Event Notification Report for March 09, 2017
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/08/2017 - 03/09/2017
EVENT NUMBERS
52603526085260152618
Agreement State
Event Number: 52603
Rep Org: MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES INC.
Region: 3
City: ROSEVILLE State: MN
County:
License #: 1192
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TYLER S. KRUSE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Licensee: TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES INC.
Region: 3
City: ROSEVILLE State: MN
County:
License #: 1192
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TYLER S. KRUSE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 03/10/2017
Notification Time: 13:08 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/10/2017
Notification Time: 13:08 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/10/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MARK JEFFERS (R3DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (NMSS)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
MARK JEFFERS (R3DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (NMSS)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIRE DURING RADIOGRAPHY OPERATIONS
The following information was provided by the State of Minnesota via email:
"A Team Industrial Services radiography crew was working at Flint Hills Refinery on March 9, 2017. Approximately 7 minutes after starting a 13 minute exposure, one of the radiographers (Radiographer 1) noticed a fire had started near the exposure device. Radiographer 1 instructed the other radiographer (Radiographer 2) to call the plant's fire department and notify the Team's lead radiographer at their Rosemount location. Radiographer 1 then attempted to retract the source and was unsuccessful. Radiographer 1 then successfully extinguished the fire however the fire started again shortly after. At this point Radiographer 1 exited the unit. [The Team's lead radiographer] instructed the crew to extend their boundaries and wait for assistance. [The Team's lead radiographer] contacted the Team's Radiation Safety Officer.
"The fire department arrived and was able to extinguish the fire from a ladder truck located outside the radiographer's boundaries. The Team's lead radiographer and [another individual] arrived on-site and assessed the situation. Other available radiographers were dispatched to the site to assist in monitoring the site boundaries. [The Team's lead radiographer] sent pictures of the site to [the Team's Radiation Safety Officer] who contacted QSA for assistance in planning the source retrieval. The retrieval team was able to identify that the drive cables conduit was melted, exposing the drive cable and separating the connection from the camera causing the crank to malfunction. They manually attempted to retract the drive cable and were able to confirm with survey meters that the source was still connected to the drive cable. The drive cable was manually retracted and the source was pulled into the shielded position. Surveys were taken to confirm the source was shielded, and the source was locked in position.
"The source has been leak tested and the sample was overnighted to QSA for analysis. The plant is assessing the situation and will issue a report regarding the cause of the fire. The pocket dosimeter readings for the crew were as follows:
Radiographer 1: 54 mR
Radiographer 2: 15 mR
Another individual: 13 mR
Team's lead radiographer: 5 mR
"The licensee is in the process of assessing the dose received by the fire fighters, however it is assumed that their doses were minimal based on the doses received by the radiography crew and their distance from the source. The licensee is preparing and will issue a written report within the required 30 day time frame.
"Exposure device: QSA 880 D. Source: A-424-9, Ir-192, 64 curies"
The following information was provided by the State of Minnesota via email:
"A Team Industrial Services radiography crew was working at Flint Hills Refinery on March 9, 2017. Approximately 7 minutes after starting a 13 minute exposure, one of the radiographers (Radiographer 1) noticed a fire had started near the exposure device. Radiographer 1 instructed the other radiographer (Radiographer 2) to call the plant's fire department and notify the Team's lead radiographer at their Rosemount location. Radiographer 1 then attempted to retract the source and was unsuccessful. Radiographer 1 then successfully extinguished the fire however the fire started again shortly after. At this point Radiographer 1 exited the unit. [The Team's lead radiographer] instructed the crew to extend their boundaries and wait for assistance. [The Team's lead radiographer] contacted the Team's Radiation Safety Officer.
"The fire department arrived and was able to extinguish the fire from a ladder truck located outside the radiographer's boundaries. The Team's lead radiographer and [another individual] arrived on-site and assessed the situation. Other available radiographers were dispatched to the site to assist in monitoring the site boundaries. [The Team's lead radiographer] sent pictures of the site to [the Team's Radiation Safety Officer] who contacted QSA for assistance in planning the source retrieval. The retrieval team was able to identify that the drive cables conduit was melted, exposing the drive cable and separating the connection from the camera causing the crank to malfunction. They manually attempted to retract the drive cable and were able to confirm with survey meters that the source was still connected to the drive cable. The drive cable was manually retracted and the source was pulled into the shielded position. Surveys were taken to confirm the source was shielded, and the source was locked in position.
