Event Notification Report for January 12, 2017
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/11/2017 - 01/12/2017
EVENT NUMBERS
5248552486524875248852507
Agreement State
Event Number: 52485
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: WIBBY ENVIRONMENTAL, INC.
Region: 4
City: GOLDEN State: CO
County:
License #: CO General Li
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LINDA BARTISH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Licensee: WIBBY ENVIRONMENTAL, INC.
Region: 4
City: GOLDEN State: CO
County:
License #: CO General Li
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LINDA BARTISH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 01/12/2017
Notification Time: 16:35 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2017
Event Time: 13:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2017
Notification Time: 16:35 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2017
Event Time: 13:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (E-MA)
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (E-MA)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST GAS CHROMATOGRAPH
The following report was received from the State of Colorado via email:
"Detail: Wibby Environmental sold the business to Phenova in 2010. Through a long process of trying to reach the company contact at Wibby, contact with Phenova was made in February of 2016. After several attempts to discover what occurred with the assets of Wibby Environmental, one device is being reported as lost/abandoned. According to Phenova they do not see the gas chromatograph as being on the asset sheet at the time of purchase.
"It is unknown as to what Wibby Environmental did with the device or if the device was returned for disposal. Our office has received no records from manufactures including CJ Bruyn & Company, showing the Gas Chromatograph was returned.
"Device information: Model # N610-0133 Source SN# 0767, NI-63, 15 mCi, Date shipped from CJ Bruyn 02-27-2004.
"Event Description: Due to the length of time for discovery this case is closed."
Colorado Event Report ID No.: CO 17-0002
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following report was received from the State of Colorado via email:
"Detail: Wibby Environmental sold the business to Phenova in 2010. Through a long process of trying to reach the company contact at Wibby, contact with Phenova was made in February of 2016. After several attempts to discover what occurred with the assets of Wibby Environmental, one device is being reported as lost/abandoned. According to Phenova they do not see the gas chromatograph as being on the asset sheet at the time of purchase.
"It is unknown as to what Wibby Environmental did with the device or if the device was returned for disposal. Our office has received no records from manufactures including CJ Bruyn & Company, showing the Gas Chromatograph was returned.
"Device information: Model # N610-0133 Source SN# 0767, NI-63, 15 mCi, Date shipped from CJ Bruyn 02-27-2004.
"Event Description: Due to the length of time for discovery this case is closed."
Colorado Event Report ID No.: CO 17-0002
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52486
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID HAILE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID HAILE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 01/12/2017
Notification Time: 18:25 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2017
Event Time: 14:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2017
Notification Time: 18:25 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2017
Event Time: 14:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
FFD GROUP (EMAI)
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
FFD GROUP (EMAI)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS-FOR-DUTY TEST POSITIVE FOR NON-LICENSED SUPERVISOR
"A non-licensed supervisor has been found in violation of the Duke Energy Fitness for Duty Policy during a random fitness for duty test. The individual's access to the plant has been suspended.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector."
"A non-licensed supervisor has been found in violation of the Duke Energy Fitness for Duty Policy during a random fitness for duty test. The individual's access to the plant has been suspended.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector."
Part 21
Event Number: 52487
Rep Org: CURTISS WRIGHT ELECTRO MECHANICAL C
Licensee: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: CHESWICK State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAY GARDINER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Licensee: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: CHESWICK State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAY GARDINER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 01/13/2017
Notification Time: 13:56 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 06/29/2017
Notification Time: 13:56 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 06/29/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
PART 21 INTERIM REPORT - EXCESS MATERIAL CONDITION ON THE CASING FOR THE AP1000 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP
The following summary was excerpted from report #EMD-GM-17-02, provided by the Curtis-Wright Electro-Mechanical Corporation:
"Curtiss-Wright Electro-Mechanical Corporation (CW-EMD) has identified a condition which is currently being evaluated to determine if a significant safety hazard exists in the casing for the AP1000 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP). The investigation is underway, but will not be completed within the required 60 days from discovery as required by paragraph 21.21(a)(1) of the regulation. This submission constitutes CW-EMD's interim report on the condition in accordance with paragraph 21.21(a)(2) of the regulation.
