Event Notification Report for March 08, 2017
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/07/2017 - 03/08/2017
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52599
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DARVIN DUTTRY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DARVIN DUTTRY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 03/08/2017
Notification Time: 08:49 [ET]
Event Date: 03/08/2017
Event Time: 02:39 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/08/2017
Notification Time: 08:49 [ET]
Event Date: 03/08/2017
Event Time: 02:39 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/08/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DUE TO CONTAINMENT FAN TRIP
"On March 08, 2017 at 0239 hours [EST], Secondary Containment Zone 3 (Unit 1 and 2 Reactor Building) differential pressure lowered to 0 [inches] WG due to a trip of the running Zone 3 Secondary Containment fans. The fan trip was caused by a human performance error during a Unit 2 outage related activity. Required differential pressure per SR 3.6.4.1.1 could not be maintained. Zone 3 differential pressure recovered to [greater than] 0.25 [inches] WG at 0255 hours after restart of Zone 3 Secondary Containment fans. All other Zones of Secondary Containment were unaffected by this event.
"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev. 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On March 08, 2017 at 0239 hours [EST], Secondary Containment Zone 3 (Unit 1 and 2 Reactor Building) differential pressure lowered to 0 [inches] WG due to a trip of the running Zone 3 Secondary Containment fans. The fan trip was caused by a human performance error during a Unit 2 outage related activity. Required differential pressure per SR 3.6.4.1.1 could not be maintained. Zone 3 differential pressure recovered to [greater than] 0.25 [inches] WG at 0255 hours after restart of Zone 3 Secondary Containment fans. All other Zones of Secondary Containment were unaffected by this event.
"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev. 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52600
Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 03/08/2017
Notification Time: 20:13 [ET]
Event Date: 03/08/2017
Event Time: 16:27 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/08/2017
Notification Time: 20:13 [ET]
Event Date: 03/08/2017
Event Time: 16:27 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/08/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JESSE ROLLINS (R4DO)
JESSE ROLLINS (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
BOTH TRAINS OF LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION INOPERABLE DUE TO MAINTENANCE ERROR
"This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3.
"On March 8, 2017 at 1627 [CST] Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.2 action 'c' was entered due to both trains of Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) being inoperable. This TS action requires one train of LPSI be restored within 1 hour or be in at least Hot Standby within the next 6 hours.
"It was identified that LPSI train B was inoperable due to SI-135B, Reactor Coolant Loop 1 Shutdown Cooling Warmup Valve, being found open. At the time of discovery, LPSI train A was inoperable for pre planned maintenance, but available and awaiting operability retest. The station was in compliance with TS 3.5.2 action 'a'. Maintenance workers were scheduled to work Sl-135A Reactor Coolant Loop 2 Shutdown Cooling Warmup Valve, and inadvertently began work on Sl-135B and manually opened the valve which resulted in the LPSI Train B being inoperable.
"Once identified by Operations Control Room staff, the valve [SI-135B] was placed in the closed position and stroke tested to ensure operability. TS 3.5.2 action 'c' was exited at time 1705. The station remained in compliance with TS 3.5.2 action 'a'. "
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3.
"On March 8, 2017 at 1627 [CST] Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.2 action 'c' was entered due to both trains of Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) being inoperable. This TS action requires one train of LPSI be restored within 1 hour or be in at least Hot Standby within the next 6 hours.
"It was identified that LPSI train B was inoperable due to SI-135B, Reactor Coolant Loop 1 Shutdown Cooling Warmup Valve, being found open. At the time of discovery, LPSI train A was inoperable for pre planned maintenance, but available and awaiting operability retest. The station was in compliance with TS 3.5.2 action 'a'. Maintenance workers were scheduled to work Sl-135A Reactor Coolant Loop 2 Shutdown Cooling Warmup Valve, and inadvertently began work on Sl-135B and manually opened the valve which resulted in the LPSI Train B being inoperable.