"The source has been leak tested and the sample was overnighted to QSA for analysis. The plant is assessing the situation and will issue a report regarding the cause of the fire. The pocket dosimeter readings for the crew were as follows:
Radiographer 1: 54 mR
Radiographer 2: 15 mR
Another individual: 13 mR
Team's lead radiographer: 5 mR
"The licensee is in the process of assessing the dose received by the fire fighters, however it is assumed that their doses were minimal based on the doses received by the radiography crew and their distance from the source. The licensee is preparing and will issue a written report within the required 30 day time frame.
"Exposure device: QSA 880 D. Source: A-424-9, Ir-192, 64 curies"
Agreement State
Event Number: 52608
Rep Org: MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: GERDAU AMERISTEEL US, INC.
Region: 3
City: ST. PAUL State: MN
County:
License #: 1109
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LYNN FORTIER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: GERDAU AMERISTEEL US, INC.
Region: 3
City: ST. PAUL State: MN
County:
License #: 1109
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LYNN FORTIER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 03/13/2017
Notification Time: 17:11 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2017
Notification Time: 17:11 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
KARLA STOEDTER (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
KARLA STOEDTER (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - GAUGE SHUTTER STUCK IN OPEN POSITION
The following information was obtained from the state of Minnesota via email:
"Minnesota Dept. of Health [MDH] was notified by phone message March 10, 2017. The message was retrieved March 13, 2017 by the RAM [Radioactive Material] unit Supervisor. MDH visited the site March 13, 2017 and gathered the following information regarding the source holder.
"Category: External EMS Housings
Source Model: P-2608-100 (Co-60)
Gauge Model: LB 300 ML
Manufacture Date: 10/2013
Manufacturer: Berthold Systems, Inc.
Source Number: 1816-10-13 (mold housing 12)
Original Activity: 1.5 mCi
Current Activity: 1.4050 mCi
"The licensee is a steel processor and the incident involved molten steel encasing the source holder, locking the shutter in an open position. This is not a typical occurrence. The licensee is working with a consultant (Applied Health Physics) to develop a plan for removing the source holder from the mold and determining whether the source holder is repairable or if it needs to be disposed of."
The following information was obtained from the state of Minnesota via email:
"Minnesota Dept. of Health [MDH] was notified by phone message March 10, 2017. The message was retrieved March 13, 2017 by the RAM [Radioactive Material] unit Supervisor. MDH visited the site March 13, 2017 and gathered the following information regarding the source holder.
"Category: External EMS Housings
Source Model: P-2608-100 (Co-60)
Gauge Model: LB 300 ML
Manufacture Date: 10/2013
Manufacturer: Berthold Systems, Inc.
Source Number: 1816-10-13 (mold housing 12)
Original Activity: 1.5 mCi
Current Activity: 1.4050 mCi
"The licensee is a steel processor and the incident involved molten steel encasing the source holder, locking the shutter in an open position. This is not a typical occurrence. The licensee is working with a consultant (Applied Health Physics) to develop a plan for removing the source holder from the mold and determining whether the source holder is repairable or if it needs to be disposed of."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52601
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: LUKE ECHOLS
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: LUKE ECHOLS
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 03/09/2017
Notification Time: 10:57 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2017
Event Time: 03:19 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/09/2017
Notification Time: 10:57 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2017
Event Time: 03:19 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/09/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
MARK JEFFERS (R3DO)
MARK JEFFERS (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO RELAY FAILURE
"On March 7, 2017, Division 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system was inoperable due to a scheduled maintenance system outage window. At 2258 [CST], Operations identified a Division 1 Unit Substation Switchgear relay was cycling, which is part of the Division 1 AC Power system. The specific relay could not be identified at the time. Division 1 AC Power systems were protected.
"On March 8, 2017 at 1830 hours, Division 2 RHR was restored to operable status.
"On March 9, 2017 at 0319 hours, Operations declared Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) inoperable due to the [identification of the] Division 1 relay as related to properly tripping non-essential loads on a bus under-voltage condition. The relay would not have actuated to trip non-essential loads. The proper tripping of non-essential loads is a requirement for Division 1 EDG.
"The Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) analysis specifies with the Division 1 DG failure, the remaining systems available are: Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS), and 2 Low Pressure Core Injection (LPCI) systems.
