Event Notification Report for November 19, 2016

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FAILURE OF SOURCE TO RETRACT

The following information was received via E-mail:

"On November 21, 2016, the licensee notified the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that on November 19, 2016, one of its radiography crews had been unable to retract an iridium-192 source back into a Spec 150 radiography exposure device (camera).

"Following their third exposure on a pipeline inspection at a temporary job site [near Mentone, Texas], one of the radiographers retracted the source and went to the camera to disconnect the guide tube. The 6-foot guide tube was laying over the top of the pipe they had been inspecting and the collimator was on the opposite side from the radiographer. When he disconnected the guide tube, the collimator was pulled to the top of the pipe. The radiographer's alarming rate meter sounded and his survey meter went off-scale. He left the area, monitored the 2 mR/hr boundary and called the site radiation safety officer (SRSO).

"The SRSO, on the license to perform retrievals, responded and retrieved the source. The control cable was found to be broken approximately one inch from the connector and the licensee suspects the automatic securing mechanism malfunctioned. The device and control assembly have been sent to the manufacturer for evaluation/repair.

"The radiographer's pocket dosimeter had a reading of 80 mR. The other radiographer had a reading of 10 mR on his pocket dosimeter. The SRSO had the following readings on pocket dosimeters located on his chest and taped to the backs of his hands: chest 131 mR; right hand 163 mR; and, left hand 167 mR. Their dosimetry badges have been sent for emergency processing. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300.

"Device: SPEC 150 SN: 1845

"Source: Iridium-192, 66 curies, SPEC G-60, SN: XI-0909"

Texas Incident #: I-9443

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GUAGE

The following information was received via E-mail:

"On Saturday at 2300 CST, the licensee's radiation safety officer called the Agency [Illinois Emergency Management Agency] to report that a vehicle carrying a moisture density gauge had been stolen. The theft had occurred around 1800 [CST] that evening while the truck was in Chicago, IL. It was reported that, at the time of the theft, the gauge was secured in the truck in accordance with the 'two lock' rule within a toolbox. The operator indicated that after he started the truck, he realized he had left his cell phone in the house and gone in to retrieve it without turning off the truck. When he returned, the truck was already being driven off down the street. The Chicago Police Department has been contacted about the theft and are aware that the gauge was present in the vehicle as well as several other company issued tools. Given the manner of the theft, it is not believed the device with radioactive sources was targeted for the theft, but that it was a theft of opportunity."

Troxler model: 3440
Serial number: 15107
Chicago Police report: HZ522208

Illinois event: IL16013

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION NOT MET

"On November 19, 2016, starting at 2150 EST, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met numerous times. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second for each instance.

"All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. At 0430 EST, high wind conditions have subsided and secondary containment vacuum was greater than the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) and steady, and the LCO was exited. There were no radiological releases associated with this event.

"Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."


* * * UPDATE ON 11/20/16 AT 1416 EST FROM BRETT JEBBIA TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

"On November 20, 2016, starting at 0654 EST, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met on multiple different occasions as of event notification update time. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second for each instance.

"Fermi 2 continues to remain in a gale force wind advisory for the local area of Lake Erie.

"All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. There were no radiological releases associated with this event.

"Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

The R3DO (Jeffers) has been notified.


* * * UPDATE ON 11/20/16 AT 2104 FROM GREG MILLER TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

"On November 20, 2016, at 1426 EST, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second.

"The Fermi 2 local area of Lake Erie is no longer in a gale force wind advisory and the high wind conditions have subsided.

"All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. There were no radiological releases associated with this event.

"Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

The R3DO (Jeffers) has been notified.

* * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

"In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below.

"The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.'

"In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event.

"In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO (Stoedter)