Event Notification Report for January 31, 2017
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/30/2017 - 01/31/2017
EVENT NUMBERS
525225252352524525325264555177
Part 21
Event Number: 52522
Rep Org: WECTEC LLC
Licensee: CB&I LAURENS
Region: 1
City: CHARLOTTE State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CURTIS A. CASTELL
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Licensee: CB&I LAURENS
Region: 1
City: CHARLOTTE State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CURTIS A. CASTELL
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 01/31/2017
Notification Time: 15:36 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/31/2017
Notification Time: 15:36 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/31/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
SHAKUR WALKER (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
SHAKUR WALKER (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
PART 21 - PIPING SPOOL WELD NONCONFORMANCE
The following is an excerpt from WECTEC LLC received via email:
"Based on information contained in nonconformance and disposition (N&D) report, a piping spool that was supplied to Aecon Industrial for use in a portion of the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVS) for the V. C. Summer Unit 2 AP1000r project was found to have a weld with an underfill condition. The piping spool was fabricated by CB&I Laurens based on a purchase order from WECTEC LLC. The identified weld defect is associated with a Safety Class B piping spool as part of the containment penetration boundary for the CVS makeup line. Evaluation of the nonconforming weld condition was inconclusive, and therefore, this condition is conservatively assumed to result in the potential failure of the associated containment penetration if it had been left uncorrected."
The following is an excerpt from WECTEC LLC received via email:
"Based on information contained in nonconformance and disposition (N&D) report, a piping spool that was supplied to Aecon Industrial for use in a portion of the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVS) for the V. C. Summer Unit 2 AP1000r project was found to have a weld with an underfill condition. The piping spool was fabricated by CB&I Laurens based on a purchase order from WECTEC LLC. The identified weld defect is associated with a Safety Class B piping spool as part of the containment penetration boundary for the CVS makeup line. Evaluation of the nonconforming weld condition was inconclusive, and therefore, this condition is conservatively assumed to result in the potential failure of the associated containment penetration if it had been left uncorrected."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52523
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: BRIAN KELLY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: BRIAN KELLY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 01/31/2017
Notification Time: 15:39 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2017
Event Time: 12:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/31/2017
Notification Time: 15:39 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2017
Event Time: 12:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/31/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
SHAKUR WALKER (R2DO)
SHAKUR WALKER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY PIPING DEFECT
"At 1200 [EST] on January 31, 2017, during investigation of potential 1B2 Reactor Coolant Pump seal degradation, a through wall defect was identified on Class 1 piping servicing the Lower Seal Heat Exchanger, which is part of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB). The reactor is presently in Mode 3 with decay heat being removed by the atmospheric steam dump valves. The plant is being maneuvered to Mode 5 to affect appropriate repairs."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1200 [EST] on January 31, 2017, during investigation of potential 1B2 Reactor Coolant Pump seal degradation, a through wall defect was identified on Class 1 piping servicing the Lower Seal Heat Exchanger, which is part of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB). The reactor is presently in Mode 3 with decay heat being removed by the atmospheric steam dump valves. The plant is being maneuvered to Mode 5 to affect appropriate repairs."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 52524
Rep Org: HENRY FORD HOSPITAL
Licensee: HENRY FORD HOSPITAL
Region: 3
City: DETROIT State: MI
County:
License #: 21-04109-16
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ALAN JACKSON
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Licensee: HENRY FORD HOSPITAL
Region: 3
City: DETROIT State: MI
County:
License #: 21-04109-16
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ALAN JACKSON
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 02/01/2017
Notification Time: 15:13 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2017
Event Time: 10:51 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/01/2017
Notification Time: 15:13 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2017
Event Time: 10:51 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/01/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE 35.3045(a)(3) - DOSE TO OTHER SITE > SPECIFIED LIMITS
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE 35.3045(a)(3) - DOSE TO OTHER SITE > SPECIFIED LIMITS
Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
POTENTIAL MEDICAL EVENT
A patient at the Henry Ford Hospital Interventional Radiology Department was prescribed a Y-90 Theraspheres treatment of 60 Gray to the left lobe of the liver. The Interventional Radiologist administered 46 Gray total to both the right and the left lobe of the liver. The referring physician has been notified and the licensee has notified the patient. It is believed that this event will not result in any harm to the patient. The licensee is in the process of determining corrective action to prevent reoccurrence.
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
A patient at the Henry Ford Hospital Interventional Radiology Department was prescribed a Y-90 Theraspheres treatment of 60 Gray to the left lobe of the liver. The Interventional Radiologist administered 46 Gray total to both the right and the left lobe of the liver. The referring physician has been notified and the licensee has notified the patient. It is believed that this event will not result in any harm to the patient. The licensee is in the process of determining corrective action to prevent reoccurrence.
