Event Notification Report for December 08, 2016

TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE DAMAGED BY PAVING EQUIPMENT

While preparing to conduct a measurement, the gauge operator placed the gauge on the asphalt. A paving roller operator did not see the gauge and ran it over.

At the time of the accident, the source was in its shielded and locked position. While the case and controls of the gauge were damaged, there was no damage to the source or the shield. As a precaution, the Radiation Safety Officer contacted the local hazmat team to confirm the source was not damaged. A leak check swipe was performed by the gauge owner and it was sent to Troxler for evaluation. There were no overexposures to the workers or members of the public.

The gauge is a Troxler model 3430 (serial number 37669). It contains a 9 mCi Cs-137 source (serial number 77-4904) and a 44 mCi AmBe source (serial number 78-2427). The gauge will be returned to Troxler for disposal.

* * * UPDATE FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY (DANIEL RICE) TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1544 EST ON 12/12/16 * * *

The licensee also reported the event to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) at 1630 EST on 12/9/16. Additional information included:

"The license reported the gauge user was nearby, but not in direct observation of the device, at the time of the incident.

"NJDEP will be investigating further. The incident is reportable within 24-hours under N.J.A.C. 7:28-51.1 (10 CFR 30.50(b)2). NJDEP is tracking this incident internally as incident ID# C62454. NMED Report No. to be assigned."

Notified R1DO (Schroeder) and NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION Resource, both via email.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGN

The following report was received via e-mail:

"During an annual inventory review, the licensee discovered a tritium exit sign was missing/lost. The licensee notified our office [Nebraska Office of Radiological Health] via phone call on 12/8/16 and followed it up with an e-mail the same day. The licensee stated there has been new construction in the area and assumes the sign went missing during this time."

Manufacturer: Safety Light Corp
Model: 880-12-6R-20
Source Activity: 11.5 Ci

Nebraska Event: NE160003

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

HPCI SURVEILLANCE FAILURE

"On 12/08/16 at approximately 2237 [EST], the Unit 2 HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] system failed to meet surveillance testing requirements for achieving rated flow at greater than or equal to a minimum test pressure established per the surveillance. Operations declared the HPCI system inoperable and entered Technical Specification 3.5.1 Condition C for HPCI being inoperable. Other standby systems (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling and low pressure emergency core cooling systems) are operable.

"HPCI is a single train system. Therefore, per NUREG-1022, this condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system required to mitigate the consequences of a design event.

"This condition has been entered into the Corrective Action program (IR 3951006). Investigation of the exact failure condition is in progress so that repairs can be made."

At the surveillance flow of 5,000 gpm, the system was approximately 80 psi below the required pressure of 1,278 psi.

Technical Specification 3.5.1, Condition C, is a 14-day Limiting Condition of Operation.

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.

* * * RETRACTION AT 1440 EST ON 01/19/17 FROM ELMER KAUFFMAN TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee provided the following information as the basis for retracting this report:

"This is a retraction of an event notification made on 12/09/16 at 0529 EST (EN #52419). This event was initially reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that, at the time of discovery, was believed to have prevented the fulfillment of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system safety function.

"On 12/08/16 at 2237 EST, the Unit 2 HPCI system was declared inoperable due to failing to meet surveillance testing requirements for achieving rated flow at greater than or equal to a minimum test pressure established per the surveillance. Prompt troubleshooting was performed and it was determined that an adjustment to the HPCI turbine governor control system was required. This adjustment was performed and HPCI was returned to an operable status on 12/09/16.

"Subsequent to this occurrence, Engineering has completed an evaluation that concluded that HPCI was capable of fulfilling its safety function and that the associated Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.5.1.8 was met. The evaluation concluded that HPCI was degraded, but met the threshold for TS operability.

"The NRC Senior Resident has been informed of this retraction."

Notified R1DO (Kennedy).

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO FAILED AIR INTAKE FAN

"This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility.

"A condition impacting functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System was discovered on December 8, 2016, at 1330 [EST]. The issue involved a loss of the ability to maintain habitability of the TSC due to a failed outside air intake fan. The repair of the equipment failure is currently being planned.

"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The secondary TSC has been notified that relocation may be necessary upon facility activation. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."