Event Notification Report for December 07, 2016

RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA LOST WHEN BARGE SANK IN BERING SEA

At approximately 1030 EST, a QSA 880 industrial radiography camera containing an Ir-192 source of approximately 26.3 Ci (source serial number - 32186G) was lost when the barge named Exito sank in the Bering Sea outside Dutch Harbor, Alaska. The ship was in transit and the camera was stored in a pelican case and not in use, with the source in the protected position. There were no unintended exposures to individuals. The licensee has notified the local area Coast Guard command.

Notified the following Federal Agencies: DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DOE Ops Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, EPA EOC. Notified the following Federal Agencies via email only: FDA EOC, Nuclear SSA, FEMA National Watch Center, and DNDO-JAC.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 2" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

DISCOVERY OF NON-CONFORMING CONDITIONS DURING TORNADO HAZARDS ANALYSIS

"During the evaluation of tornado missile vulnerabilities and the potential impacts to Technical Specification (TS) plant equipment, it was concluded that the following SSCs [systems, structures, and components] were vulnerable to tornado generated missiles.

"The Service Water Intake Structure (SWIS) intake and exhaust ventilation hoods, located on the roof of the SWIS, are not adequately protected from missiles generated by a tornado. Should a tornado-generated missile strike the SWIS intake and exhaust ventilation hoods, the hoods could crimp thus reducing air flow and challenging the performance of their heating and cooling safety functions. If the intake hoods were damaged or removed due to a missile strike, entry of rainwater could occur due to severe weather high wind velocity, and could affect safety related electrical equipment in the rooms directly below the hoods. These potential conditions could render Service Water trains inoperable on either or both units.

"This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"This condition is being addressed in accordance with EGM-15-002 and DSS-ISG-2016-01 (enforcement discretion and interim guidance documents). Required actions have been taken. Corrective actions will be documented in a follow up licensee event report.

"The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified."

The licensee is evaluating the operability of the service water system. Should one train be declared inoperable, the licensee would be in a 72 hr. LCO action statement. If both trains are inoperable, then the licensee would enter T.S. 3.0.3.

UNISOLABLE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BOUNDARY LEAKAGE

"While TMI [Three Mile Island] Unit 1 was in a hot shutdown condition, leakage was identified coming from an RCS [reactor coolant system] pressure boundary on a welded connection on the 'A' Reactor Coolant Pump. The leakage is unisolable from the RCS and is less than 0.5 gpm. Planned actions are to cooldown Unit 1 to cold shutdown conditions in order to repair the leakage."

The licensee will be notifying the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency and has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

CONTROL ROOM FAN SWITCH MIS-POSITIONED

"At 2240 [CST], December 16, 2016, it was identified that HV-SW-(SF-C-1A)(CS), control switch for supply fan SF-C-1A for HV-FAN-(SF-C-1A), main control room A/C unit supply fan had been inadvertently been placed to OFF, leaving no supply fan running as required to maintain CREFS [Control Room Emergency Filtration System] operable. This was discovered following the performance of 6.1HV.302 Essential Control Building Ventilation Functional Test (DIV 1).

"It is estimated that the control switch was placed in OFF at approximately 2220 during preparation of 6.1HV.302 per S.O.P. 2.2.38. Time of discovery was 2240. This resulted in an unplanned LCO entry for the CREFS. CREFS was subsequently declared inoperable and LCO 3.7.4 Condition A was entered, with required action A.1 to restore CREFS to operable status within 7 days. The switch was restored to its required position at 2247 and CREFS was subsequently declared operable and the referenced LCO was exited.

"CR-CNS-2016-08744 was written to document the unplanned inoperability."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

SURFACE CONTAMINATION INSIDE HIGH DOSE RATE AFTERLOADER

On 12/7/16 at approximately 1030 MST, surface contamination was discovered on the interior of a High Dose Rate (HDR) afterloader. The contamination is limited to the inside of the housing and the interior portions of the transfer cables. The contamination was discovered by the manufacturer when the manufacturer was replacing the Ir-192 seeds used by the afterloader. Direct radiation readings could not be taken due to the proximity to the sources. Wipes were observed at 200 to 4000 counts per minute. There was no observed damage to the sources. There was no contamination of personnel. The room has been secured. The resolution planned is for the manufacturer to replace the afterloader.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CANCER TREATMENT DOSE LESS THAN PRESCRIBED

The following was received from the state of Ohio via e-mail:

"On 12/9/16, the licensee reported a medical event that occurred on 12/7/16 and was discovered on 12/8/16. During a prostate seed implant procedure, the patient received a dose that was 30.57% less than the prescribed dose. The patient was informed and the physician is evaluating if a boost will be administered. The patient is not expected to have any adverse affects."

Ohio report: OH160010.

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.