"Casings for the AP1000 Reactor Coolant Pump. The casings have an excess material condition in the transition region between the cast bowl and the suction nozzle. The condition is a discontinuous (non-tangential) axisymmetric feature between the cast bowl region and machined suction nozzle OD. The as-built transition feature on the casings has not been analyzed and is not included in CW-EMD Engineering Memorandum 7242, Revision 1, Volume 1, which is the applicable generic design report for the AP1000 RCP casing and main closure.
"At present, the following domestic deliveries have been made:
- 8 casings have been provided to V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3.
- 8 casings have been provided to Vogtle Units 3 and 4.
"Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission:
Brian W. Eckels, General Manager
Curtiss-Wright Electro-Mechanical Corporation
1000 Wright Way Cheswick, Pa 15024"
* * * UPDATE AT 1238 EDT ON 06/29/17 FROM JAY GARDINER TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
The following update was received via email:
"Curtiss-Wright Electro-Mechanical Corporation (CW-EMD) submitted an interim report concerning a deviation in the AP1000 Reactor Coolant Pump casing via letter EMD-GM-17-02, dated January 12, 2017. This letter updates the status of the investigation.
"1. Extent of condition evaluation has been completed. CW-EMD has confirmed that the discontinuous (non-tangential) axisymmetric feature between the cast bowl region and machined suction nozzle OD is limited (domestically) to the 8 AP1000 RCP casings delivered to V.C. Summer units 2 & 3.
"2. AP1000 RCP casing stress and fatigue supplemental analyses have been performed to assess the excess material condition discovered on the suction nozzle OD. The deviation has been determined to still satisfactorily meet the pressure boundary stress requirements of the ASME Code and can therefore be accepted as-is.
"3. The analysis included generation of a 2D axisymmetric FEA [Finite Element Analysis] of the casing with a bounding representation of the as-built geometry, based on extraction of cross-sectional profiles from the V.C. Summer laser scan data of 2 casings. The 2D FEA was used to determine the stress concentration factor(s) associated with the as-built deviated feature, enabling a fatigue strength reduction factor to be estimated and applied to the existing 3D FEA casing fatigue (nominal design) analysis.
"4. The maximum fatigue usage at the location of the deviation on the casing suction nozzle was conservatively estimated to increase from 0.287 to 0.633. This condition still satisfies the 1.0 usage limit specified in the ASME Code.
"5. Therefore, this deviation does not constitute a substantial safety hazard, and the condition has been determined to be not reportable under the provisions of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 21."
Notified the R2DO(Bartley) and Part 21 Group (via email).
The following summary was excerpted from report #EMD-GM-17-02, provided by the Curtis-Wright Electro-Mechanical Corporation:
"Curtiss-Wright Electro-Mechanical Corporation (CW-EMD) has identified a condition which is currently being evaluated to determine if a significant safety hazard exists in the casing for the AP1000 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP). The investigation is underway, but will not be completed within the required 60 days from discovery as required by paragraph 21.21(a)(1) of the regulation. This submission constitutes CW-EMD's interim report on the condition in accordance with paragraph 21.21(a)(2) of the regulation.
"Casings for the AP1000 Reactor Coolant Pump. The casings have an excess material condition in the transition region between the cast bowl and the suction nozzle. The condition is a discontinuous (non-tangential) axisymmetric feature between the cast bowl region and machined suction nozzle OD. The as-built transition feature on the casings has not been analyzed and is not included in CW-EMD Engineering Memorandum 7242, Revision 1, Volume 1, which is the applicable generic design report for the AP1000 RCP casing and main closure.
"At present, the following domestic deliveries have been made:
- 8 casings have been provided to V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3.
- 8 casings have been provided to Vogtle Units 3 and 4.
"Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission:
Brian W. Eckels, General Manager
Curtiss-Wright Electro-Mechanical Corporation
1000 Wright Way Cheswick, Pa 15024"
* * * UPDATE AT 1238 EDT ON 06/29/17 FROM JAY GARDINER TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
The following update was received via email:
"Curtiss-Wright Electro-Mechanical Corporation (CW-EMD) submitted an interim report concerning a deviation in the AP1000 Reactor Coolant Pump casing via letter EMD-GM-17-02, dated January 12, 2017. This letter updates the status of the investigation.
"1. Extent of condition evaluation has been completed. CW-EMD has confirmed that the discontinuous (non-tangential) axisymmetric feature between the cast bowl region and machined suction nozzle OD is limited (domestically) to the 8 AP1000 RCP casings delivered to V.C. Summer units 2 & 3.
"2. AP1000 RCP casing stress and fatigue supplemental analyses have been performed to assess the excess material condition discovered on the suction nozzle OD. The deviation has been determined to still satisfactorily meet the pressure boundary stress requirements of the ASME Code and can therefore be accepted as-is.
"3. The analysis included generation of a 2D axisymmetric FEA [Finite Element Analysis] of the casing with a bounding representation of the as-built geometry, based on extraction of cross-sectional profiles from the V.C. Summer laser scan data of 2 casings. The 2D FEA was used to determine the stress concentration factor(s) associated with the as-built deviated feature, enabling a fatigue strength reduction factor to be estimated and applied to the existing 3D FEA casing fatigue (nominal design) analysis.
"4. The maximum fatigue usage at the location of the deviation on the casing suction nozzle was conservatively estimated to increase from 0.287 to 0.633. This condition still satisfies the 1.0 usage limit specified in the ASME Code.
"5. Therefore, this deviation does not constitute a substantial safety hazard, and the condition has been determined to be not reportable under the provisions of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 21."
Notified the R2DO(Bartley) and Part 21 Group (via email).
Agreement State
Event Number: 52488
Rep Org: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: ENERGY FUELS RESOURCES, INC.
Region: 4
City: KANAB State: UT
County:
License #: UT1900479
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GWYN GALLOWAY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Licensee: ENERGY FUELS RESOURCES, INC.
Region: 4
City: KANAB State: UT
County:
License #: UT1900479
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GWYN GALLOWAY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 01/13/2017
Notification Time: 15:32 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2017
Event Time: 13:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2017
Notification Time: 15:32 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2017
Event Time: 13:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING BARRELS CONTAINING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
The following report was received from the State of Utah via email:
"DWMRC [Division of Waste Management and Radiation Control] was notified of the event at about 1500 MST, on January 12, 2017. The licensee indicated that the shipper, Honeywell (Converdyne) had notified the NRC and the US DOT. This incident report is the initial notification of the NRC Operations Center from the DWMRC.
"The following description is the initial information received by DWMRC. The information will be updated as the Division obtains more information.
"A van carrying [three] barrels of [solid and wet] radioactive materials was received at the White Mesa Mill. When the employees were unloading the van they realized that a barrel, maybe two, had rusted bottoms and was leaking. Although the bottom of the barrels were not rusted through, they were characterized as 'being soft'. The barrels were on plastic sheeting that should have restricted the leaking materials to the plastic; however, when the barrels were unloaded, the employees noted that there was a hole in the sheeting. When the RSO was informed of the incident and arrived at the van, he noted that there was visible leakage on the girders and the siding of the van. Unfortunately, he was unable to take measurements of the area where the leak occurred to determine the radiation levels. The RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] stated that the van had been pulled in and cleaned prior to any measurements being taken, so the only measurements were taken after the van was cleaned."