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 52532
Rep Org: QAL-TEK ASSOCIATES, LLC
Licensee: QAL-TEK ASSOCIATES, LLC
Region: 4
City: IDAHO FALLS State: ID
County:
License #: 11-27610-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL ALBANESE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: QAL-TEK ASSOCIATES, LLC
Region: 4
City: IDAHO FALLS State: ID
County:
License #: 11-27610-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL ALBANESE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 02/03/2017
Notification Time: 18:02 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 02/08/2017
Notification Time: 18:02 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 02/08/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE SHIPMENT LOST IN TRANSIT
"On January 18th, 2017, two Troxler nuclear density gauges (NDG's) were shipped via [the common carrier] from our Idaho calibration facility to the client in Amarillo, Texas. The two gauges (Make: Troxler, Models: 3411 and 3440 Plus, sn: 12605 and 39690) each container 8mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241/Be were checked in at the Pocatello [the common carrier] hub on January 18th. The gauges owner notified the Idaho calibration facility on January 31, 2017 inquiring why the gauges have not arrived. The Idaho calibration facility immediately called [the common carrier] to check the status. [The common carrier] after tracking and looking for the gauges notified the calibration facility that they were not at the Pocatello hub. According to [the common carrier's] tracking system as of 1/24/2017, they were still in Pocatello with no further movement toward the Amarillo, Texas destination. On February 1st, the calibration facility then called on the [common carrier] account manager to apprise him of the priority situation. The account manager said he would call each hub from Pocatello to Amarillo, Texas where the gauges should pass through. The account manager returned the call the same day stating they did not find the gauges in the hub along the anticipated shipping route. The calibration facility continued to pressure [the common carrier] to search their system. On February 3rd, [the common carrier] initiated a 'corporate flag' for every dock to search for the gauges. The calibration facility also dispatched an employee with a meter to survey the Pocatello distribution hub floor and storage locations. The gauges were not found at the Pocatello hub during the survey conducted by the calibration facility representative. On February 3rd, the calibration facility RSO contacted the gauges owner to discuss the status and immediate reporting requirement. Both parties agreed to notify their respective regulators. On February 6th, the [common carrier] account manager notified the calibration facility stating that they have not made any progress finding the missing gauges in their distribution system."
See also Event Notification 52533 for this event reported by Texas.
* * * UPDATE AT 1043 EST ON 02/08/17 FROM MICHAEL ALBANESE TO S. SANDIN * * *
The missing gauges were located by [the common carrier] in their Salt Lake City hub and are enroute to the customer in Amarillo, TX. Notified R4DO (Warnick) and NMSS Events Notifications via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
"On January 18th, 2017, two Troxler nuclear density gauges (NDG's) were shipped via [the common carrier] from our Idaho calibration facility to the client in Amarillo, Texas. The two gauges (Make: Troxler, Models: 3411 and 3440 Plus, sn: 12605 and 39690) each container 8mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241/Be were checked in at the Pocatello [the common carrier] hub on January 18th. The gauges owner notified the Idaho calibration facility on January 31, 2017 inquiring why the gauges have not arrived. The Idaho calibration facility immediately called [the common carrier] to check the status. [The common carrier] after tracking and looking for the gauges notified the calibration facility that they were not at the Pocatello hub. According to [the common carrier's] tracking system as of 1/24/2017, they were still in Pocatello with no further movement toward the Amarillo, Texas destination. On February 1st, the calibration facility then called on the [common carrier] account manager to apprise him of the priority situation. The account manager said he would call each hub from Pocatello to Amarillo, Texas where the gauges should pass through. The account manager returned the call the same day stating they did not find the gauges in the hub along the anticipated shipping route. The calibration facility continued to pressure [the common carrier] to search their system. On February 3rd, [the common carrier] initiated a 'corporate flag' for every dock to search for the gauges. The calibration facility also dispatched an employee with a meter to survey the Pocatello distribution hub floor and storage locations. The gauges were not found at the Pocatello hub during the survey conducted by the calibration facility representative. On February 3rd, the calibration facility RSO contacted the gauges owner to discuss the status and immediate reporting requirement. Both parties agreed to notify their respective regulators. On February 6th, the [common carrier] account manager notified the calibration facility stating that they have not made any progress finding the missing gauges in their distribution system."
See also Event Notification 52533 for this event reported by Texas.
* * * UPDATE AT 1043 EST ON 02/08/17 FROM MICHAEL ALBANESE TO S. SANDIN * * *
The missing gauges were located by [the common carrier] in their Salt Lake City hub and are enroute to the customer in Amarillo, TX. Notified R4DO (Warnick) and NMSS Events Notifications via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52645
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DUSTIN SCURLOCK
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DUSTIN SCURLOCK
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 03/28/2017
Notification Time: 14:47 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2017
Event Time: 14:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/30/2017
Notification Time: 14:47 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2017
Event Time: 14:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/30/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BILL COOK (R1DO)
BILL COOK (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
60-DAY REPORT DUE TO INVALID ECCS ACTUATION SIGNAL
"The following report is made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) due to an unintended initiation signal that occurred on January 31, 2017 with James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) in Mode 5 at zero (0) percent power.
