Event Notification Report for December 21, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/20/2016 - 12/21/2016
EVENT NUMBERS
524525245352454524555245652466
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52452
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID RENN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID RENN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 12/21/2016
Notification Time: 16:55 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2016
Event Time: 11:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/21/2016
Notification Time: 16:55 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2016
Event Time: 11:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/21/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION - 480V BUS VOLTAGE LOWER THAN ANALYZED
"On October 8, 2016, it was initially discovered that the voltage tap changer settings for the 480V Shutdown Board Transformers 1-XFA-231-TS1A (TS1A) and 1-XFA-231-TS1B (TS1B) were incorrect (4160/480V instead of 3952/480V). This could potentially result in lower than minimum required voltages at the electrically downstream buses and equipment during a postulated loss of coolant accident coincident with design minimum voltage conditions. An initial Licensee Event Report (LER 50-259/2016-004-00) was submitted on December 7, 2016 following the initial review. This LER identified that a supplement would be required pending additional technical evaluation. While comprehensive analysis is not complete, the initial aggregate dynamic loading evaluation does not provide assurance that sufficient voltage would be available for various loading scenarios during postulated accident conditions. This condition was determined to have existed since a Unit 1 Design Change was implemented in 2004.
"This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), as any event or condition that resulted in the nuclear plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"On October 9, 2016, and October 12, 2016. the transformer taps for TS1B and TS1A, respectively, were set in accordance with the applicable drawing, which specify the correct tap settings.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
In October 2016, the licensee validated that this problem did not exist on units two and three.
"On October 8, 2016, it was initially discovered that the voltage tap changer settings for the 480V Shutdown Board Transformers 1-XFA-231-TS1A (TS1A) and 1-XFA-231-TS1B (TS1B) were incorrect (4160/480V instead of 3952/480V). This could potentially result in lower than minimum required voltages at the electrically downstream buses and equipment during a postulated loss of coolant accident coincident with design minimum voltage conditions. An initial Licensee Event Report (LER 50-259/2016-004-00) was submitted on December 7, 2016 following the initial review. This LER identified that a supplement would be required pending additional technical evaluation. While comprehensive analysis is not complete, the initial aggregate dynamic loading evaluation does not provide assurance that sufficient voltage would be available for various loading scenarios during postulated accident conditions. This condition was determined to have existed since a Unit 1 Design Change was implemented in 2004.
"This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), as any event or condition that resulted in the nuclear plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"On October 9, 2016, and October 12, 2016. the transformer taps for TS1B and TS1A, respectively, were set in accordance with the applicable drawing, which specify the correct tap settings.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
In October 2016, the licensee validated that this problem did not exist on units two and three.
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 52453
Rep Org: TERRACON CONSULTANTS, INC.
Licensee: TERRACON CONSULTANTS, INC.
Region: 3
City: CONWAY State: MO
County:
License #: 15-27070-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KATIE GILCHRIST
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: TERRACON CONSULTANTS, INC.
Region: 3
City: CONWAY State: MO
County:
License #: 15-27070-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KATIE GILCHRIST
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 12/21/2016
Notification Time: 16:55 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2016
Event Time: 10:47 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/21/2016
Notification Time: 16:55 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2016
Event Time: 10:47 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/21/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA
TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE DAMAGED
A Troxler moisture density gauge (Model 3440) was damaged when it was struck by an asphalt roller. The source rod was out at the time of the incident but the source was able to be retracted into the shielded position.
The licensee's radiation safety officer surveyed the meter and found no abnormal radiation readings. The gauge was transported back to the licensee's facility for storage awaiting results of the swipe test. Once the swipe test results are returned, the licensee intends to ship the gauge to the vendor for repair or replacement.
The gauge contains Am-241/Be and Cs-137 sources. No personnel overexposures occurred during this incident.
A Troxler moisture density gauge (Model 3440) was damaged when it was struck by an asphalt roller. The source rod was out at the time of the incident but the source was able to be retracted into the shielded position.
The licensee's radiation safety officer surveyed the meter and found no abnormal radiation readings. The gauge was transported back to the licensee's facility for storage awaiting results of the swipe test. Once the swipe test results are returned, the licensee intends to ship the gauge to the vendor for repair or replacement.