"Once identified by Operations Control Room staff, the valve [SI-135B] was placed in the closed position and stroke tested to ensure operability. TS 3.5.2 action 'c' was exited at time 1705. The station remained in compliance with TS 3.5.2 action 'a'. "
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Part 21
Event Number: 52734
Rep Org: SUMMERILL TUBE CORPORATION
Licensee: SUMMERILL TUBE CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: SCOTTDALE State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SCOTT SALVATORE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: SUMMERILL TUBE CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: SCOTTDALE State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SCOTT SALVATORE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 05/05/2017
Notification Time: 14:38 [ET]
Event Date: 03/08/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/05/2017
Notification Time: 14:38 [ET]
Event Date: 03/08/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/05/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)
ROBERT ORLIKOWSKI (R3DO)
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)
ROBERT ORLIKOWSKI (R3DO)
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)
INTERIM PART 21 - UNQUALIFIED SOURCE MATERIAL FOR NUCLEAR APPLICATIONS
During a Vendor Audit by Consolidated Power Supply located in Birmingham, AL, it was discovered that three (3) orders had been received from Summerill Tube Corporation that did not meet the ASME BPVC, Section III, NCA-3800 criteria.
Management Systems Analysis, Inc. completed a Supplier Quality Audit Report for Consolidated Power Supply which is described, in part, below:
"SUPPLIER QUALITY AUDIT REPORT
"SUPPLIER NAME/LOCATION: Summerill Tube Corp., Franklin Street, P.O. Box 302, Scottdale, Pa 15683, Phone: 724-887-9700
"PRODUCT: Ferrous & Nonferrous Tubing
"SPECIFICATIONS: ASME SECT III Div 1NCA3800 15 Ed, 10CFR50 APP 'B', ANSIN45.2, NQA-1 94 Ed thru & including 08 Ed/09 Ad Basic Requirements, 10CFR21, SNT-TC-1a ASME Nx 5500
"AUDIT SCOPE
"Summerill Tube is a Material Organization manufacturing Ferrous and Nonferrous Tubing in accordance with their Quality Assurance Manual Rev 04 dated 10/22/12 and Nuclear Code Manual Rev 03 dated 12/19/12 that supplements the program in accordance with the ASME Code.
"QUALITY ASSURANCE SUMMARY: On March 2, 2017 an audit was conducted of Summerill Tube in Scottdale, Pennsylvania. The primary contact during the investigation was Scott Salvatore Quality Assurance Manager.
"Summerill was procuring qualified materials from approved sources, typically ASME QSC holders for extrusion into its final form. Once material is accepted at their facility it is entered into inventory and stored in a lay down area outside. Upon acceptance of an order materials are allocated the job, a work order is issued detailing the sequence of operations to be performed and the customer's requirements. Testing is performed on each heat of material issued for code work using qualified materials. During the past year this has changed as documented in Audit Finding No 1.
"The material is annealed to remove work hardening, passivated to remove any scale or contamination and tested. Testing typically consists of eddy current testing, hydrostatic testing and ultrasonic examination as required. The completed materials are then line marked packaged and shipped.
"The following orders were reviewed as the primary basis of the investigation including certification of the material by Summerill material certifications, associated Shop Orders, testing performed to qualify the material, hydro testing, flare testing, heat treatment and final inspection of the parts prior shipment.
"Reviewed the following orders:
"Order 32422 Lot 32422 SA213 316L 5/17/16 ASME III NC 15 Ed Ht 541455 from Sandvik dated 7/7/15 Penn State Metals 5/12/16 Chem Analysis by LTI dated 5/13/16 Solution Anneal 5/3/16. Dim Inspection dated 5/16/16 Certification dated 5/17/16
"Order 32675 Lot 32675 SA213 to ASME III Cl 2 15Ed Ht 541366 from Sandvik dated 11/4/15 Tensile by Penn State dated 9/26/16 & Chem by Lab Testing dated 9/26/16 Solution Anneal dated 9/21/16. Dim Inspection dated 10/3/16 Certification dated 10/6/16
"Order 32676 Lot 32676 SA213 316L ASME III NC 15 Ed Ht 541028 from Sandvik dated 5/19/15 Tensile by Penn State dated 9/30/16 Chem by LTI 9/26/16 Solution Anneal dated 9/21/16. Dim Inspection dated 10/11/16 Certification dated 10/12/16
"Order 32120 Lot 32120 SA213 304L to ASME III Cl 1 15 Ed Ht 531223 from Sandvik dated 4/18/12 Tensile by Penn dated 9/1116 Chem by Lab Testing dated 8/31/16 UT by LTI 9/21/16 Solution Anneal dated 8/22/16. Dim Inspection dated 10/1/16 Certification dated 11/22/16
"As a part of the investigation corrective action to previous audit deficiencies was reviewed with the following results.
