Event Notification Report for December 13, 2016

NON-PERFORMANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE ITEM RELIED ON FOR SAFETY

"On 12/13/2016 at approximately 1500 [PST], the AREVA Nuclear Criticality Safety Staff was notified that an administrative IROFS [Item Relied On For Safety] control had not been performed in the ELO raffinate treatment process. The ELO raffinate treatment process requires the sampling of a favorable geometry process tank (IROFS 306) that is discharged to one of two sets of favorable geometry quarantine tanks. When one of the two sets of quarantine tanks is full, the input is diverted to the other set of tanks and the set that is full is recirculated and sampled for U [Uranium] concentration (IROFS 307). When both sample results have been confirmed to be acceptable the discharge valve on the transfer line may be unlocked and the raffinate solution transferred to a filter press. Sampling of the process tank was completed as required, however; the quarantine tank transfer line was unlocked and contents were pumped to the filter press without completing the required independent sampling of the quarantine tank. AREVA is conservatively reporting this plant condition under 10CFR70 Appendix A, because an accident sequence that could result in accidental nuclear criticality may not have remained highly unlikely in the absence of IROFS 307."

The licensee will notify NRC Region 2.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED DENSITY GAUGE

The following report was received from the State of California via email:

On December 13, 2016, the RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] of Cal Land Engineering, contacted the RHB [California Radiologic Health Branch] at the Brea, CA office about a gauge that had been run over. The gauge was a CPN MC-3, S/N M310706239 (10 mCi Cs-137, 50 mCi Am:Be-241). The gauge operator had removed the gauge from it's transport case, but had not set up or used the gauge at the site (the Cs-137 source was still in the shielded position). The operator then stepped away from the gauge to answer his cell phone. While the operator was on the phone, a pickup truck backed into the gauge. The gauge body remained intact, but the guide tube and source rod had been sheared off the body of the gauge. After the incident, the area was isolated and the operator contacted the RSO, who then contacted RHB. Pictures were provided by the gauge operator and forwarded to RHB for review. After the pictures confirmed that the gauge body was intact, the RHB inspector authorized the operator to place the gauge in the storage case, secure it for transport, and then return the gauge to their [licensee's] office.

An RHB inspector met the operator at their office to inspect the gauge. A Canberra Inspector 1000 with the LaBr (IPROL-1) and neutron (IPRON-N) probes was used to verify the sources remained in the gauge. The Cs-137 source was identified by the Inspector 1000 and a neutron dose of 20 counts per second (with a background of 0 counts per second) confirmed the Am:Be-241 source was present. A Victoreen 450 CHP was used to survey the gauge. The contact dose rate was 20 mR/hr (background 0.01 mR/hr), which is consistent for an MC-3 gauge. The gauge will remain in storage until disposal can be arranged. Maurer Technical Services will be used to assist in the disposal.

California 5010 number: 121316

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION - WATER CONTAINING TRITIUM SPILLED INTO STORM DRAIN

"On 12/13/16 at 1410 [EST], the following voluntary communication was made to the State of Tennessee in accordance with Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) guidance for communicating inadvertent radiological spills/leaks that are below regulatory reporting requirements to outside agencies and in alignment with NEI 07-07, 'Industry Ground Water Protection Initiative'.

"On 12/12/16, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant determined that a spill of greater than 100 gallons (approximately 3000 gallons) of condensate storage tank water with tritium levels of 1560 pCi/L [picocuries per liter] was spilled to a yard drain. The spill occurred on 12/5/16, during the filling of the Unit 1 #4 steam generator when a hose connection on a temporary fill skid failed. No elevated tritium levels have been detected at the Sequoyah Yard Drainage Pond before or after the event.

"This is reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi), the required reportable threshold for tritium is 20,000 pCi/L."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.