Event Notification Report for November 16, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/15/2016 - 11/16/2016
EVENT NUMBERS
5237652368523695237052371523725237352464
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Agreement State
Event Number: 52376
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: MOUNT AUBURN HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: CAMBRIDGE State: MA
County:
License #: 44-0017
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSHUA DAEHLER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Licensee: MOUNT AUBURN HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: CAMBRIDGE State: MA
County:
License #: 44-0017
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSHUA DAEHLER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 11/18/2016
Notification Time: 12:22 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2016
Event Time: 09:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2017
Notification Time: 12:22 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2016
Event Time: 09:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BRICE BICKETT (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (E-MA)
BRICE BICKETT (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (E-MA)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL RADIATION TREATMENT OVERDOSE
The following information was received via E-mail:
"The licensee reported on November 17, 2016 that the licensee administered on November 16, 2016 to a patient a first fraction dose of 1100 centigray to the vagina instead of the prescribed first fraction dose of 600 centigray to the vagina.
"This dose was the first of three fractionated doses, the second and third fractionated doses have not yet been administered. Each fractionated dose was prescribed to be 600 centigray for a total dose of 18 gray (1,800 centigray).
"The licensee used a Varian Medical Systems, Inc. GammaMed plus iX High Dose Rate (HDR) remote afterloader unit containing 7 curies of iridium-192 to deliver the dose.
"This is a reportable medical event in accordance with 105 CMR 120.594(A)(1)(a)3.
"The licensee reported that the patient and the referring physician have been notified and that no harmful effect to the patient has been reported.
"The licensee reported that the event occurred because the physician's plan was not performed as prescribed in the written directive and that no other cause was known at time of report.
"The Agency (Massachusetts Radiation Control Program) Director requested the licensee to cease HDR use until a corrective action to prevent recurrence has been implemented.
"The Agency plans to perform a special inspection and considers this event to be open."
* * * RETRACTION FROM JOSHUA DAEHLER TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1506 EST ON 01/12/17 * * *
"The Agency is retracting this medical event. This is not a reportable event.
"Based upon inspection/review by the Agency with the licensee, it was determined that each of the three fractions was actually prescribed to be 700 centigray for a total dose of 2,100 centigray to the vagina. The first fraction dose of 700 centigray was successfully administered to the vagina. The two additional fraction doses of 700 centigray each were also successfully administered to the vagina. The licensee prematurely reported the issue without having all the facts and without review by the RSO. Subsequently to review of information available to the licensee it was determined no reportable event occurred."
Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis) and NMSS_Events_Notification via email.
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
The following information was received via E-mail:
"The licensee reported on November 17, 2016 that the licensee administered on November 16, 2016 to a patient a first fraction dose of 1100 centigray to the vagina instead of the prescribed first fraction dose of 600 centigray to the vagina.
"This dose was the first of three fractionated doses, the second and third fractionated doses have not yet been administered. Each fractionated dose was prescribed to be 600 centigray for a total dose of 18 gray (1,800 centigray).
"The licensee used a Varian Medical Systems, Inc. GammaMed plus iX High Dose Rate (HDR) remote afterloader unit containing 7 curies of iridium-192 to deliver the dose.
"This is a reportable medical event in accordance with 105 CMR 120.594(A)(1)(a)3.
"The licensee reported that the patient and the referring physician have been notified and that no harmful effect to the patient has been reported.
"The licensee reported that the event occurred because the physician's plan was not performed as prescribed in the written directive and that no other cause was known at time of report.
"The Agency (Massachusetts Radiation Control Program) Director requested the licensee to cease HDR use until a corrective action to prevent recurrence has been implemented.
"The Agency plans to perform a special inspection and considers this event to be open."
* * * RETRACTION FROM JOSHUA DAEHLER TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1506 EST ON 01/12/17 * * *
"The Agency is retracting this medical event. This is not a reportable event.
"Based upon inspection/review by the Agency with the licensee, it was determined that each of the three fractions was actually prescribed to be 700 centigray for a total dose of 2,100 centigray to the vagina. The first fraction dose of 700 centigray was successfully administered to the vagina. The two additional fraction doses of 700 centigray each were also successfully administered to the vagina. The licensee prematurely reported the issue without having all the facts and without review by the RSO. Subsequently to review of information available to the licensee it was determined no reportable event occurred."
Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis) and NMSS_Events_Notification via email.
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52368
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: TOM DALE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: TOM DALE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 11/16/2016
Notification Time: 14:32 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2016
Event Time: 10:10 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2016
Notification Time: 14:32 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2016
Event Time: 10:10 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INADVERTENT ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY SIRENS AND NEWS RELEASE DURING EMERGENCY PLANNING EXERCISE
"On November 16, 2016 at approximately 1010 CST, a local government agency (Whiteside County, Illinois) inadvertently activated emergency response sirens for less than one minute. The inadvertent actuation occurred during the scheduled Quad Cities Station emergency planning graded exercise while local government agencies were participating.
"A related news release and radio message was subsequently issued by Whiteside County to report that Whiteside County was participating in a drill in coordination with the Quad Cities Exelon Generating Station that the emergency response sirens were inadvertently activated, and that there is no emergency at this time and no action is required.
"There was no impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event as the offsite response capabilities remain functional. The site is operating normally with no emergency conditions present.
"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), as an inadvertent activation of emergency response sirens and news release.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"On November 16, 2016 at approximately 1010 CST, a local government agency (Whiteside County, Illinois) inadvertently activated emergency response sirens for less than one minute. The inadvertent actuation occurred during the scheduled Quad Cities Station emergency planning graded exercise while local government agencies were participating.
"A related news release and radio message was subsequently issued by Whiteside County to report that Whiteside County was participating in a drill in coordination with the Quad Cities Exelon Generating Station that the emergency response sirens were inadvertently activated, and that there is no emergency at this time and no action is required.
"There was no impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event as the offsite response capabilities remain functional. The site is operating normally with no emergency conditions present.
"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), as an inadvertent activation of emergency response sirens and news release.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52369
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MANU SIVARAMAN
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MANU SIVARAMAN
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 11/16/2016
Notification Time: 17:13 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2016
Event Time: 10:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2016
Notification Time: 17:13 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2016
Event Time: 10:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BRICE BICKETT (R1DO)
BRICE BICKETT (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FAILURE OF UNIT 2 B ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM BUS SYNC SELECTOR SWITCH
"On November 16, 2016 at 1045 [EST], Unit 2 B ESS [Engineered Safeguards System] Bus Sync Selector switch failed and was unable to be switched out of the ON position. The failure rendered all other sync selector switches associated with Emergency Diesel Generators and Off-Site supplies to the ESS buses unable to fulfill their intended function of allowing manual transfer between power supplies to the ESS buses. This resulted in the inability of Unit 1 and Unit 2 to comply with SR [Surveillance Requirements] 3.8.1.8 and 3.8.1.16 thus requiring declaration of Operating AC Sources inoperable. This condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems required to maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition, remove residual heat, control the release of radioactive material, and mitigate the consequences of an accident. Subsequent actions were taken in accordance with station procedures to remove fuses for the affected sync circuit, restoring the manual transfer function to all but the Unit 2 B ESS bus. One Emergency Diesel and one offsite source remain inoperable with the fuses removed.
"At no time were any ESS buses disconnected from offsite power. All ESS buses remained capable of being automatically energized from their respective emergency diesel in an emergency."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On November 16, 2016 at 1045 [EST], Unit 2 B ESS [Engineered Safeguards System] Bus Sync Selector switch failed and was unable to be switched out of the ON position. The failure rendered all other sync selector switches associated with Emergency Diesel Generators and Off-Site supplies to the ESS buses unable to fulfill their intended function of allowing manual transfer between power supplies to the ESS buses. This resulted in the inability of Unit 1 and Unit 2 to comply with SR [Surveillance Requirements] 3.8.1.8 and 3.8.1.16 thus requiring declaration of Operating AC Sources inoperable. This condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems required to maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition, remove residual heat, control the release of radioactive material, and mitigate the consequences of an accident. Subsequent actions were taken in accordance with station procedures to remove fuses for the affected sync circuit, restoring the manual transfer function to all but the Unit 2 B ESS bus. One Emergency Diesel and one offsite source remain inoperable with the fuses removed.
"At no time were any ESS buses disconnected from offsite power. All ESS buses remained capable of being automatically energized from their respective emergency diesel in an emergency."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52370
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RICK GALLAGHER
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RICK GALLAGHER
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 11/16/2016
Notification Time: 18:22 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2016
Event Time: 11:05 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2016
Notification Time: 18:22 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2016
Event Time: 11:05 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 0 | Startup | 0 | Startup |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"At 1105 CST on Wednesday, November 16th, 2016, the Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS) Technical Support Center (TSC) Emergency Ventilation System was emergently declared inoperable due to an unplanned loss of the pneumatic air supply compressor. The loss of the air compressor resulted in the emergency air filtration unit flow control damper failing to the full open position. In this condition, the emergency air filtration unit could exceed the max flow rate of 1100 SCFM and the max differential pressure of 6 inches H2O at rated flow rate resulting in degraded performance. This results in a potential loss of protective action function provided by the emergency ventilation filtration system and could impede the ability to perform Emergency Assessments should a radiological emergency event occur requiring the system to be in service.
"Actions are being taken to repair the pneumatic air system to restore functionality of the TSC ventilation system. In the interim, contingency actions are being developed to manually control the emergency air filtration unit flow control damper in a degraded condition. In the event that ventilation cannot be restored, Station Procedures provide guidance to relocate the TSC to an alternate facility. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).'"
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM ADAM SCHUERMAN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 0812 EST ON 11/17/16 * * *
The pneumatic air supply compressor has been repaired and tested satisfactorily. The Technical Support Center is now considered operable.
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Peterson).
"At 1105 CST on Wednesday, November 16th, 2016, the Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS) Technical Support Center (TSC) Emergency Ventilation System was emergently declared inoperable due to an unplanned loss of the pneumatic air supply compressor. The loss of the air compressor resulted in the emergency air filtration unit flow control damper failing to the full open position. In this condition, the emergency air filtration unit could exceed the max flow rate of 1100 SCFM and the max differential pressure of 6 inches H2O at rated flow rate resulting in degraded performance. This results in a potential loss of protective action function provided by the emergency ventilation filtration system and could impede the ability to perform Emergency Assessments should a radiological emergency event occur requiring the system to be in service.
"Actions are being taken to repair the pneumatic air system to restore functionality of the TSC ventilation system. In the interim, contingency actions are being developed to manually control the emergency air filtration unit flow control damper in a degraded condition. In the event that ventilation cannot be restored, Station Procedures provide guidance to relocate the TSC to an alternate facility. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).'"
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM ADAM SCHUERMAN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 0812 EST ON 11/17/16 * * *
The pneumatic air supply compressor has been repaired and tested satisfactorily. The Technical Support Center is now considered operable.
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Peterson).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52371
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRET DAVIS
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRET DAVIS
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 11/16/2016
Notification Time: 23:39 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2016
Event Time: 21:09 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2016
Notification Time: 23:39 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2016
Event Time: 21:09 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR STARTED ON VALID UNDERVOLTAGE SIGNAL
"While in Mode 5, power from the switchyard east bus was lost. AC Emergency Bus NB01 is fed from east or west buses through [breakers] 345-80 or 345-90. Both breakers tripped. The 'A' train emergency diesel generator started on the undervoltage signal and powered NB01. All other systems functioned normally including the Shutdown Sequencer. Shutdown cooling was being provided by train 'B' RHR [residual heat removal] and was uninterrupted.
"Initial reports are that the #6 transformer brought in an air/gas trouble alarm.
"The plant is still in Mode 5. The 'A' emergency diesel generator is supplying power to NB01. The switchyard west bus and NB02 remain stable. Transmission reports that the grid is stable.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
"While in Mode 5, power from the switchyard east bus was lost. AC Emergency Bus NB01 is fed from east or west buses through [breakers] 345-80 or 345-90. Both breakers tripped. The 'A' train emergency diesel generator started on the undervoltage signal and powered NB01. All other systems functioned normally including the Shutdown Sequencer. Shutdown cooling was being provided by train 'B' RHR [residual heat removal] and was uninterrupted.
"Initial reports are that the #6 transformer brought in an air/gas trouble alarm.
"The plant is still in Mode 5. The 'A' emergency diesel generator is supplying power to NB01. The switchyard west bus and NB02 remain stable. Transmission reports that the grid is stable.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 52372
Rep Org: U.S. NAVY
Licensee: U.S. NAVY
Region: 1
City: WEST BETHESDA State: MD
County:
License #: 45-23645-01NA
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CAPTAIN DOUG FLETCHER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Licensee: U.S. NAVY
Region: 1
City: WEST BETHESDA State: MD
County:
License #: 45-23645-01NA
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CAPTAIN DOUG FLETCHER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 11/17/2016
Notification Time: 10:56 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2016
Event Time: 15:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2016
Notification Time: 10:56 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2016
Event Time: 15:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
BRICE BICKETT (R1DO)
PART 21 MATERIALS (EMAI)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
BRICE BICKETT (R1DO)
PART 21 MATERIALS (EMAI)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
PART 21 - NOTIFICATION OF DEFECT - IRRADIATOR MALFUNCTION
The following is excerpted from an email/fax received from the U.S. Navy, Radiological Controls Office:
An irradiator located as Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock on 16 November [2016] at approximately 1500 [EST] malfunctioned.
During routine use of the JLS 81-20 self-shielded irradiator (Co-60 source with all attenuators 1000, 100, 10, 1, 2, in place) the device did not terminate the shot at the end of the exposure period. The end-user attempted to use the emergency stop at the control panel, which did not work as intended. The panel displayed the source was in "MOVEMENT" status for approximately 70 minutes.
No injuries or overexposures occurred, there seems to be an operational issue with the irradiator source moving from an exposed position to the shielded position, which Carderock is taking steps to correct. They have verified the source returned to the shielded position and have placed the calibrator out of commission until maintenance can be performed.
The licensee has notified the NRC Project Manager (Seeley).
The following is excerpted from an email/fax received from the U.S. Navy, Radiological Controls Office:
An irradiator located as Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock on 16 November [2016] at approximately 1500 [EST] malfunctioned.
During routine use of the JLS 81-20 self-shielded irradiator (Co-60 source with all attenuators 1000, 100, 10, 1, 2, in place) the device did not terminate the shot at the end of the exposure period. The end-user attempted to use the emergency stop at the control panel, which did not work as intended. The panel displayed the source was in "MOVEMENT" status for approximately 70 minutes.
No injuries or overexposures occurred, there seems to be an operational issue with the irradiator source moving from an exposed position to the shielded position, which Carderock is taking steps to correct. They have verified the source returned to the shielded position and have placed the calibrator out of commission until maintenance can be performed.
The licensee has notified the NRC Project Manager (Seeley).
Agreement State
Event Number: 52373
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: INEOS USA LLC
Region: 4
City: ALVIN State: TX
County:
License #: L01422
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Licensee: INEOS USA LLC
Region: 4
City: ALVIN State: TX
County:
License #: L01422
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 11/17/2016
Notification Time: 14:07 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2016
Event Time: 14:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2016
Notification Time: 14:07 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2016
Event Time: 14:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER ON FIXED NUCLEAR GAUGE
The following was excerpted from information received from the Texas Department of State Health Services by email:
"On November 17, 2016, the licensee notified the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that on November 16, 2016 at approximately 1400 CST, during its semi-annual fixed nuclear gauge inspection [at Chocolate Bayou Works], it had discovered that the shutter mechanism on an Ohmart Model SHLM-BR-2, which contains a 1,000 millicurie cesium-137 source (SN: 2807CG), had become inoperable. The licensee's radiation safety officer reported the source could be moved up/down inside the source tube, but it could not be retracted into the housing. He suspects there is an issue with the positioning of the pin that holds the 2-piece source rod together. Repairs are scheduled to be completed during an operations shut-down in January/February 2017. The source is in its normal operating position and there is no risk of exposure to any individual due to its location."
Texas Incident #: I-9441
The following was excerpted from information received from the Texas Department of State Health Services by email:
"On November 17, 2016, the licensee notified the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that on November 16, 2016 at approximately 1400 CST, during its semi-annual fixed nuclear gauge inspection [at Chocolate Bayou Works], it had discovered that the shutter mechanism on an Ohmart Model SHLM-BR-2, which contains a 1,000 millicurie cesium-137 source (SN: 2807CG), had become inoperable. The licensee's radiation safety officer reported the source could be moved up/down inside the source tube, but it could not be retracted into the housing. He suspects there is an issue with the positioning of the pin that holds the 2-piece source rod together. Repairs are scheduled to be completed during an operations shut-down in January/February 2017. The source is in its normal operating position and there is no risk of exposure to any individual due to its location."
Texas Incident #: I-9441
Agreement State
Event Number: 52464
Rep Org: GEORGIA RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PGM
Licensee: VALMET, INC.
Region: 1
City: DULUTH State: GA
County:
License #: GA 458-3
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MONICA JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Licensee: VALMET, INC.
Region: 1
City: DULUTH State: GA
County:
License #: GA 458-3
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MONICA JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 12/29/2016
Notification Time: 07:55 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/29/2016
Notification Time: 07:55 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/29/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JON LILLIENDAHL (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
JON LILLIENDAHL (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
AGREEMENT STATE - LEAKING GENERAL LICENSED KR-85 SOURCE
The following information was received from the State of Georgia via email:
"Valmet was recently notified by one of their customers [WestRock MWV, LLC, Evadale, TX] regarding a leaking Kr-85 source in one of their general licensed [GL] devices that Valmet had supplied them a year or so ago. [Valmet personnel] retrieved the source and found that it was a slow leaker, and that it needed to be returned to the manufacturer. Valmet exchanged the source in the device and brought the faulty source back to Valmet's office to be returned to the manufacturer. The mill began to suspect a leaking source because of the operating parameters of the equipment. Valmet believes there were no exposures or ingestions of radioactive material, and will have the source returned to the manufacturer soon after the holidays when people are back to work. We expect them to let [the Georgia Radioactive Materials Program] know what the cause of the leak might be."
Facility where event occurred: WestRock MWV, LLC, 1913 FM 105, Evadale, TX 77615 - PM4 reel
Service Company: Valmet, Inc. 242225 Commerce Ave., Suite 100, Duluth, GA 30096
Source manufacturer: QSA Global, GL Device SS&D NR-0596-D-113-G Serial # 50048138, current activity 380 mCi of Kr-85
The following information was received from the State of Georgia via email:
"Valmet was recently notified by one of their customers [WestRock MWV, LLC, Evadale, TX] regarding a leaking Kr-85 source in one of their general licensed [GL] devices that Valmet had supplied them a year or so ago. [Valmet personnel] retrieved the source and found that it was a slow leaker, and that it needed to be returned to the manufacturer. Valmet exchanged the source in the device and brought the faulty source back to Valmet's office to be returned to the manufacturer. The mill began to suspect a leaking source because of the operating parameters of the equipment. Valmet believes there were no exposures or ingestions of radioactive material, and will have the source returned to the manufacturer soon after the holidays when people are back to work. We expect them to let [the Georgia Radioactive Materials Program] know what the cause of the leak might be."
Facility where event occurred: WestRock MWV, LLC, 1913 FM 105, Evadale, TX 77615 - PM4 reel
Service Company: Valmet, Inc. 242225 Commerce Ave., Suite 100, Duluth, GA 30096
Source manufacturer: QSA Global, GL Device SS&D NR-0596-D-113-G Serial # 50048138, current activity 380 mCi of Kr-85