* * * UPDATE FROM GWYN GALLOWAY TO JOHN SHOEMAKER, VIA EMAIL, AT 1830 EST ON 1/13/17 * * *
"On January 12, 2017, at approximately 1142 MST, a TAM International van carrying barrels of KOH alternate feed materials from Honeywell International arrived at the White Mesa Mill Scale house. According to Honeywell the materials are basically uranium ore concentrates. The White Mesa employees began unloading the van, but as they began offloading some of the last barrels, they noticed that some of the barrels were leaking. From what they could tell, three barrels were potentially leaking . The barrels were not rusted through, but were 'soft' and allowed liquid contained in the solid materials to leak from the barrel. The material leaked from the barrel onto a plastic sheet; however, the plastic sheet had an opening (rip, tear) through which the material was able to pass. The RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] was notified of the event at about 1300 MST.
"When the RSO reached the van, the employees had completed emptying the van and had 'cleaned' the van. The RSO indicated he was able to see visible evidence that the material had been able to leak from the van, but the area had been cleaned and no valid measurements or samples of the materials leaked from the van were able to be taken. Pictures were taken and from the pictures provided to the Division [Utah Division of Waste Management and Radiation Control], it appears that only a small quantity of liquid material was leaking from the barrels. Because the contents of the barrels are primarily solid and only contain small amounts of liquid and the liquid contents in the barrels were leaking through the bottom of the barrel, through a plastic sheet, across the van floor and out of the van along a girder and the siding, it is likely that only small quantities of materials were leaking from the van. The weather across the nation has been fairly stormy this past week and has included both rain and snow. Because of the rain and snow that has been occurring while the vehicle was traveling to the Mill site, it is likely that any small amounts of materials that leaked from the van were subsequently washed away and diluted. The Mill analyzes each alternate feed stream annually to verify the isotopic content of the alternate feed. At the last verification, the Honeywell KOH material contained, approximately 633,000 mg/kg uranium (about 61% uranium), 39 pCi/g Pb-210, 44.6 pCi/g Ra-226, 358 pCi/g Th-230, and 27 pCi/g Th-232."
This event was also reported by National Response Center to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission , Report # 1168447, on 01/12/17 at 1720 EST.
Utah Event Number: UT170001
The following report was received from the State of Utah via email:
"DWMRC [Division of Waste Management and Radiation Control] was notified of the event at about 1500 MST, on January 12, 2017. The licensee indicated that the shipper, Honeywell (Converdyne) had notified the NRC and the US DOT. This incident report is the initial notification of the NRC Operations Center from the DWMRC.
"The following description is the initial information received by DWMRC. The information will be updated as the Division obtains more information.
"A van carrying [three] barrels of [solid and wet] radioactive materials was received at the White Mesa Mill. When the employees were unloading the van they realized that a barrel, maybe two, had rusted bottoms and was leaking. Although the bottom of the barrels were not rusted through, they were characterized as 'being soft'. The barrels were on plastic sheeting that should have restricted the leaking materials to the plastic; however, when the barrels were unloaded, the employees noted that there was a hole in the sheeting. When the RSO was informed of the incident and arrived at the van, he noted that there was visible leakage on the girders and the siding of the van. Unfortunately, he was unable to take measurements of the area where the leak occurred to determine the radiation levels. The RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] stated that the van had been pulled in and cleaned prior to any measurements being taken, so the only measurements were taken after the van was cleaned."
* * * UPDATE FROM GWYN GALLOWAY TO JOHN SHOEMAKER, VIA EMAIL, AT 1830 EST ON 1/13/17 * * *
"On January 12, 2017, at approximately 1142 MST, a TAM International van carrying barrels of KOH alternate feed materials from Honeywell International arrived at the White Mesa Mill Scale house. According to Honeywell the materials are basically uranium ore concentrates. The White Mesa employees began unloading the van, but as they began offloading some of the last barrels, they noticed that some of the barrels were leaking. From what they could tell, three barrels were potentially leaking . The barrels were not rusted through, but were 'soft' and allowed liquid contained in the solid materials to leak from the barrel. The material leaked from the barrel onto a plastic sheet; however, the plastic sheet had an opening (rip, tear) through which the material was able to pass. The RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] was notified of the event at about 1300 MST.