"On January 31, 2017 at 1425 [EST] the control room received multiple annunciations associated with the following Systems / Trains:
Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) / Trains A and B
Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) / Trains A and B
Core Spray (CS) / Trains A and B
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)
"All four (4) Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) auto-started with their associated Emergency Service Water pumps operating. RHR and CS both received initiation signals but were defeated per procedure. The HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] auxiliary oil pump was taken to Pull-to-Lock per procedure, and the RCIC steam isolation valve cycled until the breaker was opened to close the valve.
"An evaluation concluded that the [Emergency Core Cooling System - ECCS] initiation signals were caused by the opening of a portable job box that was stored near sensitive equipment. Upon opening the job box, the lid bumped a reference leg resulting in the initiation signals. All initiation signals were reset and systems restored to normal shutdown lineups."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 3/30/17 AT 0840 EDT FROM DUSTIN SCURLOCK TO DONG PARK * * *
To the original report, the licensee added, "This condition recurred at 1624 [EDT on 1/31/17]."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Cook).
"The following report is made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) due to an unintended initiation signal that occurred on January 31, 2017 with James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) in Mode 5 at zero (0) percent power.
"On January 31, 2017 at 1425 [EST] the control room received multiple annunciations associated with the following Systems / Trains:
Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) / Trains A and B
Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) / Trains A and B
Core Spray (CS) / Trains A and B
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)
"All four (4) Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) auto-started with their associated Emergency Service Water pumps operating. RHR and CS both received initiation signals but were defeated per procedure. The HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] auxiliary oil pump was taken to Pull-to-Lock per procedure, and the RCIC steam isolation valve cycled until the breaker was opened to close the valve.
"An evaluation concluded that the [Emergency Core Cooling System - ECCS] initiation signals were caused by the opening of a portable job box that was stored near sensitive equipment. Upon opening the job box, the lid bumped a reference leg resulting in the initiation signals. All initiation signals were reset and systems restored to normal shutdown lineups."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 3/30/17 AT 0840 EDT FROM DUSTIN SCURLOCK TO DONG PARK * * *
To the original report, the licensee added, "This condition recurred at 1624 [EDT on 1/31/17]."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Cook).
Agreement State
Event Number: 55177
Rep Org: NH DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES
Licensee: Anheuser-Busch, Inc.
Region: 1
City: State: NH
County: Merrimack
License #: General Licensee
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: David Scalise
HQ OPS Officer: Jeffrey Whited
Licensee: Anheuser-Busch, Inc.
Region: 1
City: State: NH
County: Merrimack
License #: General Licensee
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: David Scalise
HQ OPS Officer: Jeffrey Whited
Notification Date: 04/07/2021
Notification Time: 13:49 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/07/2021
Notification Time: 13:49 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/07/2021
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
WERKHEISER, DAVE (R1)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION, (EMAIL)
WERKHEISER, DAVE (R1)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION, (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 5/7/2021
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK GAUGE SHUTTER
The following was received from the New Hampshire Radiological Health Section via email:
"[In January 2017], during routine maintenance of a generally licensed fill-level gauge, it was discovered that the gauge shutter would not close by ordinary means. A manual shutter handle within the actuation assembly was used to attempt to close the shutter, but the linkage was binding and causing the shutter to remain open. The gauge was already out of service for maintenance, and remained so until the shutter mechanism was repaired. No personnel exposure resulted.
"The cause was determined by the service technician as a binding solenoid spool. The spool bushing was reamed out and the shutter linkage was lubricated, which allowed the solenoid spool to resume moving freely as designed."
Gauge Details: Americium-241, 300mCi (11.1 GBq) sealed source; Industrial Dynamics Model 19567; s/n 156LX; no detectable leakage
The New Hampshire Radiological Health Section considers this event closed.
Report ID #: #NH17-0003
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK GAUGE SHUTTER
The following was received from the New Hampshire Radiological Health Section via email:
"[In January 2017], during routine maintenance of a generally licensed fill-level gauge, it was discovered that the gauge shutter would not close by ordinary means. A manual shutter handle within the actuation assembly was used to attempt to close the shutter, but the linkage was binding and causing the shutter to remain open. The gauge was already out of service for maintenance, and remained so until the shutter mechanism was repaired. No personnel exposure resulted.
"The cause was determined by the service technician as a binding solenoid spool. The spool bushing was reamed out and the shutter linkage was lubricated, which allowed the solenoid spool to resume moving freely as designed."
Gauge Details: Americium-241, 300mCi (11.1 GBq) sealed source; Industrial Dynamics Model 19567; s/n 156LX; no detectable leakage
The New Hampshire Radiological Health Section considers this event closed.
Report ID #: #NH17-0003