"As a result of Division 2 RHR [being] inoperable at the same time Division 1 EDG was inoperable, an unanalyzed condition existed. While Division 2 RHR was inoperable, Division 1 EDG was inoperable. Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, was not met. Condition B, One Required DG Inoperable, Required Action B.2 declares required features, [normally] supported by the inoperable DG, inoperable when the redundant required features are inoperable, with a completion time of 4 hours. The action would have required declaring Division 1 ECCS inoperable, which includes Division 1 RHR and Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS).
"With Division 1 EDG, Division 1 RHR, and Division 2 RHR inoperable, the station did not satisfy the USAR ECCS analysis and was in an unanalyzed condition. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition, since the condition occurred within three years of the date of discovery.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"On March 7, 2017, Division 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system was inoperable due to a scheduled maintenance system outage window. At 2258 [CST], Operations identified a Division 1 Unit Substation Switchgear relay was cycling, which is part of the Division 1 AC Power system. The specific relay could not be identified at the time. Division 1 AC Power systems were protected.
"On March 8, 2017 at 1830 hours, Division 2 RHR was restored to operable status.
"On March 9, 2017 at 0319 hours, Operations declared Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) inoperable due to the [identification of the] Division 1 relay as related to properly tripping non-essential loads on a bus under-voltage condition. The relay would not have actuated to trip non-essential loads. The proper tripping of non-essential loads is a requirement for Division 1 EDG.
"The Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) analysis specifies with the Division 1 DG failure, the remaining systems available are: Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS), and 2 Low Pressure Core Injection (LPCI) systems.
"As a result of Division 2 RHR [being] inoperable at the same time Division 1 EDG was inoperable, an unanalyzed condition existed. While Division 2 RHR was inoperable, Division 1 EDG was inoperable. Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, was not met. Condition B, One Required DG Inoperable, Required Action B.2 declares required features, [normally] supported by the inoperable DG, inoperable when the redundant required features are inoperable, with a completion time of 4 hours. The action would have required declaring Division 1 ECCS inoperable, which includes Division 1 RHR and Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS).
"With Division 1 EDG, Division 1 RHR, and Division 2 RHR inoperable, the station did not satisfy the USAR ECCS analysis and was in an unanalyzed condition. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition, since the condition occurred within three years of the date of discovery.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52618
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN McILNAY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN McILNAY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 03/17/2017
Notification Time: 17:08 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2017
Event Time: 01:20 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2017
Notification Time: 17:08 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2017
Event Time: 01:20 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
FRANK EHRHARDT (R2DO)
FRANK EHRHARDT (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
CONTAINMENT AIRLOCK FUNCTION LOST DUE TO EQUALIZING VALVE NOT CLOSING
"On March 9, 2017 at 0120 EST, the equalizing valve for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 upper containment airlock inboard door was found not closed while the outboard airlock door was open. This created a containment bypass with leakage potentially greater than allowed by the design. The operator immediately identified, after opening the outer door of the elevation 757 Air Lock, the pressure equalizing valve for the inner door was not fully closed. The outer door was promptly shut to isolate the airlock. The inner door was then cycled which closed the equalizing valve. The total time that a containment bypass was present is estimated at five minutes.
"This condition was initially recognized as being potentially reportable. However, the assessment performed at the time, based on operator control of the outer airlock door, concluded there was a reasonable assurance of meeting the safety function. A subsequent independent review of this condition identified that this should have been reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) within eight hours of the event.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this event."
The licensee is planning on replacing the equalizing valve in the near future.
"On March 9, 2017 at 0120 EST, the equalizing valve for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 upper containment airlock inboard door was found not closed while the outboard airlock door was open. This created a containment bypass with leakage potentially greater than allowed by the design. The operator immediately identified, after opening the outer door of the elevation 757 Air Lock, the pressure equalizing valve for the inner door was not fully closed. The outer door was promptly shut to isolate the airlock. The inner door was then cycled which closed the equalizing valve. The total time that a containment bypass was present is estimated at five minutes.
"This condition was initially recognized as being potentially reportable. However, the assessment performed at the time, based on operator control of the outer airlock door, concluded there was a reasonable assurance of meeting the safety function. A subsequent independent review of this condition identified that this should have been reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) within eight hours of the event.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this event."
The licensee is planning on replacing the equalizing valve in the near future.