Event Notification Report for October 28, 2016

SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE

"At 0851 [EDT] on October 28, 2016, Division 1 RHR was started in shutdown cooling (SDC) mode of operation. Prior to starting the RHR system, the Alternate Decay Heat Removal (ADHR) system was maintaining RPV and Spent Fuel Pool temperature.

"At 0924 on October 28, 2016, RHR [pump A] tripped due to RHR-MOV-17 (SDC suction valve) closing. This is considered to be an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function, and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). RHR SDC subsystem A was declared inoperable. CNS [Cooper Nuclear Station] entered LCO 3.9.7, Condition A - Required Action A.1: Verify an alternate method of decay heat removal is available within 1 hour and once per 24 hours thereafter; Condition C - Required Action C.1: Verify reactor coolant circulation by an alternate method within 1 hour from discovery of no reactor coolant circulation and once per 12 hours thereafter, and Required Action C.2: Monitor reactor coolant temperature hourly. All LCO conditions specified have been met.

"ADHR remained in service throughout the event and the plant remained aligned for natural circulation. Spent fuel pool weir temperature monitoring was commenced to verify natural circulation. No increase in RPV [reactor pressure vessel] temperature has been observed. There was no impact to plant operations.

"Initial investigation indicates that installation of PCIS relay K27 during a maintenance activity physically agitated the adjacent relay, K30, which actuated and caused RHR-MOV-17 to close.

"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been informed."

UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO FIRE BARRIER/HELB DOOR INOPERABLE

The licensee reported an unanalyzed condition under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) due to a fire barrier/HELB (high energy line break) door being inoperable during maintenance. This resulted in two of five safe shutdown panels to be declared inoperable.

The door, located between the Turbine and Administrative Buildings, was opened for approximately two minutes for 'tool pouch work'. When Operations discovered the door was opened for maintenance, they declared the door inoperable until Operations performed the surveillance required to declare the door operable. The total time the door was inoperable was approximately 1 hour and 11 minutes.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION AT 1642 EST ON 12/27/2016 FROM DUSTIN SCURLOCK TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The condition reported in ENS 52329 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) has been evaluated, and determined not to be an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety.

"NRC Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2001-09, 'Control of Hazard Barriers,' allows breaching of HELB barriers, provided the risk associated with the applicable maintenance activity is assessed and managed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) of the Maintenance Rule. The hazard barrier controls procedure at JAF [James A. Fitzpatrick] is consistent with this guidance, and includes compensatory measures for opening of the subject HELB door (76FDR-A-272-26). Per the JAF hazard barrier controls procedure the secondary HELB doors are to be verified operable, and the Alternate Shutdown Panels 25ASP-4 and 25ASP-5 declared inoperable.

"Based on a review of previous performances of ST-76Y, Fire Door Inspection and Operability Test, and the JAF Paperless Condition Reporting System, all applicable secondary HELB doors were operable prior to and during the 'tool pouch work' on 76FDR-A-272-26. JAF TS LCO 3.3.3.2, Remote Shutdown System (RSS), stipulates a completion time of thirty days to restore one or more required remote shutdown functions to operable. The duration of the 'tool pouch work' and inoperability of 76FDR-A-272-26 is well within this thirty day allowed outage time. In addition, the Alternate Shutdown Panels that were rendered inoperable by this condition are not required for mitigation of a HELB, and steam line break accidents are not discussed in the Technical Specification (TS) Bases for the Remote Shutdown System."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R1DO (Lilliendahl).

COLORADO AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PANORAMIC IRRADIATOR DISABLED DUE TO STUCK SAMPLE DRAWER

"The Department [Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment] was notified via phone on 10/28/16 at 1309 MDT by the Radiation Safety Officer [RSO] of Colorado State University (license # CO 002-19) that an irradiator room with a panoramic irradiator (J.L. Shepherd and Associates Model 81-14A irradiator, Cs-137 sealed source, 6000 Ci at 11/01/1976) has been disabled. The reason to disable the irradiator is because the sample drawer is stuck. The licensee reports the source is [apparently] fully in the shielded position because: the incident occurred before operating the irradiator, Primalert monitors are not alarming, and surveys do not suggest the source is exposed.

"At approximately 1217 MDT, the licensee was to perform a monthly check of the safety system. It was a normal entry into the irradiator room. The irradiator source was not exposed. The licensee checked the operation of the sample drawer and it was found to be stuck, and cannot be opened. The sample drawer is to be used to place a sample into the housing closer to the source for irradiation. The irradiator source was not moved at any point. The RSO was then notified.

"The keys to the irradiator room are currently secured in a locked box where no authorized operators to the irradiator can access. An e-mail was sent out to authorized operators that the irradiator is out of service. The RSO will be contacting J.L. Shepard & Associates on Monday 10/31/16 for service options. The Department will be notified on Monday 10/31/16 after J.L. Shepard & Associates communication."

Colorado Event Report ID No.: CO16-I16-27

STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION NOT MET

"On October 28, 2016, at 1500 EDT, the Standby Liquid Control system was declared inoperable. Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.1.7 Condition B was entered due to sodium pentaborate concentration not within limits.

"Standby Liquid Control sodium pentaborate concentration was found to be low outside of the acceptable region following a Standby Liquid Control system tank high level alarm in the Main Control Room. Sodium pentaborate was added to the Standby Liquid Control tank by chemistry personnel and the concentration was then verified to be acceptable. Standby Liquid Control was declared Operable on 10/28/16 at 1935 EDT. The cause of the out-of-acceptable concentration was due to make-up water leaking by a closed valve. [The licensee cycled this valve and closed an upstream valve.]

"Declaring the Standby Liquid Control system inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), (C), and (D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of a system needed to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, control the release of radioactive material, and mitigate the consequences of an accident."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PROCESS GAUGE SHUTTER FAILS TO CLOSE

The following report was received via e-mail:

"On 10/28/2016, GA-PAC [Georgia Pacific] was shutting down this process to perform routine annual maintenance. In the process of securing the radiation sources from becoming a radiation exposure hazard, it was discovered that the gauge shutter would not close.

"GA-PAC called a service contractor, BBP Sales, to evaluate the situation and determine the best course of action to correct the problem. [BBP Sales] was unable to close the shutter and determined the source holder would have to be replaced. Further evaluation determined one of the pins holding the shutter had sheared off and would have to be replaced, not repaired.

"The sources and device with shutter failure will remain installed until the replacement source and device are received. The failed device will be sent for disposal when replaced. This is not a radiation exposure hazard and does not pose a health and safety situation for the GA-PAC employees or the general public.

"The gauge is a RONAN C-10 device/source holder, S/N 9830GG, loaded with a 2,000 mCi Cs-137 source. The manufacturing date was 1994.

"This event is considered to be closed by LDEQ. This event is being reported to the NRC as required by Regulatory Requirement 10 CFR Part 30.50(b)(2)."

Louisiana Event: LA-160016

INVALID ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

"This telephone notification is being made in lieu of a Licensee Event Report in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(1) to notify the NRC of on invalid actuation of a group isolation, reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

"On October 28, at 0139 Central Daylight Time, electricians were removing a test jack from a terminal on a primary containment isolation system relay due to the test jack being installed on the wrong relay. During removal of the test jack, a neutral wire came out of the terminal causing multiple relay actuations resulting in a half Group 2 isolation signal on the Division 2 side. Because of the plant being in Mode 5, refueling, the only isolation valves that closed because of the invalid isolation signal were the Division 2 isolation valves associated with the drywell ventilation monitor and the drywell floor and equipment sumps.

"The specific train and system actuated was the Primary Containment Isolation System [PCIS] Division 2 portion of the Group 2 isolation circuit (i.e. half group isolation). This was a partial actuation affecting only half of the logic and causing isolation of two systems. Based on the inadvertent actuation of the affected PCIS relays, the system isolated and functioned as expected. The isolation signal was reset at 0230 and the affected systems restored to service."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

PART-21 NOTIFICATION - WILLFUL MISCONDUCT AND FALSIFICATION OF RECORDS

The following report was excerpted from an e-mail:

"On September 28th, System One received an email from Curtis Wright that a 'forged' VT-1, 2, 3 Level II training record was being circulated by [an individual], who was seeking employment with Applied Technical Services.

"On September 28th 2016, System One voided the certification of [the individual] and proceeded to address the condition under the nonconformance reporting process.

"On October 11th, 2016, System One determined that [the individual], who was certified in VT-1, 2, 3 by the System One Quality Assurance Manager, did not fully meet the certification requirements of the System One Written Practice under CP-199 (in effect at the time) due to lack of acceptable VT [visual testing] Training (40 hours of required class room training) to support the VT-1, VT-2 and VT-3 certification issued by System One. A review of the original certification record found/confirmed there was indication of alteration on a training record used for the original certification.

"On October 28th, 2016, System One notified stakeholders (AREVA NP). [The individual was deployed to Areva on two occasions] based upon holding VT-1, 2, 3 certification.
AREVA NP - deployed in 10/7/2012 to Cooper with VT-1, 2, 3 Certification
AREVA NP - deployed in 3/31/2013 to DC Cook with VT-1, 2, 3 Certification
Carolina Energy Services - deployed in 8/23/2013 - certification conducted by CES not System One LLC.
AREVA NP - deployed in 10/27/2013 to Palo Verde with PT Level II and QC Mechanical (not deployed for VT-1, 2, 3)

"AREVA NP has informed System One that they have conducted/completed their extent of condition review regarding work performed by [the individual], and confirmed to System One, that [the individual] did not perform any safety related VT-1, 2, 3 work at either the D. C. Cook or Cooper facilities.

"Our internal investigation has determined this matter does not represent a breakdown in the mechanics of the System One Quality Assurance Program or procedures in effect at the time. We have established the event represents willful misconduct and the falsification of a record by an individual, and use of such forged record, under 10 CFR references contained in US NRC Information Notice 2013-15."

* * * UPDATE ON 3/28/17 BY BETHANY CECERE * * *

System One determined that the individual who had been deployed to the various sites referenced, did not falsify the certification documents in question.

Notified R1DO (Cook), R3DO (Cameron), R4DO (Hipschman), and Part 21/50.55 Reactors Group by email.