"Audit Finding No. 1 (V16-7) Contrary to NCA 1140.g STC does not have a copy of the 2015 Edition of the ASME Code and consequently has not reviewed the edition for changes that would impact their program. A copy of the 2015 Ed of Section III was obtained and reviewed. Actions taken found to be satisfactory.
"Based on the investigation the supplier program was found to be adequate and effective.
"RESULTS
"As a result of the investigation performed at Summerill revealed the following deficiency was noted.
"Audit Finding No. 1
"Two suppliers appear on the Approved Suppliers List, Walsin Specialty dated 4/15/16 and Shanghai Maxmount dated 4/13/16, as ASME III NCA 3800 suppliers. Audits of each of these suppliers performed by AccuInspection. The checklist sections covering NCA 3800 indicate 'Minor NC' and 'N/A' as a result without further explanation. Materials from these supplier were purchased from Krupala in Canada and unaudited source.
"Audit Finding No. 2
"Contrary to NCA 3855.5 and Section 7.3 of the manual only one chemistry was performed by Lab Testing on Ht E110462 Sa213 316L unqualified source material from Outokumpu via Krupalu and Walsin to represent 18 pieces used on order 32132. This material was certified as ASME Section III NC 2015 Ed."
Summerill identified three (3) additional unqualified orders that were shipped to Tioga who was notified on 04/28/2017.
For additional information, you may contact:
Scott Salvatore
Quality Manager
Summerill Tube Corp.
P. O. Box 302
220 Franklin Street
Scottdale, PA 15683
Work: 724.887.1412 / Cell: 412.901.9643 / Fax: 724.887.1450/Email: scotts@summerilltube.com
http://www.summerilltube.com/
During a Vendor Audit by Consolidated Power Supply located in Birmingham, AL, it was discovered that three (3) orders had been received from Summerill Tube Corporation that did not meet the ASME BPVC, Section III, NCA-3800 criteria.
Management Systems Analysis, Inc. completed a Supplier Quality Audit Report for Consolidated Power Supply which is described, in part, below:
"SUPPLIER QUALITY AUDIT REPORT
"SUPPLIER NAME/LOCATION: Summerill Tube Corp., Franklin Street, P.O. Box 302, Scottdale, Pa 15683, Phone: 724-887-9700
"PRODUCT: Ferrous & Nonferrous Tubing
"SPECIFICATIONS: ASME SECT III Div 1NCA3800 15 Ed, 10CFR50 APP 'B', ANSIN45.2, NQA-1 94 Ed thru & including 08 Ed/09 Ad Basic Requirements, 10CFR21, SNT-TC-1a ASME Nx 5500
"AUDIT SCOPE
"Summerill Tube is a Material Organization manufacturing Ferrous and Nonferrous Tubing in accordance with their Quality Assurance Manual Rev 04 dated 10/22/12 and Nuclear Code Manual Rev 03 dated 12/19/12 that supplements the program in accordance with the ASME Code.
"QUALITY ASSURANCE SUMMARY: On March 2, 2017 an audit was conducted of Summerill Tube in Scottdale, Pennsylvania. The primary contact during the investigation was Scott Salvatore Quality Assurance Manager.
