March 24, 2017, LDEQ [Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality] was notified by Blue Cube Operations LLC, that during an annual equipment inspection, it was determined that a level density gauge shutter was malfunctioning.
"The density gauge was a TN Technologies Inc. Model: 5202, and equipped with a TN Technologies Inc. Model 57157C sealed source - serial number: GK-9492. Initial source activity was 500 mCi [Cs-137], after decay correction, it is 341.78 mCi.
"No release or exposure to personnel. Blue Cube Operations plans to repair the shutter to the level density gauge.
"Event Report ID No.: LA170004"
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52630
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAMON FEGLEY
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAMON FEGLEY
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Notification Date: 03/23/2017
Notification Time: 02:48 [ET]
Event Date: 03/23/2017
Event Time: 00:14 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2017
Notification Time: 02:48 [ET]
Event Date: 03/23/2017
Event Time: 00:14 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 16 | Power Operation | 3 | Startup |
AUTOMATIC START OF AUXILIARY FEED WATER
"On March 23, 2017, at 0014 EDT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 (WBN2) experienced an unplanned trip of both Turbine Driven Main Feed Pumps (TDMFP) following a loss of Main Condenser Vacuum. The trip of both TDMFPs caused an automatic start of both Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pump. [The] cause of the loss of Main Condenser Vacuum is currently under investigation."
The plant was performing a normal startup, and had just synced the main generator to the grid. Subsequent to the event, the plant was transitioned to Mode 3. All rods are fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed via the atmospheric relief valves.
Unit 1 remains in Mode 5 for a refueling outage.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On March 23, 2017, at 0014 EDT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 (WBN2) experienced an unplanned trip of both Turbine Driven Main Feed Pumps (TDMFP) following a loss of Main Condenser Vacuum. The trip of both TDMFPs caused an automatic start of both Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pump. [The] cause of the loss of Main Condenser Vacuum is currently under investigation."
The plant was performing a normal startup, and had just synced the main generator to the grid. Subsequent to the event, the plant was transitioned to Mode 3. All rods are fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed via the atmospheric relief valves.
Unit 1 remains in Mode 5 for a refueling outage.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52631
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: TIM GATES
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: TIM GATES
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Notification Date: 03/23/2017
Notification Time: 07:24 [ET]
Event Date: 03/23/2017
Event Time: 02:56 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2017
Notification Time: 07:24 [ET]
Event Date: 03/23/2017
Event Time: 02:56 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY DECLARED INOPERABLE
"River Bend Station personnel declared the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system inoperable at 0256 on 3/23/2017.
"During performance of the HPCS Pump and Valve Operability Test, the operators observed an unusual system response after E22-MOVF023 (HPCS Test Return to the Suppression Pool) was stroked closed. A field check showed that the key that connects the E22-MOVF023 valve stem to the anti-rotation device had become dislodged.
"E22-MOVF023 is a Primary Containment Isolation Valve (PCIV) and is designed to close automatically on an ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] initiation signal to ensure that injection flow is directed to the reactor vessel. Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.1.3 requires that containment penetrations associated with an inoperable PCIV be isolated. E22-MOVF023 was declared inoperable at 0028. Operators were unable to close or demonstrate that E22-MOVF023 was fully closed as required by TS 3.6.1.3 and proceeded to isolate the associated containment penetration by closing other system valves. This action was completed at 0320.
"The net effect of the actions taken to isolate the containment penetration is that HPCS is inoperable as of 0256. This results in 14 day LCO."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM DAN JAMES TO KARL DIEDERICH ON 3/23/17 AT 10:01 EDT * * *
The Event Time was 0028 CDT rather than 0256 CDT. "The scheduled surveillance test of the high pressure core spray system was initiated at 2355 CDT on March 22, and the pump was secured at 0028 CDT on March 23. The inspection of the HPCS test return valve to the suppression pool occurred at 0050 CDT, and it was at that point that an apparent malfunction of the valve had occurred to the extent that it did not appear to be able to perform its safety function to close upon receipt of a design basis system initiation signal. Thus, the event time for this condition would be more accurately defined as 0028 CDT."
Notified R4DO (James Drake) via e-mail.
"River Bend Station personnel declared the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system inoperable at 0256 on 3/23/2017.
"During performance of the HPCS Pump and Valve Operability Test, the operators observed an unusual system response after E22-MOVF023 (HPCS Test Return to the Suppression Pool) was stroked closed. A field check showed that the key that connects the E22-MOVF023 valve stem to the anti-rotation device had become dislodged.
"E22-MOVF023 is a Primary Containment Isolation Valve (PCIV) and is designed to close automatically on an ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] initiation signal to ensure that injection flow is directed to the reactor vessel. Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.1.3 requires that containment penetrations associated with an inoperable PCIV be isolated. E22-MOVF023 was declared inoperable at 0028. Operators were unable to close or demonstrate that E22-MOVF023 was fully closed as required by TS 3.6.1.3 and proceeded to isolate the associated containment penetration by closing other system valves. This action was completed at 0320.
"The net effect of the actions taken to isolate the containment penetration is that HPCS is inoperable as of 0256. This results in 14 day LCO."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM DAN JAMES TO KARL DIEDERICH ON 3/23/17 AT 10:01 EDT * * *
The Event Time was 0028 CDT rather than 0256 CDT. "The scheduled surveillance test of the high pressure core spray system was initiated at 2355 CDT on March 22, and the pump was secured at 0028 CDT on March 23. The inspection of the HPCS test return valve to the suppression pool occurred at 0050 CDT, and it was at that point that an apparent malfunction of the valve had occurred to the extent that it did not appear to be able to perform its safety function to close upon receipt of a design basis system initiation signal. Thus, the event time for this condition would be more accurately defined as 0028 CDT."
Notified R4DO (James Drake) via e-mail.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52632
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DONALD TOWNSEND
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DONALD TOWNSEND
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 03/23/2017
Notification Time: 13:55 [ET]
Event Date: 03/23/2017
Event Time: 06:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2017
Notification Time: 13:55 [ET]
Event Date: 03/23/2017
Event Time: 06:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
FFD GROUP (EMAI)
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
FFD GROUP (EMAI)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT INVOLVING DISCOVERY OF KOMBUCHA TEA INSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA
An employee reported finding a container of herbal tea (Kombucha) in the Administrative Building refrigerator which is inside the Protected Area. Kombucha tea is a fermented tea containing trace amounts of alcohol. A similar incident occurred on 6/16/2016. The licensee issued a communication to all employees at that time identifying that Kombucha tea is not permitted on-site.
The licensee will re-issue their communication to all employees and continue their investigation to identify who may have brought the tea on-site.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and R4 (Haire).
An employee reported finding a container of herbal tea (Kombucha) in the Administrative Building refrigerator which is inside the Protected Area. Kombucha tea is a fermented tea containing trace amounts of alcohol. A similar incident occurred on 6/16/2016. The licensee issued a communication to all employees at that time identifying that Kombucha tea is not permitted on-site.
The licensee will re-issue their communication to all employees and continue their investigation to identify who may have brought the tea on-site.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and R4 (Haire).