The gauge contains Am-241/Be and Cs-137 sources. No personnel overexposures occurred during this incident.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52454
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RON BLENKER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RON BLENKER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 12/21/2016
Notification Time: 18:00 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2016
Event Time: 09:35 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/18/2017
Notification Time: 18:00 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2016
Event Time: 09:35 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/18/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"At 0935 [CST] on 12/21/2016, while performing the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Comprehensive Pump and Valve Tests for post-maintenance testing following scheduled maintenance, the HPCI turbine did not start as expected due to the HPCI turbine stop valve failing to open. This issue is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function at the time of discovery. Investigation into the failure of the HPCI system to start is in progress. The plant remains at 100% power with no challenges to the health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The plant is in a 14-day action statement under LCO 3.5.1, 'ECCS - Operating' due to the HPCI turbine stop valve failure.
The licensee notified the Minnesota State Duty Officer.
* * * RETRACTION FROM KIM HOFFMAN TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1303 EST ON 1/17/18/17 * * *
"On December 21, 2016, the NRC Operations Center was notified of Event Number 52454 that described a failure of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) turbine stop valve to open during post maintenance testing prior to being declared operable. The condition was reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function at the time of discovery. At the time, it was not readily apparent that the failure was due to the maintenance activities. Subsequent return-to-service testing showed the oil system vent and fill had been inadequate following the maintenance. This event occurred as a result of the maintenance process and would not have occurred during normal operation of the system.
''NUREG-1022, Revision 3 states, 'reports are not required when systems are declared inoperable as part of a planned evolution for maintenance or surveillance testing when done in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's TS (unless a condition is discovered that would have resulted in the system being declared inoperable).'
"There was no discovered condition that would have resulted in the safety function of the system being declared inoperable under normal, non-maintenance conditions.
"Based on the above additional information, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant is retracting this report. The plant was in a planned evolution and did not discover a condition that could have prevented performing a safety function.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (McCraw).
"At 0935 [CST] on 12/21/2016, while performing the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Comprehensive Pump and Valve Tests for post-maintenance testing following scheduled maintenance, the HPCI turbine did not start as expected due to the HPCI turbine stop valve failing to open. This issue is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function at the time of discovery. Investigation into the failure of the HPCI system to start is in progress. The plant remains at 100% power with no challenges to the health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The plant is in a 14-day action statement under LCO 3.5.1, 'ECCS - Operating' due to the HPCI turbine stop valve failure.
The licensee notified the Minnesota State Duty Officer.
* * * RETRACTION FROM KIM HOFFMAN TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1303 EST ON 1/17/18/17 * * *
"On December 21, 2016, the NRC Operations Center was notified of Event Number 52454 that described a failure of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) turbine stop valve to open during post maintenance testing prior to being declared operable. The condition was reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function at the time of discovery. At the time, it was not readily apparent that the failure was due to the maintenance activities. Subsequent return-to-service testing showed the oil system vent and fill had been inadequate following the maintenance. This event occurred as a result of the maintenance process and would not have occurred during normal operation of the system.
''NUREG-1022, Revision 3 states, 'reports are not required when systems are declared inoperable as part of a planned evolution for maintenance or surveillance testing when done in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's TS (unless a condition is discovered that would have resulted in the system being declared inoperable).'
"There was no discovered condition that would have resulted in the safety function of the system being declared inoperable under normal, non-maintenance conditions.
"Based on the above additional information, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant is retracting this report. The plant was in a planned evolution and did not discover a condition that could have prevented performing a safety function.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (McCraw).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52455
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MATTHEW BONANNO
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MATTHEW BONANNO
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 12/21/2016
Notification Time: 19:45 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2016
Event Time: 13:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/21/2016
Notification Time: 19:45 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2016
Event Time: 13:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/21/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1DO)
JAMES NOGGLE (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO VALVE FAILURE
"During review of the Limerick future modification list, a concern was raised with a proposed modification for HV-011-015A, ESW [Emergency Service Water] 'A' Discharge to 'B' RHR Service Water Return, which failed to fully close during routine testing.
"As a result of the failure to close, a clearance was applied and a 10CFR50.59 screening was performed to close and de-energize HV-011-015A and open and de-energize valve HV-011-011A, ESW 'A' Discharge to 'A' RHR [Residual Heat Removal] Service Water Return. This clearance isolated one of the two ESW return flow paths so that only one flow path is available to return cooling water flow to the spray pond.
"The 10CFR50.59 screening did not address that fire areas 12 (Unit 1 4kV D13 switch gear room) and 18 (Unit 2 4kV D23 switch gear room) are not in compliance with the existing fire safe shutdown (FSSD) analysis. The FSSD analysis credits both flow paths so that Emergency Service Water can be returned to the spray pond. With only one of the two return flow paths available, a single spurious fire induced valve operation can result in deadheading an ESW pump and starving an operating emergency diesel generator of cooling water. Running the emergency diesel generator with a loss of cooling water will initiate a diesel protective trip on high temperature.
"Compensatory measures are in place for the specific fire areas listed above."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"During review of the Limerick future modification list, a concern was raised with a proposed modification for HV-011-015A, ESW [Emergency Service Water] 'A' Discharge to 'B' RHR Service Water Return, which failed to fully close during routine testing.
"As a result of the failure to close, a clearance was applied and a 10CFR50.59 screening was performed to close and de-energize HV-011-015A and open and de-energize valve HV-011-011A, ESW 'A' Discharge to 'A' RHR [Residual Heat Removal] Service Water Return. This clearance isolated one of the two ESW return flow paths so that only one flow path is available to return cooling water flow to the spray pond.
"The 10CFR50.59 screening did not address that fire areas 12 (Unit 1 4kV D13 switch gear room) and 18 (Unit 2 4kV D23 switch gear room) are not in compliance with the existing fire safe shutdown (FSSD) analysis. The FSSD analysis credits both flow paths so that Emergency Service Water can be returned to the spray pond. With only one of the two return flow paths available, a single spurious fire induced valve operation can result in deadheading an ESW pump and starving an operating emergency diesel generator of cooling water. Running the emergency diesel generator with a loss of cooling water will initiate a diesel protective trip on high temperature.
"Compensatory measures are in place for the specific fire areas listed above."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52456
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BUD HINCKLEY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BUD HINCKLEY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 12/22/2016
Notification Time: 05:45 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2016
Event Time: 23:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2017
Notification Time: 05:45 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2016
Event Time: 23:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS DECLARED INOPERABLE
"With D.C. Cook Unit 1 in Mode 1 and 100 percent power and Unit 2 in Mode 4 during a refueling outage, the following emergency diesel generators (EDGs) were declared inoperable due to a discovered design and manufacturing issue involving some of the diesel fuel pumps/injectors in each of the following EDGs:
"Unit 1 CD (Train A) EDG, Unit 2 AB (Train B) EDG, and Unit 2 CD (Train A) EDG
"Due to both Unit 2 EDGs being inoperable, Unit 2 is required to be in Mode 5 by 1300 [EST] on 12/23/16. Unit 1 is required to restore its emergency diesel generator within 14 days (by 2300 [EST] on 1/04/17).
"In connection with both trains of Unit 2 EDGs being inoperable, this is being reported as an 8-hour report pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as loss of safety function in connection with mitigating the consequences of an accident.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
Unit 1 maintenance will be prioritized over Unit 2 and Unit 2 will most likely proceed to Mode 5.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1406 EDT ON 5/22/17 FROM RODNEY PICKARD TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
"The condition reported in ENS 52456 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) has been evaluated, and determined not to be a loss of safety function in connection with mitigating the consequences of an accident, and is being retracted.
"With D.C. Cook Unit 1 in Mode 1 and 100% power and Unit 2 in Mode 4 during a refueling outage, the following Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) were declared inoperable due to a discovered design and manufacturing issue involving some of the diesel fuel pumps/injectors in each of the following EDGs: Unit 1 CD (Train A) EDG, Unit 2 AB (Train B) EDG, and Unit 2 CD (Train A) EDG.
"Subsequent endurance testing was performed on selected Delivery Valve Holders (DVH), which were the affected components of the diesel fuel pumps/injectors, to evaluate the expected degradation of the DVHs during the EDG mission. This testing determined that the identified design and manufacturing issue would not have prevented the EDGs from performing their intended safety functions. Therefore, all EDGs were OPERABLE and did not result in a loss of safety function in connection with mitigating the consequences of an accident.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction."
Notified the R3DO (Kunowski).
"With D.C. Cook Unit 1 in Mode 1 and 100 percent power and Unit 2 in Mode 4 during a refueling outage, the following emergency diesel generators (EDGs) were declared inoperable due to a discovered design and manufacturing issue involving some of the diesel fuel pumps/injectors in each of the following EDGs:
"Unit 1 CD (Train A) EDG, Unit 2 AB (Train B) EDG, and Unit 2 CD (Train A) EDG
"Due to both Unit 2 EDGs being inoperable, Unit 2 is required to be in Mode 5 by 1300 [EST] on 12/23/16. Unit 1 is required to restore its emergency diesel generator within 14 days (by 2300 [EST] on 1/04/17).
"In connection with both trains of Unit 2 EDGs being inoperable, this is being reported as an 8-hour report pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as loss of safety function in connection with mitigating the consequences of an accident.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
Unit 1 maintenance will be prioritized over Unit 2 and Unit 2 will most likely proceed to Mode 5.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1406 EDT ON 5/22/17 FROM RODNEY PICKARD TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
"The condition reported in ENS 52456 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) has been evaluated, and determined not to be a loss of safety function in connection with mitigating the consequences of an accident, and is being retracted.
"With D.C. Cook Unit 1 in Mode 1 and 100% power and Unit 2 in Mode 4 during a refueling outage, the following Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) were declared inoperable due to a discovered design and manufacturing issue involving some of the diesel fuel pumps/injectors in each of the following EDGs: Unit 1 CD (Train A) EDG, Unit 2 AB (Train B) EDG, and Unit 2 CD (Train A) EDG.
"Subsequent endurance testing was performed on selected Delivery Valve Holders (DVH), which were the affected components of the diesel fuel pumps/injectors, to evaluate the expected degradation of the DVHs during the EDG mission. This testing determined that the identified design and manufacturing issue would not have prevented the EDGs from performing their intended safety functions. Therefore, all EDGs were OPERABLE and did not result in a loss of safety function in connection with mitigating the consequences of an accident.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction."
Notified the R3DO (Kunowski).
Part 21
Event Number: 52466
Rep Org: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM HORNER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM HORNER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 12/29/2016
Notification Time: 16:54 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/04/2020
Notification Time: 16:54 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/04/2020
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - Defects And Noncompliance
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - Defects And Noncompliance
Person (Organization):
STEVE ROSE (R2DO)
MARK JEFFERS (R3DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTORS (EMAIL)
STEVE ROSE (R2DO)
MARK JEFFERS (R3DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTORS (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 12/7/2020
EN Revision Text: PART 21 - ISSUES IDENTIFIED WITH THE ENTERPRISE DIESEL ENGINE SUBCOVER
The following information is excerpted from a facsimile report submitted:
"Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) began a 10 CFR 21 evaluation on November 18, 2016 upon notification of an issue with a subcover assembly at Perry Nuclear Plant. Attempts to install the subcover on their Enterprise diesel engine revealed two issues that prevented successful installation. First, one of the bolt holes was not fully machined through the entire depth of the subcover. Though the bolt could be inserted into the top of its corresponding hole, it would not pass completely through. The second issue was an interference between the rocker arm shaft and its mating pedestal. It was found that incomplete machining of the pedestal prevented the shaft from sitting flat on the pedestal.
"The evaluation was concluded on 12/21/16 and it was determined that this issue is a reportable defect as defined by 10 CFR 21."
The affected facilities are:
First Energy - Perry
Georgia Power - Vogtle
Also listed was the following affected facility:
Korea - Yonggwang
Component: Subcover Assembly, P/N 1A-7846
* * * UPDATE ON 12/4/20 AT 1435 EST FROM DAN ROBERTS TO THOMAS KENDZIA * * *
The following is the summary of a facsimile:
Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) determined that in addition part number 03-362-04-AH was affected by this defect. Two of these parts were supplied to Commanche Peak with an ESI certification date of 8/6/2014.
Notified R4DO (Gepford) and Part 21 Reactors Group (email).
EN Revision Text: PART 21 - ISSUES IDENTIFIED WITH THE ENTERPRISE DIESEL ENGINE SUBCOVER
The following information is excerpted from a facsimile report submitted:
"Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) began a 10 CFR 21 evaluation on November 18, 2016 upon notification of an issue with a subcover assembly at Perry Nuclear Plant. Attempts to install the subcover on their Enterprise diesel engine revealed two issues that prevented successful installation. First, one of the bolt holes was not fully machined through the entire depth of the subcover. Though the bolt could be inserted into the top of its corresponding hole, it would not pass completely through. The second issue was an interference between the rocker arm shaft and its mating pedestal. It was found that incomplete machining of the pedestal prevented the shaft from sitting flat on the pedestal.
"The evaluation was concluded on 12/21/16 and it was determined that this issue is a reportable defect as defined by 10 CFR 21."
The affected facilities are:
First Energy - Perry
Georgia Power - Vogtle
Also listed was the following affected facility:
Korea - Yonggwang
Component: Subcover Assembly, P/N 1A-7846
* * * UPDATE ON 12/4/20 AT 1435 EST FROM DAN ROBERTS TO THOMAS KENDZIA * * *
The following is the summary of a facsimile:
Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) determined that in addition part number 03-362-04-AH was affected by this defect. Two of these parts were supplied to Commanche Peak with an ESI certification date of 8/6/2014.
Notified R4DO (Gepford) and Part 21 Reactors Group (email).