"Summerill was procuring qualified materials from approved sources, typically ASME QSC holders for extrusion into its final form. Once material is accepted at their facility it is entered into inventory and stored in a lay down area outside. Upon acceptance of an order materials are allocated the job, a work order is issued detailing the sequence of operations to be performed and the customer's requirements. Testing is performed on each heat of material issued for code work using qualified materials. During the past year this has changed as documented in Audit Finding No 1.
"The material is annealed to remove work hardening, passivated to remove any scale or contamination and tested. Testing typically consists of eddy current testing, hydrostatic testing and ultrasonic examination as required. The completed materials are then line marked packaged and shipped.
"The following orders were reviewed as the primary basis of the investigation including certification of the material by Summerill material certifications, associated Shop Orders, testing performed to qualify the material, hydro testing, flare testing, heat treatment and final inspection of the parts prior shipment.
"Reviewed the following orders:
"Order 32422 Lot 32422 SA213 316L 5/17/16 ASME III NC 15 Ed Ht 541455 from Sandvik dated 7/7/15 Penn State Metals 5/12/16 Chem Analysis by LTI dated 5/13/16 Solution Anneal 5/3/16. Dim Inspection dated 5/16/16 Certification dated 5/17/16
"Order 32675 Lot 32675 SA213 to ASME III Cl 2 15Ed Ht 541366 from Sandvik dated 11/4/15 Tensile by Penn State dated 9/26/16 & Chem by Lab Testing dated 9/26/16 Solution Anneal dated 9/21/16. Dim Inspection dated 10/3/16 Certification dated 10/6/16
"Order 32676 Lot 32676 SA213 316L ASME III NC 15 Ed Ht 541028 from Sandvik dated 5/19/15 Tensile by Penn State dated 9/30/16 Chem by LTI 9/26/16 Solution Anneal dated 9/21/16. Dim Inspection dated 10/11/16 Certification dated 10/12/16
"Order 32120 Lot 32120 SA213 304L to ASME III Cl 1 15 Ed Ht 531223 from Sandvik dated 4/18/12 Tensile by Penn dated 9/1116 Chem by Lab Testing dated 8/31/16 UT by LTI 9/21/16 Solution Anneal dated 8/22/16. Dim Inspection dated 10/1/16 Certification dated 11/22/16
"As a part of the investigation corrective action to previous audit deficiencies was reviewed with the following results.
"Audit Finding No. 1 (V16-7) Contrary to NCA 1140.g STC does not have a copy of the 2015 Edition of the ASME Code and consequently has not reviewed the edition for changes that would impact their program. A copy of the 2015 Ed of Section III was obtained and reviewed. Actions taken found to be satisfactory.
"Based on the investigation the supplier program was found to be adequate and effective.
"RESULTS
"As a result of the investigation performed at Summerill revealed the following deficiency was noted.
"Audit Finding No. 1
"Two suppliers appear on the Approved Suppliers List, Walsin Specialty dated 4/15/16 and Shanghai Maxmount dated 4/13/16, as ASME III NCA 3800 suppliers. Audits of each of these suppliers performed by AccuInspection. The checklist sections covering NCA 3800 indicate 'Minor NC' and 'N/A' as a result without further explanation. Materials from these supplier were purchased from Krupala in Canada and unaudited source.
"Audit Finding No. 2
"Contrary to NCA 3855.5 and Section 7.3 of the manual only one chemistry was performed by Lab Testing on Ht E110462 Sa213 316L unqualified source material from Outokumpu via Krupalu and Walsin to represent 18 pieces used on order 32132. This material was certified as ASME Section III NC 2015 Ed."
Summerill identified three (3) additional unqualified orders that were shipped to Tioga who was notified on 04/28/2017.
For additional information, you may contact:
Scott Salvatore
Quality Manager
Summerill Tube Corp.
P. O. Box 302
220 Franklin Street
Scottdale, PA 15683
Work: 724.887.1412 / Cell: 412.901.9643 / Fax: 724.887.1450/Email: scotts@summerilltube.com
http://www.summerilltube.com/