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Event Notification Report for January 29, 2017

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/28/2017 - 01/29/2017

EVENT NUMBERS
5252952517

Agreement State
Event Number: 52529
Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY
Licensee: ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN INTERNATIONAL
Region: 3
City: CHICAGO   State: IL
County:
License #: GL 9223295
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAREN PERRERO
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 02/03/2017
Notification Time: 11:51 [ET]
Event Date: 01/29/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/03/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN X-RAY FLUORESCENT ANALYZER

"On Sunday evening January 29, 2017 an instrument case containing a portable lead in paint analyzer belonging to an Environmental Design International, Inc. employee was stolen from a vehicle. The general licensee reported the event the following day to the Agency but had already been in contact with the Chicago Police Department who were investigating. The theft took place in the Near West Side neighborhood of Chicago while the locked case was in the trunk of a vehicle. This device can only be operated with a password. The maximum surface radiation level from the device as reported by the manufacturer does not exceed 0.1 milliR/h. It contains an IAEA Category 5 level source, the lowest risk category assigned by the IAEA in that no one could be permanently injured by this source and if the radioactive material could be dispersed, would not permanently injure anyone."

Manufacturer: Niton
Model: XLp-300
Serial Number: 84640
Source Manufacturer: Eckert & Ziegler
Source Activity: 25 mCi Cd-109
Source Model: XFB-3
Source Serial Number: TR3631

Illinois Event: IL17003

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52517
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4     State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: STEVEN CARTER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 01/29/2017
Notification Time: 16:30 [ET]
Event Date: 01/29/2017
Event Time: 02:09 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/08/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
JESSE ROLLINS (R4DO)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown
Event Text
LOSS OF BOTH DIVISIONS OF CONTROL BUILDING CHILL WATER AND VENTILATION SYSTEM

"At 0209 CST, on January 29, 2017, while the plant was in MODE 4 for a refueling outage, the main control room crew removed the AC/DC inverter in the Division 1, 120 VAC electrical distribution system from service due to an equipment malfunction. Removing the inverter from service caused a loss of the associated 120 VAC instrument buss. This instrument buss loss caused a trip of the Division 1 Control Building Chill Water and Ventilation system. The Division 2 Control Building Chill Water and Ventilation System was locked out for surveillance testing at the time of the equipment failure. This condition rendered both divisions of Control Building Chill Water and Ventilation Systems unable to perform the support function for cooling Division 1 and 2 AC and DC power distribution systems. These systems are required to support the operability of two required divisions of shutdown cooling. Division 2 Shutdown Cooling System was in service and remained in service through out the event.

"The Division 2 Control Building Chill Water and Ventilation System was returned to service at 0220 CST on January 29, 2017.

"Division 1 Control Building Chill Water remains inoperable pending restoration with the installed backup Division 1 DC/AC inverter. Actions are ongoing to place this component in service and restore the associated 120 VAC instrument buss.

"The equipment malfunction was limited to the Division 1 inverter. The investigation of the inverter failure is ongoing. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B).

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION ON 2/8/17 AT 1617 EST FROM STEVEN CARTER TO DONG PARK * * *

"Engineering has previously performed an evaluation for a loss of Control Building Chill Water and Ventilation, reference Engineering Change-58699. Based on the evaluation, it can be determined that in the event of a Loss of Coolant Accident with a loss of Offsite Power, a loss of all Control Building cooling the Inverter, Battery, and Switchgear Rooms will not exceed 122 deg. F for 2.80 hours or greater with no operator actions required. The 2.8 hours is based on the switchgear room inverters operating which is bounding for the case where the DC equipment room inverters are operating. The 122 deg. F criterion is significant because that is the manufacturer ambient maximum temperature for the Division 3 DC Equipment Room. This is the limiting temperature for the Battery, Inverter, and Switchgear Rooms.

"During the event, operators performed the dedicated actions of AOP-0060 Loss of Control Building Ventilation and restored Division II Chill Water and Ventilation in 11 minutes. All required actions are in the Control Building, either in the Main Control Room or on the 98 foot Elevation. There are no radiological concerns in the Control Building, such as high radiation areas or contaminated areas. Per Engineering Change-58699, assuming a single operator error, the total time to recover from a single operator error and to complete the standby chiller realignment and start is 76 minutes ([approximately] 1.3 hours) which is less than half of the 2.8 hours established in Engineering Change-58699. Therefore, there was no loss of safety function for Control Building Chill Water and Ventilation."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Warnick).