"When the RSO reached the van, the employees had completed emptying the van and had 'cleaned' the van. The RSO indicated he was able to see visible evidence that the material had been able to leak from the van, but the area had been cleaned and no valid measurements or samples of the materials leaked from the van were able to be taken. Pictures were taken and from the pictures provided to the Division [Utah Division of Waste Management and Radiation Control], it appears that only a small quantity of liquid material was leaking from the barrels. Because the contents of the barrels are primarily solid and only contain small amounts of liquid and the liquid contents in the barrels were leaking through the bottom of the barrel, through a plastic sheet, across the van floor and out of the van along a girder and the siding, it is likely that only small quantities of materials were leaking from the van. The weather across the nation has been fairly stormy this past week and has included both rain and snow. Because of the rain and snow that has been occurring while the vehicle was traveling to the Mill site, it is likely that any small amounts of materials that leaked from the van were subsequently washed away and diluted. The Mill analyzes each alternate feed stream annually to verify the isotopic content of the alternate feed. At the last verification, the Honeywell KOH material contained, approximately 633,000 mg/kg uranium (about 61% uranium), 39 pCi/g Pb-210, 44.6 pCi/g Ra-226, 358 pCi/g Th-230, and 27 pCi/g Th-232."
This event was also reported by National Response Center to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission , Report # 1168447, on 01/12/17 at 1720 EST.
Utah Event Number: UT170001
Agreement State
Event Number: 52507
Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: STOCKYARD MOVIES 8 - QUICK TRIP
Region: 4
City: OMAHA State: NE
County:
License #: GL0336
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MELISSA MCCOWN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Licensee: STOCKYARD MOVIES 8 - QUICK TRIP
Region: 4
City: OMAHA State: NE
County:
License #: GL0336
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MELISSA MCCOWN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 01/23/2017
Notification Time: 15:11 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/23/2017
Notification Time: 15:11 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/23/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JESSE ROLLINS (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
JESSE ROLLINS (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS
The following report was received from the State of Nebraska via email:
"[The licensee] contacted [the Nebraska Office of Radiological Health] on January 12, 2017. The licensee indicated that they purchased the theater from Perkins Delaware, LLC but were not informed of the Tritium exit signs or the related license. The licensee became aware of the signs and the related license when they received the annual renewal and related inventory. The licensee opted to dispose of the signs with SRB technologies. During the packing process, the licensee discovered two signs missing from the inventory and is unable to ascertain when they were lost."
Lost Source Number: 1, Source/Radioactive Material: SEALED SOURCE LUMINOUS, Manufacturer: Isolite, Model Number: 2040, Serial Number: A4N1925, Radionuclide: H-3, 7.5 Ci 277.5 GBq.
Lost Source Number: 2, Source/Radioactive Material: SEALED SOURCE LUMINOUS, Manufacturer: NRD, INC., Model Number: T4001, Serial Number: 61821, H-3, 25 Ci 925 GBq.
Cause: Human Error. Corrective Action: None. The State of Nebraska considers this event to be closed.
Nebraska Item Number: NE170001.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following report was received from the State of Nebraska via email:
"[The licensee] contacted [the Nebraska Office of Radiological Health] on January 12, 2017. The licensee indicated that they purchased the theater from Perkins Delaware, LLC but were not informed of the Tritium exit signs or the related license. The licensee became aware of the signs and the related license when they received the annual renewal and related inventory. The licensee opted to dispose of the signs with SRB technologies. During the packing process, the licensee discovered two signs missing from the inventory and is unable to ascertain when they were lost."
Lost Source Number: 1, Source/Radioactive Material: SEALED SOURCE LUMINOUS, Manufacturer: Isolite, Model Number: 2040, Serial Number: A4N1925, Radionuclide: H-3, 7.5 Ci 277.5 GBq.
Lost Source Number: 2, Source/Radioactive Material: SEALED SOURCE LUMINOUS, Manufacturer: NRD, INC., Model Number: T4001, Serial Number: 61821, H-3, 25 Ci 925 GBq.
Cause: Human Error. Corrective Action: None. The State of Nebraska considers this event to be closed.
Nebraska Item Number: NE170001.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf