Event Notification Report for December 15, 2016

ALERT DECLARED - CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF AN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.

"During a scheduled surveillance test run of the PVNGS [Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station] Unit 3 'B' Train Emergency Diesel Generator, there was a catastrophic failure of a piston to include crankcase damage and diesel trip. The Emergency Plan has been entered and an ALERT was declared at 0410 [MST] on 12/15/16 based on an explosion resulting in visible damage to a safety system required for safe shutdown. The cause of the failure is unknown at this time. PVNGS Fire Department responded and no fire was observed. Unit 3 remains on line at 100% power. No other safety functions are impacted."

No personnel injuries occurred. The unit is in a ten day technical specification on an emergency diesel generator being inoperable.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified DHS, DOE, EPA, FEMA, NICC, USDA, HHS, FDA, NSSA, Mexico, and OIP (Skeen).

* * * UPDATE AT 0947 EST ON 12/15/2016 FROM MICHAEL GOODRICH TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"This serves as the notification of the termination of Alert HA2.1 declared at 0410 MST at Palo Verde Nuclear Generation Station. The event terminated at 0636 MST."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R4DO (Keller), NRR EO (Miller), IRD (Stapleton), DHS, DOE, EPA, FEMA, NICC, USDA, HHS, FDA, NSSA, Mexico, and OIP (Skeen).

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT MOMENTARY LOW PRESSURE

"On December 15, 2016, at 1010 EST, the startup of the Reactor Building HVAC [Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning] system resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met for approximately 1 second. The maximum secondary containment pressure observed during that time was approximately 0.044 inches of vacuum water gauge.

"Secondary containment pressure was returned to within the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4. 1.1) by Reactor Building HVAC and Standby Gas Treatment System already in operation. There were no radiological releases associated with this event.

"Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

* * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

"In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below.

"The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.'

"In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event.

"In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO (Stoedter).

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION MADE FOR POTENTIAL FUEL OIL LEAKAGE

"On 12/14/16 at 1206 [EST], 0-PT-89.9K (underground fuel-oil piping pressure test), was performed UNSAT after a failed attempt to maintain pressure in the supply line to the Unit 2 'H' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Day Tank. The exact source of the leakage is unknown at this time but is reasonable to believe some fuel oil was released underground. The associated Fuel Oil line is currently tagged out and isolated. This condition is reportable to the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality [VA DEQ] as part of the Underground Storage Tank Program. Pressure tasting of the other EDG fuel oil supply lines has been previously completed satisfactorily. The 2H EDG remains Operable as the redundant fuel oil transfer pump and its fuel oil piping are Operable and capable of maintaining adequate day tank level. The VA DEQ was notified of this condition
at 1130 [EST] on 12/15/16.

"This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) for 'Any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.'"

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify Louisa County.

* * * UPDATE ON 12/28/16 AT 1659 EST FROM JAY LEBERSTIEN TO DONG PARK * * *

"This is a follow-up report to Event Number 52438, made on 12/15/2016, regarding offsite notification to the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality for potential fuel oil leakage from the supply line to the Unit 2H Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Day Tank.

"During investigation of the potential fuel oil leak from the 2HB EDG Day Tank supply line (as previously reported in EN 52438), the 2HA fuel oil line, which runs close to the 2HB line, was disturbed and began to leak a mist of fuel oil. The fuel oil was contained in the area and was being cleaned via vacuum truck as it was leaking. Personnel at the scene noted the soil was not contaminated with fuel oil initially and saw the leak start on 2HA line. It has been estimated that less than one gallon of fuel oil was released to the surrounding soil during troubleshooting of the leak. The fuel oil was immediately vacuumed. The 2HA line was isolated and the leakage was stopped. The 2HA line is to be repaired and tested. The 2H EDG remains available, however, it is considered inoperable at this time. Investigation of the 2HB fuel oil line continues.

"The condition of the 2HA fuel oil line was reported to the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality [VA DEQ] as part of the Underground Storage Tank Program on 12/28/16. Therefore, this event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) for 'Any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.'

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify Louisa County."

Notified R2DO (Rose).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE DISCONNECT

The following was received from the State of Texas via email:

"On December 15, 2016, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] received notice that the licensee had retrieved a source disconnected via a broken drive cable. The camera was an 880 Delta with a 135 curie iridium-192 source. The retrieval agent received an estimated 113 mRem to the whole body and 1 Rem to the hands for the procedure. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident #: I - 9450

60 DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION FOR AN INVALID CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION ACTUATION

"This 60 day telephone notification is being submitted in accordance with paragraphs 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to report an Invalid Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI) actuation at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2.

"On December 15, 2016 at 1332 Eastern Standard Time (EST), Unit 2 maintenance personnel were preparing to perform a breaker swap for the normal feed to the 2B1B C and A vent board. When the power was removed from Radiation Monitor 2-RM-90-131, the B Train master isolation signal status panel was unexpectedly lit for CVI. The only automatic action observed from the containment isolation status panel was that 2-FCV-30-037, Lower Compartment Purge Control valve, went closed. The loss of power to 2-RM-90-131 de-energized the relay associated with the high radiation setpoint, resulting in an invalid Train B CVI actuation.

"During this event, the train B CVI actuation was complete and equipment functioned as designed. Upon identification of the Train B CVI, maintenance activities were halted and a prompt investigation was initiated. WBN found that the work order to perform the breaker swap was planned to lift leads to disable actuation of CVI. The work order lifted the lead for the K622 relay, which was insufficient to prevent the actuation. Two other leads on relays should have been lifted to prevent the actuation in Mode 1. A contributor to this error was that this work had been rescheduled several times prior to actual performance. From the time it was planned to the actual performance, mode changes had been performed on the Unit and no further reviews were performed.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

REMOVABLE CONTAMINATION IDENTIFIED IN VAULT

At 1300 CST on December 15, 2016, during a survey, removable contamination above 1000 dpm was identified in a normally controlled and restricted area. Access was restricted to the area, the area was roped off and a decontamination team was assigned to decontaminate the area. Additional surveys were conducted outside the area identified and no additional areas were found to be contaminated. The licensee reported that the initial investigation indicates that none of the individuals who had access were contaminated or accessed the area.

The cause of the contamination is still under investigation.

* * * RETRACTION AT 1755 EST ON 1/4/2017 FROM MICHAEL GRAY TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The following retraction was received via e-mail:

"Since the notification, we have confirmed the source of contamination as cracked vial containing cobalt-60. Calculations of the current activity of the source and associated exposure levels were sent to NRC Region III. We also determined that total amount of cobalt-60 involved was less than the annual limit on intake (ALI) for ingestion.

"Mr. Zahid M. Sulaiman, Health Physicist, NRC Region III, called today to confirm:
(a) they verified our calculations on activity and exposure levels
(b) the amount of radioactive material involved does not exceed the ALI for ingestion
(c) this is not a reportable event and to notify NRC Operations Center of their decision."

Notified the R3DO (Daley) and NMSS (via e-mail).